On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> >> >>> >>> Do you take the same position with regard to many-worlds style splitting >>> experiments? >>> >> >> >> >> >> No. >> >> Everett's Many Worlds >> contains no ambiguity but Bruno's thought experiment >> has nothing but ambiguity >> . >> In Many Worlds the word "you" causes no problems, if duplicating >> chambers haven't been invented yet then "you" is the only chunk of matter >> that the laws of physics allow John Clark to observe that are arranged in a >> Terren >> s >> uydam >> ian way. There is no ambiguity, everything is clear as a bell. B >> ut in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of >> the duplicating machine >> who looks like >> Terren Suydam >> >> and a >> n >> identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and >> they both >> passionately >> insist that they are >> Terren Suydam >> and both >> have a equal right to use the grand title "you". >> > > > > I'm not sure there's a difference there that makes a difference. > In one case the meaning of the question "what will *you* see" is guaranteed to be perfectly clear by the very laws of physics, in the other case the question is complete gibberish. And that's a difference that makes no difference?! > > > The only difference is that in the Many Worlds scenario, the two Terren > Suydams have no possibility of interacting. > And in one case the laws of physics ensure that a third party experimenter can only interact with one Terren Suydam, and in the other case a third party experimenter can interact with an unlimited number of Terren Suydams; and thus in one case the word "you" has a meaning and in one case it does not. > > > Otherwise, everything else is the same. > Other than that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play? > > > I don't see what problem the possibility for interaction, or not, poses on > the question of "which continuation will I find myself in and with what > probability?" > If duplicating chambers are used then the above is not a question at all, it's just a sequence of unrelated words with a question mark at the end. To become meaningful it would have to be changed to "which continuation will Terren Suydam find Terren Suydam in and with and in what probability?" And the answer would be " Terren Suydam will find Terren Suydam in both continuations with 100% probability because Terren Suydam has been duplicated". >> >> Another difference is that Bruno and Everett are trying to explain >> different things. Everett's Many Worlds Theory is trying to make >> predictions and explain why they are probabilistic, and in that he was >> successful. In contrast Bruno wants to cast insight on the nature of >> consciousness, but predictions have nothing to do with the sense of >> personal identity, not good predictions, not bad predictions, and not >> probabilistic predictions. So Everett accomplished what he set out to do >> but Bruno did not. >> > > > > Bruno's not talking about first-person-indeterminacy (FPI) as a means to > explain personal identity. It's a key part of the explanation that > computationalism implies that physics is not fundamental. > First-person-indeterminacy is just another way of saying that the Moscow Man will turn out to be the man who sees Moscow. Bruno thinks this fact signifies great profundity, but for me not so much. > > > The point is that understanding the role of consciousness in Bruno's > argument depends on understanding the FPI. > No problem, the idea is so shallow there is very little there that needs understanding. > > > Given you accept the use of pronouns in the many worlds duplication, the > problem must lie in the differences between those two scenarios. > Exactly. John K Clark > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
