On 18 Sep 2014, at 02:27, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 03:30:55PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Sep 2014, at 05:46, Russell Standish wrote:
I tend to think that thermostat are not conscious. They are not
universal.
So adding a universal machine to a thermostat makes it conscious?
That action is better described as adding a thermostat to a universal
machine, and it might (or not) give to universal machine the ability
to incarnate a consciousness capable of differentiating between some
temperature. If you add the goal: avoid the too much cold, and the too
much hot, you get closer to making the machine capable of having an
experience of cold and hot.
The
Nest smart sensors are conscious? Forgive my chortle.
...
I agree that to have awareness, you need a self, a third person
self. But that is well played by the relative body (actually
bodies,
incarnate through the UD).
Maybe we should define consciousness by self-awareness, and then
self-consciousness would be the higher form of self-self-awareness?
That makes one "self" per reflexive loop.
What's the distinction?
Between what? Consciousness (self-awareness) needs, as you say, a
self. Self-consciousness (self-self-awareness) needs not only a
self, but an awareness that there is a self. The distinction is that
in the first case we don't have Kp -> KKp. It is the difference
between universal and Löbian, or between Robinson Arithmetic (RA)
and Peano Arithmetic (PA). technically, universality implies the
existence of one reflexive loop, and Löbianity gives the cognitive
faculty of being able to know our own universality.
OK - you've clarified your terminology, but I think it is nonstandard.
I invented only in that post, and just to assess your idea that
awareness needs some notion of self.
Self-aware means "aware of your self".
Hmm... It is a bit ambiguous, because that awareness can be implicit,
like I assume for the consciousness of a worm, or explicit, which I
assume for more complex animals.
How do you distinguish awareness from self-awareness?
One could say self-conscious as being "conscious of your self", except
that I don't think there is any distinction in meaning between
awareness and consciousness.
BTW - conceptually, I don't see any inherent reason why a self is
needed just to be aware (or conscious), except that a self is a bloody
useful thing, evolutionarily speaking - helps the immune system stop
parasites and pathogens, for example - also helps you stop injuring
your body (see what happens to people who lose their sense of touch,
or their proprioception or nociception (pain)).
The 3p self is the body, or the Gödel number of that body. It is what
the doctor will put on the hard disk, and a program can refer to
itself in that sense through the Dx = "xx" method. It is captured by
the modal box of the modal logic of self-reference. That self is not
"conscious". It can only manifest your 1p-self (closer to
consciousness) when in company of God (truth). But then it lost his
name, and is not really a machine.
I address this in the paper.
But my comment sum up where I disagree. I will comment more
precisely when I have more times.
What you go on to say that consciousness
C (ie the consciousness attached to body C, which is in B)
supervenes
on B+A, which is correct.
OK, so you agree that Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice's
body + Bob's body + the room + the entire universe + the entire UD*.
OK?
But my point is that consciousness itself
(not necessarily attached to a particular body or person)
You mean the existence of consciousness?
is not
supervenient on B+A in this case, as the consciousness could be a
C or
a D (where D supervenes on A).
?
I agree, (assuming always some neuro-assumption to make things
simple) that Alice's consciousness does not supervene on Bob's brain
activity, but it does supervenes on Alice + Bob brains activities.
Where this matters is that one cannot say consciousness supervenes
on
the universal dovetailer.
I really don't see this. That contradict the fact that if A
supervenes on B, it supervenes on A+B.
If Alice consciousness supervenes on say one computation in the UD*,
it supervenes on that computation + all the others.
The computation here is the UD. If Alice experiences a different
thought, then the UD does not change, as the UD calculates that
experience too. Consequently, Alice's consciousness cannot supervene
on the UD itself. Only on some computations that the UD executes.
To change Alice consciousness "here and now" you need to change the UD*.
The fact that is is impossible does not change the fact that Alice
consciousness supervenes on the UD*.
Assuming COMP, of course.
Of course, and some high level of substitution.
Maybe the classroom analogy is not clearly enough expressed, because
you still say Alice's consciousness, not consciousness (in general)
What is "consciousness (in general)"? Is it the existence of
consciousness? In this case I would say something like "consciousness
in general supervenes on computations and truth". Consciousness is
first person. It is more related to some "[]p & p" or "[]p & <>p" (&
p), than to any 3p "[]p".
Even for p sigma_1 (even on p sigma_0) we don't have, from the
machine's point of view, that p <-> []p. We do have p -> []p, but the
reciprocal []p -> p is only true in G* minus G, so machines can't
believe in it "rationally", only guess it instinctively, and with the
development of self-reflexion, this will look weird for her. The
conjunction with truth makes consciousness, awareness, knowledge, into
non propositional attitudes. Most of the machine's first person
knowledge is non representational. It is not in the brain, it is in
the relation between the brain and the whole (sigma_1, or more) truth.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
(http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
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