At 7:58 PM +1200 7/20/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
At 2:45 AM +1200 7/20/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
|From a security point of view, this is really bad. From a
usability point of
|view, it's necessary.
As you can see from my list of proposed solutions, I disagree. I see no
reason not to to alert a user *who has removed a root* that you are about to
put it back in.
It depends on what you mean by "user". You're assuming that direct action by
the wetware behind the keyboard resulted in its removal.
Correct, I was.
However given how
obscure and well-hidden this capability is, it's more likely that a user agent
acting with the user's rights caused the problem. So the message you end up
communicating to the user is:
"Something you've never heard of before has changed a setting you've never
heard of before that affects the operation of something you've never heard
of before and probably wouldn't understand no matter how patiently we
explain it".
(those things are, in order "some application or script", "the cert trust
setting", "certificates", and "PKI").
Very good point.
Bigger picture takeaway: when both a user and an application can
change a crypto setting in an application (or OS), any later messages
relating to that event are likely to be confusing because they can't
be directly linked to the action. This applies to all of our
crypto-in-the-real-world, not just the trust anchor issue at hand.
--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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