On 28 Jun 2015, at 19:05, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jun 28, 2015 at 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> when describing the latest variation on the thought
experiment why not simply do away with personal pronouns like "I"
and use the referent instead?
> Because the referent are ambiguous.
Exactly, so a personal pronoun without a clear referent is used
instead to sweep this ambiguity under the rug and hope nobody
notices.
No, because when a pronoun is used, we can eliminate the ambiguity by
telling if we use the 1p or 3p sense of the person.
> The one who tell me in Helsinki that he is sure that he
will [blah blah]
AHHH! That is a perfect example right there of ambiguity in action.
Where? It is you, at the moment before duplication, when you drink
some tea in Helsinki.
Where is the ambiguity?
Bruno Marchal is unable to write more than a few dozen words about
the philosophy of personal identity without slipping in one of those
damn personal pronouns and assuming the very thing the "proof" is
supposed to establish.
Without explanation this looks gratuitous.
If John Clark is wrong about that then prove that John Clark is
wrong by simply stop using personal pronouns.
JC-H = John Clark, drinking tea when writing his prediction in his
diary, in the city of Helsinki.
He knows the protocol: he will be cut and pasted in Washington and
Moscow, and nowhere else. And this in virtue of a working comp
technology at the correct substitution level. The original body (of JC-
H) is eliminated.
JC-HM is the "John Clark" reconstituted in Moscow.
JC-HW is the "John Clark" reconstituted in Washington.
JC-H is asked about what JC-H, the living guy who believe that, thanks
to comp, he will survive such duplication, expects as personal
experience, what he expects for his personal future possible.
JC-H predicts, and writes in the personal diary: "JC-H will feel to
survive in the body of JCH_W and JC-H will feel to survive in the body
of JCH_M"].
JC-HM sees that JC-H was wrong, as JC-HM sees that he feel to survive
exclusively in the body of JC-HM, and not in the body of JC-HW, which,
as far as he *knows* might well not exist at that time.
Similarly, JC-HW sees that JC-H was wrong, as JC-HM sees he is in the
body of JC-HM, and not in the body of JC-HW.
Eventually JC-H (in the body of JC-HM and in the body of JC-HW)
understands what we were asking, and predicts correctly the next time.
I don't see the problem as we have agreed on the personal identity
issue.
We both agree that both JC-HM and JC-HW are the person JC-H, yet
implemented in the physical reality two times at once.
But of course, there is at the start an ambiguity in the sentence "JC-
H will feel to survive in the body of JCH_W and JC-H will feel to
survive in the body of JCH_M" written in the diary.
What do you write write really in the diary at Helsinki: what is your
personal experience of what will happen in your life that day?
The 1p transforms an "and" into an "or". It is "W & M" in the 3p, and
"W v M" in the 1p. When you keep in mind that the question is for your
future 1p (and that we keep in mind we assume comp).
You see paradoxes and ambiguities, where I give simple transparencies.
Indeed, obvious, once understood, as you can't avoid showing you do at
times, but then insist that it is too much obvious to take that in
consideration, and still refuse to move on step 4, why? because it is
as much obvious?
The use of pronouns made things simpler, as the things are resolved in
the 1p/ 3p distinction, not about names and pronouns.
Tell me, with or without pronoun how you estimate the chance to get a
cup of coffee in the cut and paste 2 times, in different places A and
B, but where a cup of coffee is guarantied for both reconstitution.
And what is your expectation of where you will feel to survive? What
do you write in the diary?
It is easier to use the first and third person definition: the first
person experience is what is described in the personal diaries. The
personal diaries are defined by the diaries which the teletransported
person carry, and so they are duplicated along with the duplication
machine user, entering the box.
It seems to me that you did agree that for having the confirmation, we
need to interview all the copies.
With comp, the fist things all machines say is that they have a well
defined unique experience. A simple counting or logical argument shows
that in the iterated case, most experiences, in this protocol, are
random, even algorithmically incompressible.
> The "1-I" is never ambiguous
It's like a burp, it's never anything. If a gun was placed at John
Clark's head John Clark could not coherently explain what the hell
the "1-I" is, and neither could Bruno Marchal.
For the UDA reasoning it the owner of the diary.
For AUDA it is the larger and subtler notion of intersection of truth
and locally justifiable belief.
> we have agreed that both are the Helsinki person
Yes.
> If not, you are claiming implicitly that you die at step 3.
GODDAMN PERSONAL PRONOUNS! The above is not wrong, the above is
pure unadulterated gibberish.
Just tell me what happens.
Nobody here understands your "refutation". What is your prediction
about your possible subjective future, about surviving, getting the
cup of coffee, and city to expect?
> So you agree now that the FPI problem is the same in MW and
comp,
John Clark neither agrees nor disagrees with "FPI" or "comp". John
Clark doesn't agree or disagree with a burp either.
Give me your prediction. The question is what experience anyone can
expect to live when duplicated iteratively in distinguishable
contexts, say 0 and 1.
I say that there is no ambiguity at all, and that, in this protocol,
P(0) = P(1) = 1/2 is the most reasonable assumption.
If you have another one, then please let us known.
The question is not ambiguous if you understand that you survive no
matter what, but without any magical tools making it possible to
predict the experience actually lived. It is random according to most
machines having done such experiences.
You don't listen to your futures selves. I do one half of the thought
experience.
Just a bit of effort, and we can move on step 4.
All you need is the difference between 1p and 3p, and the truth table
of "and" and "or" (& and v).
If you agree p(coffee) = 1, you are done.
I guess you know that, and it explains why you have still not answered
that question asked many times.
You seem to stop at the reasoning at the precise place where
computationalism makes precise how to pursue the reasoning.
No need either to be 100% convinced of the necessity before
understanding the plausibility of the consequences and the shape of a
different rationalist conception of reality.
Bruno
Don't be afraid of those who are ignorant.
Be afraid only of those who ignore that they are ignorant.
John K Clark
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