scott liebrand has already followed up on most of what i thought interesting in brian dickson's latest post on this thread, so i'll limit myself to this:
> The thing we need to be concerned about is not only route leakage, but > packet leakage, especially if it has the ability to affect the core > infrastructure, e.g. DNS. in RFC 1918 land, it's impossible for a root name server to know where the junk-source queries are coming from, since 192.168.1.100 looks the same no matter who leaks it. in any ULA plan, "recourse" has to exist, such that when someone sends you a DNS query you can't reply to because it's from a ULA-verse that you're not part of, you can still look it up in WHOIS. i've got a metric buttload of leaked corporate identifiers on hand that i have no way to embarrass anybody with because by definition i cannot know the identity of the leaker. let's ensure that ad-hoc networking doesn't mean "recourse-free networking". (therefore ULA-G's WHOIS requirements.) -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list ipv6@ietf.org Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
