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Jyrki Soini wrote:

> I sent a comment to ICMPv6 update draft during IETF meeting 
> and received a few comments but not quite a discussion. Here is somewhat extreme
> example of the DoS attack vulnerability I'm worried about:
> 
> Imagine, one day man is landing on Mars and real-time video is
> multicasted on Internet. There are 100 million listeners on the
> group.

I like this idea, especially the part where 100 million users
are using IPv6 ;)

<SNIP

> I see two alternatives to limit the Echo Reply to multicast packet
> problem:
> 1. Limit Echo Reply packet to only be allowed on link-scope multicast
>    echo requests.
> 2. Require that hop-limit is set to for instance value 1 for the
>    Echo Reply packet.

<SNIP>

> Perhaphs in practice the hop-limit could be somewhat bigger 
> than 1 without real problems?

I would suggest that the default hoplimit for these kind of
ICMP's gets set to 1 but that it is configurable in cases
where the ISP knows the size of their multicast network.
In an ideal solution it would be only the hops of a maximum
of 2 AS's.

In light of the above and debugging multicast wouldn't it be
a good idea to revive and implement mtrace, eg as in:
http://archive.dante.net/mbone/refs/draft-ietf-idmr-traceroute-ipm-07.txt

But then for IPv6?

Greets,
 Jeroen

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