The Hindu
Jan 05, 2005

Need for a universal EGS

By Prabhat Patnaik

Confining the Employment Guarantee Scheme to 
particular areas on the ground that they have 
"implementation capacity" while leaving out other 
areas like Bihar because they allegedly lack this 
capacity would mean cutting out the really poor.


WHILE I welcome Professor T.N. Srinivasan's 
support, no matter how qualified, for the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (The Hindu, Jan. 3), 
I find his arguments rather baffling. He claims 
that while a closed economy may be afflicted by a 
lack of aggregate demand, an open economy cannot 
be so afflicted, because there would always be 
world demand for exportable goods "provided we 
are internationally-competitive." This presumes 
that a country can export as much as it likes at 
the going world prices, that is, there cannot be 
any lack of aggregate demand in the world economy 
as a whole. Now, if this were the case there 
would never be any world depressions; nor would 
there be the large unemployment, together with 
unutilised capacity, that we find in the OECD in 
general, and in continental Europe in particular. 
(The fact that continental Europe is 
"uncompetitive" vis-à-vis China or East Asia is 
irrelevant, since even in a Keynesian world of 
deficient demand, not all units are equally 
"competitive" and face identical demand 
constraints.) Moreover, the logic of his argument 
is faulty. Since we cannot export to the moon or 
Mars, the world as a whole is necessarily a 
closed economy. If lack of demand can afflict a 
closed national economy, it should also afflict 
the world economy as a whole. If Say's Law which 
denies the possibility of demand deficiency is 
invalid for an isolated country, it should be 
equally invalid for an isolated world.

If the immediate constraint on employment is not 
inadequate demand, then what is it? The only two 
possible answers are: first, the real wage is 
"too high" which keeps labour demand low; and 
second, the labour demand is "too low" for 
independent reasons, that is the low level of 
capital stock in the economy, and is not too 
sensitive to the real wage. Judging by his 
emphasis on growth, Professor Srinivasan 
obviously puts greater weight on the latter. But 
the argument that a high growth rate necessarily 
leads to high growth in labour demand is invalid. 
The growth rate of labour demand is the 
difference between the growth rate of aggregate 
output and that of labour productivity, and if 
this difference is less than the growth rate of 
the work-force, then the unemployment rate 
increases, no matter how high the growth rate. If 
growth, no matter how high, is accompanied by 
rapid technological and structural change, 
resulting in a high rate of labour productivity 
growth, it may not reduce the unemployment rate 
at all. Since the current "reforms" entail 
reduced control over the pace of technological 
and structural change, the unemployment rate has 
not been lowered despite the supposedly high 
growth, whence the term "jobless growth."

The problem of unemployment, and the related 
problem of poverty, has become accentuated, in 
rural India in particular, precisely since the 
introduction of the "reforms." Poverty in India 
is defined with respect to a calorie "norm," 2400 
calories per capita per day in rural areas. 
Whether one likes this definition or not, this 
has been the basis for identifying rural poverty. 
On this criterion, 75 per cent of the rural 
population in India today is "poor", compared 
with 56 per cent in 1973-74. (Utsa Patnaik, "The 
Republic of Hunger", Social Scientist, Sept.-Oct. 
2004.) To wait for a high growth rate to 
ameliorate poverty and unemployment therefore is 
like "waiting for Godot".

The argument for an Employment Guarantee Scheme 
arises precisely for this reason. Instead of 
having a chimera dangled before them, the poor 
have to be provided immediate relief. But such a 
scheme necessarily has to be universal, not 
confined to those officially defined as "poor", 
not confined to particular districts, and not 
confined to areas that are officially credited 
with possessing "implementation capacities" (to 
use Professor Srinivasan's words). The case for a 
universal EGS, which, to be meaningful, must 
cover the country within a specified time-period, 
arises not only from a "rights-based approach," 
which has much to commend it, even though, for 
some unspecified reason, Professor Srinivasan 
appears to pooh-pooh it; it arises also from the 
fact that the official poverty figure is a gross 
underestimate, derived not from direct inspection 
of current consumption data but from a 
price-adjusted thirty-year-old poverty line which 
entails a substantial lowering of the consumption 
level. Any targeting leaves out of its ambit the 
bulk of the really poor.

Macro-estimates of poverty, no matter what 
adjustments one makes to the "contaminated" data 
of the 55th round of the NSS, are not worth much: 
the poverty-line is defined by the Planning 
Commission for 1999-2000 as a per capita daily 
expenditure of Rs.10.8 (the current figure is 
less than Rs.12) which is ludicrously paltry! As 
for actually identifying the poor, matters are 
even worse: according to Madhura Swaminathan 
(Weakening Welfare, Leftword, 2000, p.97), in 
1999 in Dharavi, the largest slum cluster in 
Asia, there were precisely 151 BPL cardholders! 
The only meaningful Employment Guarantee Scheme 
therefore would be one that is not targeted, but 
is universal and demand-driven.

Using the "Bihar alibi" for denying universality, 
which has been a favourite ploy of successive 
governments for parsimony towards the poor, would 
be a travesty. Confining the Scheme to particular 
areas on the ground that they have 
"implementation capacity," while leaving out 
other areas like Bihar because they allegedly 
lack this capacity, would mean cutting out the 
really poor, since areas allegedly lacking such 
capacity are precisely where the really poor are 
concentrated. The so-called lack of 
"implementation capacity" is the obverse of the 
pervasive poverty of the people which prevents 
their empowerment. The only way to make a 
difference to their lives is to legislate a 
universal Employment Guarantee Act, with penal 
clauses for violation by the local authorities 
when finance has been made available from the 
Centre (with the institutionalisation of a chain 
of ombudsmen), which, no matter how abused in the 
beginning, would start a chain-reaction of 
empowering the people, and thereby contribute to 
so-called "good governance."

Financing a universal EGS is far from being a 
daunting task. The annual expenditure on such a 
Scheme is unlikely to exceed Rs.25,000 crore at 
present, or 1 per cent of GDP. Many have argued 
that raising this amount through taxation is no 
big deal. But, what is more, complete 
tax-financing of such a Scheme is neither 
necessary nor even advisable. Tax revenue entails 
a loss of employment elsewhere (through negative 
multiplier effects), so that a tax-financed 
employment-generation programme, even while it 
creates employment in one sphere, destroys 
employment, to an extent, in another. A largely 
borrowing-financed EGS is actually preferable, 
since, to meet any employment target, less would 
have to be mobilised in the absence of negative 
multiplier effects, and, as Professor Amit 
Bhaduri rightly pointed out earlier (The Hindu, 
Dec. 27), the existence of unutilised capacity in 
the feeder industries, and of excess foodgrain 
stocks, would ensure that there are no 
inflationary pressures. Rough calculations of 
multiplier values made by me (in an article 
forthcoming in the Economic and Political Weekly) 
suggest that Rs. 18,000 crore of borrowing and 
Rs.6,300 crore of tax revenue would constitute 
the most appropriate combination for financing 
the EGS, provided about 18 million tonnes of 
excess foodgrain stocks are available with the 
FCI. (The tax revenue demand is about the same as 
P. Chidambaram had hoped to raise through his 
0.15 per cent tax on stock-market transactions, 
but which he largely abandoned under pressure 
from stock-brokers.)

In the light of this, any linking of the EGS with 
a curtailment of subsidies seems totally 
unwarranted, as indeed does the whole emphasis 
that the Government is placing on cutting 
subsidies. A subsidy is but a negative tax, and 
it is bewildering why those who cry hoarse over 
subsidies never talk of raising tax revenue, 
especially when the country's tax-GDP ratio, 
already among the lowest in the world, has gone 
down drastically since the introduction of 
"reforms." (If the 1990-91 central tax-GDP ratio 
obtained today, then the Centre would be raising 
an additional revenue of Rs.30,000 crore annually 
at today's GDP.) True, subsidies "distort" 
prices, but these are not "competitive prices" 
anyway; and if price-"distortions" are to be 
avoided, then those wanting subsidy cuts should 
also be demanding increases in direct taxation, 
which paradoxically they never do.

Professor Srinivasan not only sees, without any 
justification, growth-stimulation as the panacea 
for removing unemployment but advocates the same 
old neo-liberal measures as the means of 
growth-stimulation. If after a decade and a half 
of "reforms", during which wealth and income 
inequalities in the economy have increased 
significantly as the Government has sought to 
improve the "investment climate," the 
investment-GDP ratio is no higher than in 
1990-91, then clearly one cannot blandly advocate 
"more of the same". To say that the investment 
ratio has not increased because of poor 
"investment climate" is a tautology; to say that 
the "investment climate" would improve through 
more "neo-liberal reforms" is a non sequitur. 
Perhaps if the idea of a demand-constraint was 
taken more seriously, Professor Srinivasan would 
find a clue to why the investment ratio has 
stagnated. At any rate it is morally duplicitous 
to say that if transfers to the rich have not 
achieved the desired objective then more 
transfers are necessary, while if transfers to 
the poor are feared not to achieve the desired 
objective (the "Bihar alibi"), then such 
transfers should be avoided.

(Prabhat Patnaik is Professor, Centre for 
Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University.)





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