Vishwas and Tim,

I would prefer to require one or the other.  This is because a router
implementing OSPFv3 MUST provide some means of authenticating messages.
The options are:

1. ESP-NULL: ESP without confidentiality and with integrity
2. ESP-ENC: ESP with confidentiality
3. AH: AH with integrity

I suggest we require implementations to do one or more.

Best Regards,
 
Jeffrey Dunn
Info Systems Eng., Lead
MITRE Corporation.

-----Original Message-----
From: Vishwas Manral [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 1:10 PM
To: Tim Enos
Cc: Brian E Carpenter; Dunn, Jeffrey H.; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
ipv6@ietf.org
Subject: Re: Security Requirements for IPv6 Node Req summary

Hi Tim,

You may have not read the OSPFv3 security RFC - RFC4552. It states
clearly:

   In order to provide authentication to OSPFv3, implementations MUST
   support ESP and MAY support AH.

Thanks,
Vishwas

On Thu, Mar 6, 2008 at 9:49 AM, Tim Enos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I too would be in favor of a SHOULD for the AH requirement, with
language dedicated both to a specific example of where AH is arguably a
MUST (e.g. for nodes implementing OSPFv3), and other language which at
least outlines where AH is and is not applicable.
>
>  Best regards,
>
>  Tim Enos
>  Ps 84:10-12
>
>
>
>  >I also suggest that the AH requirement be SHOULD, or even better
MUST,
>  >for nodes implementing OSPFv3, RFC 2740.  This is based on the
removal
>  >of the authentication LSA from OSPFv3, which was done with the
>  >expectation that AH would be mandatory.  Thoughts?
>  >
>  >Best Regards,
>  >
>  >Jeffrey Dunn
>  >Info Systems Eng., Lead
>  >MITRE Corporation.
>  >-----Original Message-----
>  >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of
>  >Brian E Carpenter
>  >Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 4:22 PM
>  >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  >Cc: ipv6@ietf.org
>  >Subject: Re: Security Requirements for IPv6 Node Req summary
>  >
>  >If we write a SHOULD we really do need some guidance
>  >as to when it doesn't apply. Otherwise we make it too
>  >easy for product managers to simply cross it off the list.
>  >How about
>  >
>  >  The normal expectation is that a complete IPv6 stack
>  >  includes an implementation of ESP. However, it is
>  >  recognized that some stacks, implemented for low-end
>  >  devices that will be deployed for special purposes
>  >  where strong security is provided by other protocol
>  >  layers, may omit ESP.
>  >
>  >Regards
>  >   Brian Carpenter
>  >   University of Auckland
>  >
>  >
>  >On 2008-03-06 09:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>  >> Sorry, that was a cut & paste mistake. AH is a MAY.
>  >>
>  >> John
>  >>
>  >>> -----Original Message-----
>  >>> From: ext Vishwas Manral [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  >>> Sent: 05 March, 2008 12:12
>  >>> To: Loughney John (Nokia-OCTO/PaloAlto)
>  >>> Cc: ipv6@ietf.org
>  >>> Subject: Re: Security Requirements for IPv6 Node Req summary
>  >>>
>  >>> Hi John,
>  >>>
>  >>> RFC4301 states AH is optional. Is there a reason why we are
>  >>> making it a MUST be supported feature. Below quoting RFC4301:
>  >>>
>  >>> "IPsec implementations MUST support ESP and MAY
>  >>>   support AH."
>  >>>
>  >>> Thanks,
>  >>> Vishwas
>  >>>
>  >>> On Wed, Mar 5, 2008 at 11:46 AM,  <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>  >>>> Hi all,
>  >>>>
>  >>>>  The RFC 4294-bis draft has the following requirement, which
comes
>  >>>> from  the initial RFC.
>  >>>>
>  >>>>   8.1. Basic Architecture
>  >>>>
>  >>>>    Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC-4301]
MUST
>  >be
>  >>>>    supported.
>  >>>>
>  >>>>   8.2. Security Protocols
>  >>>>
>  >>>>    ESP [RFC-4303] MUST be supported.  AH [RFC-4302] MUST be
>  >>> supported.
>  >>>>  We have had a lot of discussion that people basically feel
>  >>> that these
>  >>>> requirements  are not applicable and should be moved to SHOULD.
I
>  >>>> would say that  there is rough  WG Consensus on this.  Do
>  >>> people feel
>  >>>> if there should be additional text  to explain  this?
>  >>>>
>  >>>>  I suggest that the WG Chairs and our ADs discuss this with the
>  >>>> Security  ADs to ensure  that this is a reasonable consensus
>  >>> to adopt
>  >>>> - so that we do not run  into issues  during the eventual
IETF/IESG
>  >
>  >>>> review.  I am not sure that we can go much  further in
>  >>> discussions in
>  >>>> the WG.
>  >>>>
>  >>>>  Does anyone have comments on this approach?
>  >>>>
>  >>>>  John
>  >>>>
>  >>>>
>
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