See comments interleaved below.
At 11:19 AM 5/27/2005 -0400, Charles Brown wrote:
Ralph Dumain
.
Briefly:
(1) Seed, imaginary numbers as negation of negation: stated and argued in
this manner: these examples are empty verbiage.
^^^^^
CB: As stated here, this assertion is unsupported,i.e. it itself is empty
verbiage.
^^^^
RALPH:
Well, specifically, how does the progression plant-seed-plant constitute
the negation of negation? How does the physiology of plant reproduction
correlate to a logical relationship? Is not the burden of proof on a
person making a positive assertion to indicate why it makes sense? What
could the concept of negation mean in this instance but some kind of loose
metaphor?
Imaginary numbers belong to the realm of pure mathematics, yet this example
too seems senseless. Is -1 the negation of 1? (Are there in fact two
notions of negation at work in such discussions?) How then does creating a
logical entity that when squared yields -1 constitute a negation of a
negation? Even as a metaphor I don't get it.
Engels was indeed in
pursuit of something much ore serious, but along the way he dropped a
number of ill-thought-out examples in his _unpublished_ writing, which was
later taken as gospel.
^^^^^^
CB: Claim that Engels' example of imaginary numbers is "taken as gospel" is
strawman argument. Important thing here is _I_ don't take it as "gospel" but
an interesting suggestion from a teacher of dialectics. You haven't
demonstrated, that I see, that it is ill-thought out. You just make an
unsupported assertion.
Yes, I think the unpublished aspect is important to consider. A big reason
why it is not "gospel". It's like an email discussion with Engels on the
list.
^^^^^^
RALPH:
I've indicated above how it's ill-thought out. But precisely because it
comes from a manuscript not offered for publication, we shouldn't be too
harsh on Engels for trying out various ideas that he might have not stuck
with after further deliberation.
(2) Confirmation of dialectical laws (or of formal logic): there is a basic
conflation between natural law and logical law. Engels seems to have
finessed the distinction, and the garbling was never corrected, though there
have been attempts to do so (cf. Richard Norman).
^^^^^^
CB: Where exactly does Engels do this ?
^^^^^
RALPH:
For starters, see
Jean van Heijenoort
Friedrich Engels And Mathematics
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/heijen/works/math.htm
Formal logical laws make no direct assertions about ontological matters
such as stasis, motion, change, etc. The real issue is the relationship of
logic to ontology. These problems arise in the fusion of logic with
ontology, as occurs historically with interpretations of both formal and
dialectical
logic. But if logic is conceived as a mode of valid and consistent
inference of statements one from another, and not as a direct set of
assertions about being, then the relationship between conceptions of logic
and ontology can evolve into a more mature analysis. If it turns out that
we cannot adequately formulate a system of assertions about being without
eliminating the contradictory relationships between categories, then
dialectical logic has something to do. But physical processes have nothing
to do with dialectical laws per se; rather, dialectical laws, if such exist,
are logical abstractions describing the categorial relationships of concepts
(which in turn reference empirical realities) one to another.
^^^^^^
CB: This seems worth thinking over.
^^^^^^^
RALPH:
This is the crux of the matter.
(3) Confirmation of dialectical laws/processes: the historical problem with
diamat rhetoric is the positing of correlations of abstract categorial
statements (which cannot deduce empirical matters, as we should know since
Hume and Kant) with specific empirical contents (scientific theories &
examples of natural phenomena). To wit, your examples:
^^^^^^^^
CB: Problem is you assert that there is a "problem" but you don't make an
argument supporting your assertion. Pronoucements are not rebuttals.
RALPH:
The very fact that we are having this old discussion indicates a continuing
problem. If one follows the literature over the past century, one will
find the problem recurrent. Do I need to compile a bibliography of every
bad piece of Marxist argumentation I've ever read? If you take a look at
Sean Sayers' side of the argument with Richard Norman, you will find that
Sayers commits every blunder associated with the entire history of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
Are you saying there is never a step of correlating abstract categorical
statements with specific empirical contents ? If so, your claim here seems
invalid.
^^^^^^^
RALPH:
The problem is that a logical relationship is not prima facie the same
thing as a physical process. A physical process does not take place as a
result of a logical law. If there is a logical relationship that correctly
characterizes a physical process, then one must show that the categories
necessary to categorize the process exhibit a dialectical
relationship. Chance and necessity, for example, might be such a category
pair. My problem is that many of your arguments do not exhibit such a
tight relationship. If one wants to show an intrinsic relationship between
the achievements of Einstein and Lenin, which would be fine with me, one
would have to show how the logic of Einstein's basic concepts relates to
Lenin's analysis. I most certainly do think that physics of the past
century requires dialectical thought, and in some sense, Lenin saw what was
coming when the revolution in physics gets turned into mysticism, but this
doesn't mean that Lenin himself addressed the matter with scientific
concreteness. Of course, to settle this, I would have to make a careful
textual study of MAEC to make this claim or the counterclaim that Lenin was
out of step with the march of science. I don't have time for this right
now. My hunch is that neither assertion is quite the case.
>CB: I don't recall if I said it here, but his formulation "there is only
>matter and its mode of existence is motion" seems a quite exact forumuation
>of the philosophical-physics issue that was addressed experimentally by
>Michelson and Morley in discovering no absolute rest/ether and used
>theoretically by Einstein in the relativity of all motion ( no absolute
>rest). Change is absolute. Rest is relative. It's quite a remarkable
>philosophical anticipation of the events in actual physics.
>
>Also, the way Engels emphasizes in _The Dialectic of Nature_ the
>transformations of one form of matter into another makes me think about E =
>MC squared which is a formula for the transformation of mass into energy
and
>vica versa. I haven't thought this one through as much, but there might be
>something there.
Note that general ontological statements about matter, motion, energy, etc.
lack the specificity to be translated into special relativity or any other
scientific theory.
^^^^^^
CB: Note: this is another baldface assertion with no supporting
argumentation.
When you argue with someone, it is not a valid method to rely on
authoritative assertion with you as the "authority".
RALPH:
Well, consider your example. Of course, Engels remarks about the
transformations of matter philosophically--very generally--suggests that
physical entities are not as discrete as previously thought and that prove
to be more interdependent and dynamic--interpenetrating if you will--than
previous conceptions, say of atoms and void. But note that while Engels'
_sensibility_ is certainly congruent with the later discovery of the
conversion of mass into energy, it doesn't--at least not as presented
here--attain the degree of specificity to enable the claim that Engels
anticipated Einstein. This is one reason I suggest that Gerald Holton's
concept of themata might be applicable.
^^^^^^^
There is no substance here to the argument that Engels
anticipates relativity. A better developed argument would look for more
substantive remarks by Engels and show that the world-picture delineated
therein has some substantive relationship to the conceptual reorganization
mandated by revolutionary developments in scientific theories.
^^^^^
CB: You may have missed it. That there is no absolute rest, no ether, is an
underlying empirical premise of Einstein's theory of Special Relativity.
Engels formulation "there is only matter and motion is it mode of existence"
is pretty much identical with the physical empirical discovery that there is
no absolute rest.
^^^^^^^^
RALPH: Now look at what you just wrote again.
Einstein: no absolute rest, no ether
Engels: no matter without motion
Where is the equivalency? Does absolute rest mean no absolute frame of
reference, or no absolute lack of motion (as in absolute zero
temperature)? Does Engels pronounce of the need for a medium of
propagation of electromagnetic waves?
The problem is the vagueness of the correlation between abstract
philosophical categorial statements and empirical realities.
The dialectical sensibility is a powerful one, but we have to hone our
analytical skills.
You may be right about heuristics, but in context of this discussion, I
would again bring up Gerald Holton's notion of themata.
^^^^^^
CB: I'll look for notion of themata
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