On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 09:05:41AM -0700, The IESG <iesg-secret...@ietf.org> wrote a message of 51 lines which said:
> The IESG has received a request from the Domain Name System Operations WG > (dnsop) to consider the following document: - 'Message Digest for DNS Zones' > <draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-zone-digest-09.txt> as Proposed Standard This is not really part of the Last Call (I have no problem with the document in its current form), it's more about two "philosophical" questions I have about zone digests. One is small: the draft claims "a name server loading saved zone data upon restart cannot guarantee that the on-disk data has not been modified". This argument seems weak. Can we really imagine attacks where the attacker can modify the zone file on the disk, but cannot modify the verifier, for instance its code, or its trust anchors? The other is more complicated. The draft says "Unfortunately, the protections [TLS, SSH, etc] provided by these channel security techniques are (in practice) ephemeral and are not retained after the data transfer is complete. [they] not provide any methods to verify data that is read after transmission is complete." In the DNSSEC cas, zone digest provide such a method but only for a time. Once the keys are rolled over, the verification is no longer possible. Since most (all?) DNSSEC tools assume they can delete a key once the RRSIG which use it have been removed from all caches, you can have a zone file whose signatures are still valid (not expired) but the DS and/or keys are no longer available online. Unless I'm wrong, this limit is not mentioned. (Not sure it is important in practice, as I said, it is more a philosophical question.) _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
