>Indonesian Announcement Ends Political, Starts Military Debate >http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special74.htm > >Where Serb Forces are Forbidden, Serb Paramilitary Grows >http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9909142140.htm > >Has Iraq Boosted Its Air Defense? >http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/m9909142100.htm >__________________________________ > > >STRATFOR.COM >Global Intelligence Update >September 15, 1999 > >Saudi Arabia Looks to Iran > >Summary: > >A message from a high-level Saudi envoy to Iranian President >Mohammed Khatami reportedly called for increased Saudi-Iranian >cooperation. The call likely fell on eager ears; Iran has wanted >for years to increase cooperation with Saudi Arabia in order to >supplant the U.S. presence in the region. And after eight years of >a low-grade, U.S.-led war against Iraq, Saudi Arabia is now being >forced to reconsider both its strategy and the balance of power in >the Persian Gulf. Recent evidence indicates the Saudis may be >looking to Iran to tip that balance. > > >Analysis: > >Since the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been >anything but regional allies. While Saudi Arabia traditionally >backed U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, Iran became >internationally isolated due to its extremist politics and anti- >Western orientation. This dynamic appears to be changing. > >The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported on September 12 >that Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Khuwaytir, special envoy of Saudi Crown >Prince Abdullah, met with Iranian President Khatami on September >11, presenting Khatami with a letter from Abdullah. The letter >reportedly referred to the satisfactory relations between Iran and >Saudi Arabia and called for increased collaboration in stabilizing >the oil market and developing military cooperation in the Gulf. >While there have been previous contacts between the two, this is >the first discussion of joint security cooperation. Saudi radio on >September 11 also reported the meeting, saying that the envoy who >delivered the letter voiced a desire to see Saudi-Iranian ties >strengthen. > >This is not the only indication of improving Saudi-Iranian ties. In >May 1999, Khatami visited Saudi Arabia, paving the way for further >cooperation. During the visit, economic and cultural accords were >signed. Prior to that visit, the two countries agreed to >consolidate relations and expand mutual ties at the eighth >Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Tehran, >where they reportedly discussed setting up an Islamic deterrent >force to defend Moslem rights in the midst of the Kosovo crisis. >These improved relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have already >borne fruit by helping boost oil prices. > >One reason the Saudis may be looking to Iran as a potential ally is >in reaction to weak, increasingly untenable U.S. policy in the >gulf. U.S. policy in the region has long focused on countering >Iraq, with Saudi policy generally reflecting the U.S. line. > >But Washington is locked in a vicious, dead-end cycle, bombing Iraq >while trying to keep the lid of international sanctions clamped on >Baghdad. The bombing accomplishes little strategically. The >sanctions are increasingly porous, as Iraqi oil comes out and the >money of anxious European companies comes in. The Clinton >administration can't seem to break the cycle. It has so demonized >the Iraqi regime in the eyes of the American public that any >perceived slackening of tension would immediately be condemned as >hypocritical. > >Given the lack of a strong U.S. policy, and the Saudis' concerns >about Iraqi intentions, the kingdom is forced to re-examine ties >with the only other power in the gulf, Iran. The Saudis could >easily influence the policy of other states in the region, a move >with serious implications for the United States. Iran has called >for increased military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the rest >of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states to >counterbalance U.S. air and naval presence in the region. > >The Saudis, however, must tread cautiously. They must avoid >alarming the United States while uniting an apparently divided GCC >coalition. The GCC seems unsure of future of relations with Iran. >Signals from the rest of the GCC have been mixed. Early this week, >there was consternation in Oman over an Iranian announcement of a >joint Oman-Iran naval exercise. Since the Saudis cannot afford to >hand over regional leadership to the Iranians, the kingdom must >rally the rest of the GCC. Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab >Emirates have traditionally taken their lead from the Saudi >monarchy. Finally, although the Saudis would benefit from having >the Iranians help contain Iraq, they have no desire to see the >Iranians grow so strong that Iraq is eliminated as a valuable >buffer. > >However, if Saudi Arabia can get the rest of the GCC to fall in >line, it can attempt to play the balance of power game between Iran >and Iraq. It is a game that the Gulf states have played skillfully >in the past. In the 1970s, during the reign of the shah, the Gulf >States supported Iran against Iraq. After the fall of the shah, >these same states supported Iraq in its war against Iran. Since the >1991 Gulf War, the overwhelming U.S. military presence has >artificially altered this balance, throwing traditional balance-of- >power politics in the Gulf entirely to the wind. > >Aware that U.S. policy drifts without direction, the Saudis appear >to be seeking to restore the Gulf's natural balance. Saudi support >of Iraq would force the balance of power to revert to its 1990 >pattern, unacceptable for the U.S. and the Saudis. Therefore, using >Iran to balance against Iraq is an option the Saudis can afford to >explore. The question is what role will the U.S. now choose to >play? > >__________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
