From c2e2aed630f95a9326f8b0969600c44a5db0fe8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Indutny Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2015 14:14:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] evp: fix memory corruption on absent payload aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1, aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1 ciphers expect the AEAD payload, but fail to operate if it wasn't supplied. In fact, in case of absent payload - `plen` is going to be `NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH` and the memory will be corrupted (which sometimes leads to the crash). NOTE: 41cf2d2518f8b7f31287984ea9f13bc9d55205dc implicitly fixes this in 1.0.2, so this commit could be considered to be a partial back-port of that one. --- crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c index 3f8a5ae..1d1257b 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, /* decrypt HMAC|padding at once */ aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &key->ks, ctx->iv, 0); - if (plen) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ + if (plen != NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) { /* "TLS" mode of operation */ size_t inp_len, mask, j, i; unsigned int res, maxpad, pad, bitlen; int ret = 1; -- 2.3.5