On Wed, Sep 28, 2022 at 10:33:40AM +0200, Sergio Lopez wrote: > On Tue, Sep 27, 2022 at 04:14:20PM -0400, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 27, 2022 at 01:51:41PM -0400, Colin Walters wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 27, 2022, at 1:27 PM, German Maglione wrote: > > > > > > > >> > Now all the development has moved to rust virtiofsd. > > > > > > Oh, awesome!! The code there looks great. > > > > > > > I could work on this for the next major version and see if anything > > > > breaks. > > > > But I prefer to add this as a compilation feature, instead of a command > > > > line > > > > option that we will then have to maintain for a while. > > > > > > Hmm, what would be the issue with having the code there by default? I > > > think rather than any new command line option, we automatically use > > > `openat2+RESOLVE_IN_ROOT` if the process is run as a nonzero uid. > > > > > > > Also, I don't see it as a sandbox feature, as Stefan mentioned, a > > > > compromised > > > > process can call openat2() without RESOLVE_IN_ROOT. > > > > > > I'm a bit skeptical honestly about how secure the existing namespace code > > > is against a compromised virtiofsd process. The primary worry is guest > > > filesystem traversals, right? openat2+RESOLVE_IN_ROOT addresses that. > > > Plus being in Rust makes this dramatically safer. > > > > > > > I did some test with > > > > Landlock to lock virtiofsd inside the shared directory, but IIRC it > > > > requires a > > > > kernel 5.13 > > > > > > But yes, landlock and other things make sense, I just don't see these > > > things as strongly linked. IOW we shouldn't in my opinion block > > > unprivileged virtiofsd on more sandboxing than openat2 already gives us. > > > > I think openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) support should be added unless there is > > another unprivileged mechanism that is stronger. > > > > The security implications need to be covered in the user documentation > > so people can decide whether using this mode is appropriate. > > > > We should continue to explain the difference between a voluntary > > mechanism like openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) and a mandatory mechanism like > > mount namespaces with pivot_root(2). Rust programs are not immune to > > arbitrary code execution, but it's less likely than with a C program. > > I agree. Perhaps we could modify the "none" sandbox mode to use > openat2, if available, and add an "openat2" mode which does basically > the same thing, but bailing out if openat2 is not available.
Sounds reasonable. In fact, we could probably do someting similar for "landlock" as well. Vivek > > And explain this clearly in the docs, of course. > > Sergio. _______________________________________________ Virtio-fs mailing list Virtio-fs@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
