On 12/9/10 3:27 AM, "Alan Altmark" <alan_altm...@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>In order to achieve the savings you imply, then z/VM must move to the
>z/OS 
>model in which, except for a few specific functions, an ESM is required
>for proper operation.  NO native CP security controls beyone those
>required to restore ESM control vis a vis SYS1.UADS in order to login to
>TSO.  Any function dependent on the ESM will be configured to DENY access
>without the ESM.

That is exactly what I'm arguing for. IF VM is going to play with the big
boys in the enterprise market, it's a necessity to do this, and long
overdue. 

>You would HAVE to buy an ESM, whether from IBM or CA.

Or have IBM include a basic awful one (eg, RACF) in the price of VM and be
done with it. Including a basic one that can be replaced with Something
Else would make everybody (IMHO) happy. The internal cost of including
RACF can't be that large.

>And THAT will be acceptable only when folks wrap their heads around the
>fact that z/VM systems WITHOUT an ESM will fail a modern security audit.
>The primary example is the presence of unencrypted passwords in USER
>DIRECT.

Amen, brother. 

I think, however, the pressure will be on IBM to deliver/upgrade the base
VM to a state that *can be* acceptable.

Another area would be enabling SSL login by default (the setup process for
SSLSERV is just a royal PITA). Setting the defaults for FTP to always
negotiate SSL. Removing default read/write/multi pw from all system
minidisks. Putting a decent backup tool in place. Removing the need for
tape drives for spool management. Fixing printing in the default build to
not require channel-attached printers. Etc, etc, etc,...

There's a whole lot of things that would be a Very Good Idea to Do -- in
fact, I'd say that would be a great task for user groups over the next
year: write IBM a detailed report of What Needs To Be Done to VM Packaging
to Make It Modern and World-Class. I think that would be *extremely*
useful as 6.2 ramps up to delivery.

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