I for one have spoken in the past in favor of making the FCC Outage
Reports public again. If you want to deliberatley destroy fiber infrastructure,
you can gain more knowledge quicker by stepping outside your door and gazing
upon clearly marked routes, than by reading outage reports. Want to find a
bldg where multiple carriers are housed? Read the carrier hotel advertisements
on the internet and in print or read NANOG.
I have suffered more from trying to figure out (quickly) over the past
few years what's going on in a multi carrier fiber outage situation, especially
when a given carrier has IRU's on the competitor's fiber which I have also
provisioned my redundany on (and they seem to "forget" that). Many times during
outages people in NOCs are spinning in their chairs trying get a grip. The
information that is purposely being suppressed from the public by DHS
initiatives with the FCC, is also frequently inadvertantly obfuscated within
a given orginisation due to turnover, layoffs, mergers and acquisitions, etc.
So besides government interference, we are at times our own worst enemy due to
lack of adequate knowledge transfer and change mgmt. procedures. Imagine if you
will 2 competing carriers, 1 has a cut 22.1 km east of X, the other 3 km west
of Y, crews are dispatched, and bingo- collide at the scene.....how many times
has THAT happened. Neither realizes they share some form of infrastructure
until they are having coffee together while looking at the muddy hole in the
ground that the contractor for a 3rd company just dug. It IS a less than
perfect world within the industry.
On a slightly different rant - Forget attacking the glass. Take down DNS and
SS7 at the same time...hmmm wonder what one company has a lock on a big piece
of THAT. enough said. Hope their infrastructure for those things stays totally
diverse (no offense meant). Just another thing that I think about at times...
-Keith
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2006 3:05 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Subject: Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
What data went into the system would depend on what questions you were looking
to answer. I spend most of my time looking at the geographic diversity of
fiber routes, so I'll use that as a very simple example.
To answer that particular set of questions you would need the fiber routes for
each provider, and they would need to be georeferenced. Other useful data
would be the buildings lit by those fiber routes and lease costs. Users would
then enter the buildings they want connectivity for. The system would find all
the providers that could service that combination of buildings then calculate
what the diversity of each provider is for that set of buildings, or what the
diversity was if the user wanted to use more than one provider. Each provider
would be given a score for that particular connectivity combination and a
price, or the scores for each combination of providers. The user would then
have a market indicator for diversity. You could have a vairety of metrics -
the total distance between network paths, average distance, the variance, the
number of times paths come with 100 feet of each other, the number of routes
that are colocated etc.
The providers do not give up any proprietary data and the customers have a set
of indicators to make a more informed choice. Not the ideal solution, but the
game was to come up with something that would be palatable to the providers.
Companies like Last Mile Connections already keep provider supplied databases
of lit buildings and prices to run auctions. This would just be another
indicator for customers that also value diversity and resiliency. Protecting
the master database would be important, but there are lots of mechanisms to do
that effectively. The metrics are the key, and that of course is my angle on
the game.
----- Original Message -----
From: Frank Coluccio <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 1:53 pm
Subject: Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
>
> >My argument simply is if this kind of awareness
>
> >can be made more broadly available you end up with
>
> >a more resilient infrastructure overall.
>
>
>
> Sean, would you care to list the route, facility, ownership and
> customer
> attributes of the data base that you'd make public, and briefly
> explain the
>
> access controls you would impose on same?
>
>
>
> If this is not what you originally intended, then please show me
> the way ... thanks.
>
>
>
>
>
> Frank
>
>
>
> On Fri Jan 20 9:19 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] sent:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> As you mentioned before this is largely because the customer
> (SIAC) was savvy
>
> enough to set the reuirements and had the money to do it. A lot of
> that saviness
>
> came from lessons learned from 9/11 and fund transfer. Similar
> measures were
>
> taken with DoD's GIG-BE, again because the customer was
> knowlegable and had the
>
> financial clout to enforce the requirements and demand the
> information. An
>
> anonymous data pool is just one suggestion of a market based
> mechanism to do it.
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 5:37 am
>
> Subject:
>
>
>
> >
>
> > > Imagine if 60 Hudson and 111 8th
>
> > > were to go down at the same time? Finding means to
> mitigate this
>
> > > threat is not frivolously spending the taxpayer's money, IMO;
>
> > > although perhaps removing fiber maps is not the best way to
>
> > > address this.
>
> >
>
> > No, removing fiber maps will not address this problem
>
> > now that you have pinpointed the addresses that they
>
> > should attack.
>
> >
>
> > Separacy is the key to addressing this problem. Separate
>
> > circuits along separate routes connecting separate routers
>
> > in separate PoPs. Separacy should be the mantra, not
>
> > obscurity.
>
> >
>
> > End-to-end separation of circuits is how SFTI and other
>
> > financial industry networks deal with the issue of continuity
>
> > in the face of terrorism and other disasters. In fact, now
>
> > that trading is mediated by networked computers, the physical
>
> > location of the exchange is less vulnerable to terrorists
> because
> > the real action takes place in redundant data centers connected
>
> > by diverse separate networks. Since 9-11 was a direct attack on
>
> > the financial services industry, people within the industry
>
> > worldwide, have been applying the lessons learned in New York.
>
> > Another 9-11 is simply not possible today.
>
> >
>
> > --Michael Dillon
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
>
