Hi everyone,

This week’s speaker in the University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar Series is 
Mark Alfano (Macquarie University).

The title of Mark’s talk is “Trust from mistrust”. The full abstract for Mark’s 
talk is included below.

The talk will take place on Wednesday the 19th of April at 3:30 p.m. in the 
Philosophy Seminar Room (N494) in the Quadrangle and will be simulcast via 
Zoom: https://uni-sydney.zoom.us/j/88699564848.

The talk will be followed by drinks and informal discussion at the Rose. All 
welcome!

Enquiries about the seminar series can be directed to 
ryan....@sydney.edu.au<mailto:ryan....@sydney.edu.au>

Ryan Cox
Associate Lecturer in Philosophy
Discipline of Philosophy
School of Humanities
University of Sydney
ryan....@sydney.edu.au<mailto:ryan....@sydney.edu.au>

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Title: Trust from mistrust
Speaker: Mark Alfano (Macquarie University).
Abstract:

Nietzsche poses the question, “How could anything originate out of its 
opposite? Truth from error, for instance? Or the will to truth from the will to 
deception?” (BGE 2) He suggests that many people cannot bring themselves to 
accept that things of great value might be “derived from this ephemeral, 
seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and 
desire.” But, he contends, possibly “whatever gives value to those good and 
honorable things has an incriminating link, bond, or tie to the very things 
that look like their evil opposites.”

Nietzsche’s interest in the origins of epistemic values in their opposites 
dates back to HH AOM 215, where he attempts to trace the “integrity of the 
republic of the learned” to patterns of trust and mistrust among scientists. He 
claims that scientific progress is made possible because “the individual is not 
obliged to be too mistrustful in the testing of every account and assertion 
made by others in domains in which he is a relative stranger,” but that this 
trustingness is licensed by the fact that “in his own field everyone must have 
rivals who are extremely mistrustful and are accustomed to observe him very 
closely.” The looming presence of these rivals makes it unrewarding and 
unappealing to engage in fraud or sloppy reasoning. And when scientists engage 
in questionable research practices under such conditions, they are liable to be 
caught and corrected.

Though he was writing before the era of modern peer review, Nietzsche 
anticipated some of its structural features. In this paper, I offer a more 
detailed account of the origins of warranted trust in systems and psychologies 
that cultivate mistrust. I contend that trust in experts by laypeople resembles 
trust in scientists by other scientists, and that more attention needs to be 
paid to the geometry of networks of trust and mistrust. I go on to characterize 
several ways to improve such networks through strategic (global) and tactical 
(individual) rewiring, as well the disposition to adopt more or less trusting 
attitudes depending on the group one finds oneself in. Thus, I adopt a 
role-based virtue epistemology modeled on Astola (2021), who argues for the 
importance of what might be seen as a vicious role when one’s group lacks the 
mistrust that makes trust reasonable. Or, as Nietzsche puts it in BGE 34, “As 
the creature who has been the biggest dupe the earth has ever seen, the 
philosopher pretty much has a right to a ‘bad character.’ It is his duty to be 
suspicious, to squint as maliciously as possible out of every abyss of 
mistrust.”

I conclude by presenting empirical evidence (n=989) that people who report a 
disposition to adopt this gadfly role are more likely to reject medical 
misinformation and unwarranted conspiracy theories, more likely to accept sound 
medical information warranted conspiracy theories, more likely to perform well 
on tests of numeracy, cognitive reflection, and intelligence, and more likely 
to correct their own errors in light of social feedback.
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