At 09:09 13/08/99 -0400, Jim Farmelant wrote:
>
>On Fri, 13 Aug 1999 11:41:21 GMT "J.WALKER, ILL"
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>>> Why should we, as socialists or Marxists, adopt such a perspective?
>>> In what way does it contribute to the struggle for socialism?
>>> Lew
>>
>>Lew,
>>
>>The importance of dialectical materialism to the struggle for
>>socialism is in my opinion twofold.
Although Jim F's comments are, as always, reasoned, he places the burden of
proof on dialectical materialism. This is odd when conventional science has
been unable to produce a unified field theory, to know where 90% of the
matter is in the universe, and, according to a recent article in New
Scientist, has just begun to question whether the speed of light really has
always been constant.
But a pitfall in these debate is that those of us who see no reason why the
burden of proof should be on dialectical materialism, may be misrepresented
as dogmatic and reductionist in how dialectical materialism is applied.
Many of Jim F's individual points I can agree with.
Jim F to John Walker:
> It sounds like you
>are saying that a science of society or history cannot be credible
>unless it is somehow also a science or philosophy of the natural
>world. But I would think that it should be sufficient that a putative
>science of society be able to provide cogent explanations of social
>phenomena in order to be credible. The first business of a
>credible social science ought to be the explanation of phenomena
>like the rise and fall of modes of production, the courses of class
>struggles, the importance of ideologies like religion or nationalism,
>the functions of law etc. It is not in any sense mandataory that
>such a science should also explain the phenomena of subatomic
>particles or provide us with an account of the origins and destiny
>of the universe.
In practice this is true. We do not demand of ourselves or of others that
ideas must fit perfectly together before we take action. The socialist
movement pre-dates the marxist movement. But - the over-arching connection
is that just as marxists see social processes, class conflict, change,
revolution in terms of the working out of whole systems, so there is a link
with such a systems approach to the non-human and the inanimate world.
Marx wrote of men as a variety of animals. Humanity is not an isolated
idealised separate category in marxism. Nor does a marxist approach assume
that Life is such an idealised category separate from inanimate forms of
organisation.
I agree that simplistic reductionist analogies from inaminate science do
not prove the historical inevitability of socialism. (eg the fact that
Soviet Science put a human in space before the US, does not prove that the
Soviet economy would outperform the US in the production of commodities).
However the defence of the basic scientific-ness of marxism has been a core
feature of marxism. It accounts for much of the pungency of the writings of
Marx and Engels. And I would argue that a feature of science is the ability
to integrate each reasonable scientific advance with the previous body of
reasonable scientific advances. (Even though that sometimes requires a
paradigm shift.)
Therefore it is not trivial, nor is it reductionist, nor is it dogmatic, to
argue that in the great body of the inanimate sciences, advances are
occuring that require science to look at things as systems, composed of
inter-related and often contrasting forces, which shift and change and are
interconnected with one another. A "systems approach" would be the simplest
way of expressing this.
It includes advances in the mathematics of chaos theory that demonstrate
how simple systems may produce patterns apparently roughly regular most of
the time, which may flip into a phase of quite different patterns, or
become continuously turbulent. Complexity theory has modelled the processes
whereby "emergent properties" may appear from out of the interaction of
numerous less complex systems such that the whole is indeed greater than
the parts.
Jim F:
>It seems to me that you are trying to collapse historical
> materialism into dialectical materialism. Well as we say in the States,
> "that dog won't hunt."
I am not sure what the implications of "collapse" are here, but certainly
in philosophical terms historical materialism is a subset of dialectical
materialism. It is not necessary to "believe" in the wider set in order to
"believe" in the subset. But it is surprising if there has to be a block
about this.
It also suggests that one's approach to the subset may not be truly
dialectical. One may for example not see also the temporary unity between
the bourgeoisies and the proletariat under the capitalist mode of
production, but only see the opposition, thereby adopting the position of a
radical utopian socialist, ready to slip into cynicism and despair about
the disappointing qualities of the working class, rather than being a
dialectical-materialist socialist.
Jim F:
>I think that perhaps what you are arguing is that historical materialism
>by itself is not sufficient to win over intellectual support. I am not
>sure that as an empirical matter that is necessarily true.
True, though see previous comments about idealist socialism.
Besides it is not so much a question of "us" winning support in a sectarian
way for "our" intellectual position, as seeing the long term process and
aiding the struggle by arguing for the interests of the working class
across countries and along time (to paraphrase the Manifesto).
>However,
>even granting that it is, I am not sure that diamat provides us with
>either the best philosophical basis for historical materialism nor
>is it necessarily the best basis for integrating our understanding
>of History with that of Nature.
Those who base the burden of proof on dialectical materialism, belabour
"diamat". Soviet science was not without its achievements, but the
defenders of dialectical materialism as an integral feature of the marxist
approach, are not under any obligation to defend every formulation of
"diamat". Yes it could be presented in idealist, dogmatic ways, that are
themselves reductionist.
>The notion of a dialectics of nature
>is full of ambiguities that have yet to be resolved.
And what of conventional science?! The evidence of an impending paradigm
shift is physics is massive. It simply does not hang together. Where lies
the burden of proof?
>Probably, the
>most compelling dialectical materialism around is the "weak
>dialectical materialism" of Lewontin and Levins.
I cannot remember whether I have used the team "weak" or "soft" dialectical
materialism as a way of differentiating what I regard as a reasonable
position from a dogmatic, mechanical and reductionist application of
dialectical materialism. But I would ask Jim F whether he does indeed find
the arguments of Lewontin and Levins compelling, because if so he should
change sides in the debate. And whether on reflection he considers they
are weak.
After looking again at their last chapter in "The Dialectical Biogist"
(1985, Harvard) again, I would emphasise that the arguments are not weak.
They are not put stridently, and are reasoned in a non-confontational
manner, but they are very extensive in their implications.
In the 20 pages of the final chapter I have noted over 40 passages of
significance, any one of which I could quote. But for brevity, let me ask
if this passage from page 283 is unreasonable, or trivial in its implications:
"The dialectical viewpoint sees dynamical stability as a rather special
situation that must be accounted for. Systems of any complexity - the
central nervous system, that national and world capitalist economies,
ecosystems, the physiological networks of organisms - are more likely to be
dynamically unstable. Even systems designed explicitly to be stable, such
as nuclear power plants, have shown a remarkable propensity to behave in
unplanned ways."
Levins and Lewontin do not have a dogmatic style of argumentation. They
conclude with due scientific modesty about the need for research and
education. But their final two sentences echo, without a reference, the
revolutionary thesis of Marx on Feuerbach.
Here is the entire concluding paragraph of their work:
"We do not know whether or not these elements of a research and educational
program will in fact result in solutions to long-standing problems of
biology. Dialectical philosophers have thus far only explained science. The
problem, however, is to change it."
Not weak, particularly when you bear in mind their many allusions to
spheres of interest other than those of the professional biologist.
Chris Burford
London
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