Rob provides a lot of food for thought on the internal manoeuverings of the
various factions of the bourgeoisie (national and international) in
Indonesia/East Timor, but nothing regarding the problems of organizing,
mobilizing and leading the working and peasant masses to a real independent
class solution -- ie one that's revolutionary and socialist.
I think the key to it is the way he leaves out the class basis of the
ruling regime in the country in question. It's a relief, but at the same
time a historical copout, that he doesn't try and use the concept fascism
to explain things. Because this would open the way not just to the sterile
old Stalinist drivel about defending democracy at all costs (and burying
yourself -- literally -- in a popular front with allegedly democratic and
progressive bourgeois forces a la Chiang Kai Shek/Kuomintang) but to a real
Marxist analysis of the need for Bonapartist solutions to save the skin of
the bourgeoisie.
It's pretty obvious in Indonesia that the local conditions require a
Bonapartist solution (= "fascist military dictatorship") for the national
bourgeoisie, and that the imperialists want more control than this would
admit. So the first thing for us to do is not to get dizzy staring at the
oscillations of the bourgeoisie, as Rob does (however clearly he may see
and present these) but to stand on our own ground and see this instability
and this turbulence as symptoms of the decay of bourgeois property
relations in the political sphere both nationally and internationally. I.e.
to realize that we're in the epoch of the (long-drawn-out) death agony of
capitalism, and this is the kind of thing we'll get all the time (wars,
revolutions and -- under the right political conditions -- the transition
to socialism) until the whole question of the property relations is brought
into synch with the needs of the forces of production on a world scale.
Simple.
Obviously we need to organize our own political forces with our own
working-class poltical agenda to take advantage of the weaknesses of the
bourgeoisie being revealed more and more every day. None of the factions of
the bourgeoisie have any real solutions to offer, and few of them have any
even half-plausible solutions of any kind any more. The only way we can
carry out this organizational work is with an internationalist party based
on revolutionary Marxism. This means joining one of the currents aspiriing
to be such a party and working to forge unity among such currents generally
(as we're doing in the LIT with initiatives like the KOORKOM) and working
to build an independent revolutionary working-class force in each country
where you have sections.
Otherwise you'll spend for ever rocking on your porch sipping a cold one
and reeling at the bourgeois vomit spewed over you by the media, till the
final day when they come themselves in their material jackboots and take
you to the camp...
Cheers,
Hugh
>G'day Thaxists,
>
>My thoughtlets on this unbelievably sad business from a post I initially
>sent elsewhere, in case we might wanna talk about it here:
>
>G'day all,
>
>>Can someone tell me why the Indonesians (with power) _want_ East Timor?
>
>I think Jim formulates the above sentence very well. Not only because we
>all know there's a danger here of demonising a couple of hundred million
>people, but because Indonesia is coming apart at the seams. This latter is
>as evident within the military as it is everywhere from Sumatra to West
>Irian.
>
>Some of the shooting in East Timor, for instance, is by Indonesian regulars
>at other Indonesian regulars. Nobody knows which side Wiranto (the CinC)
>is on, and nobody knows whether he's on General Tanjung's side (the other
>ranking general staffer). Nobody knows if either is on Habibie's side.
>And, whilst I'd be very surprised if Habibie hadn't hoped quietly to remove
>East Timor from his long list of disasters-in-waiting, I'm not even sure if
>he hasn't had to rethink this for party-political reasons (Habibie is close
>to losing the presidential race in Djakarta, and now that his main, but not
>only, rival, Megawati Sukarnoputri has come out for a quick
>foreign-supervised withdrawal of Indonesian sovereignty, Habibie may be
>tempted to seize the brand-differentiation offered him and go on a
>'national unity' ticket (this would only be tempting if he felt the balance
>of the military was with him - as many have established lucrative holdings
>in East Timorese plantations and various rackets, this is possible).
>
>'National Unity', implicit all through the long-standing official ideology
>of *Panca Sila* (the five points of Indonesianness), is well internalised
>throughout the political culture of much of the country (especially in Java
>- the most decisive bit), and I've yet to meet an Indonesian (and I meet
>many) who is not astonished by Chomskian rreadings of the '75/'76 invasion
>(they'd always been convinced it was an act of 'integration' at East
>Timorese request, opposed only by a few Communist Fretelin trouble-makers.
>So Habibie has a significant part of the culture with which to resonate if
>he chooses to go this route.
>
>Me, I'd go a step further. I think the (inconclusive and drawn-out)
>Indonesian election has convinced many big boys in the military that
>liberal democracy ain't gonna cut it in Indonesia (only 'guided democracy'
>can keep 17000 islands, many ethnic groups and so many significant minority
>religions together). They're anticipating the possibility of, or the
>'need' for, a military take-over (the military has ever been inculcated
>with the an identity based on ideas
>technocratic/warrior-class/noblesse-oblige etc), and are positioning
>themselves, vis likely internal rivals, ahead of time. Much of this is
>playing out in East Timor right now, I reckon.
>
>If one bloke gets the credit for simply cleansing East Timor (and hence the
>problem), he has a status which might resonate very nicely with a lot of
>prevalent sentiment, anyway. So would a bloke who successfully foils his
>plan, perhaps. My guess is that a throne in Djakarta is perceived as up
>for grabs, and that this is what all the hellish carnage in East Timor's
>basically about.
>
>As for what we can do about it. Well, I'm not sure there's anything that
>meets the basic requirement of doability. Oz and US have busily painted
>themselves into a corner on this one for a quarter of a century - our
>initial treachery killed 250000 of 'em, and a clumsy attempt to put our
>consciousnesses right (hardly a noble motive anyway) could see the rest of
>'em in the ground by November.
>
>Japan has a point when it questions the efficacy of cutting off aid. The
>millions who've been doing it so tough since the ravages of late '97, could
>begin to starve. Indonesia's almost inevitable trajectory to the dustbin
>of history would be hastened and its potential for desperate belligerence
>multiplied. The whole region stands to pay a big price.
>
>And if we don't threaten ostracisation, we leave ourselves with the idea of
>going in mob-handed. Well, what happened in Kosovo when we did that? We
>bloody recognised Indonesian sovereignty in 1976, and if we go in without
>UN auspices, we invade a neighbour 200 million strong. Oz has two
>battalions at the ready - good for bushfires and hurricanes - good for
>peace-keeping - but absolutely no good against 30000 Indonesian regulars if
>the latter are at all united and resolute. We'd be massacred unless we
>used our airpower, and then we'd be on the way to total war. If we go in
>under UN auspices (to take the 'invasion' curse off it), and with at least
>ten thousand allies (to counter the militias alone - never mind those
>regulars who are antagonistic), we'd get into the towns, but there are few
>civilians left in the towns already. What would we do? Go into the jungle
>after the enemy? We tried that in Vietnam, and we collected the silver
>medal for our trouble. What's more, we had the US on-side that time (or
>rather we were on Unca Sam's side). I'm not at all sure we have Unca Sam
>on our side this time! Certainly, Indonesia looms big in Unca Sam's
>regional policy strategy - perhaps bigger than poor li'l Oz. And history
>shows that the Yank electorate will wear a million dead non-whites a little
>more comfortably than 2500 dead whites. Anyway, Clinton told Howard to go
>fuck himself when the latter rang up for a little material support on
>Monday.
>
>Nope, we effectively killed the East Timorese, if not in '75/'76, in August
>of this year - when we decided to back the referendum without providing the
>material conditions it was always gonna need (everyone in East Timor -
>independent and integrationist alike - had been telling us this for
>months). We paved the road to hell with bad intentions in 1975, and now
>our good intentions have marched a whole population all the way up it.
>
>It's all down to Habibie and the little question of what options/relevance
>he really has, I'm afraid.
>
>We've already done our bit ...
>
>Cheers,
>Rob.
>
>
>
>
> --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
--- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
