Edwina,
I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.
Best,
Helmut
 
 29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since 'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]....and both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant.

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed. 

Edwina

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On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Jon, Edwina, List,
I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic.
I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.
Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:
 
A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,
a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,
an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.
 
About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that there are different theories.
The supersign, as any sign, has all three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess.
Best,
Helmut
 
 28. März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 


That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I have backed up my views of Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again.

Edwina
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On Tue 28/03/17 3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, List:
 
I knew that I could count on you!  As usual, you offer no evidence to back up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither does anyone else.
 
Cheers,
 
Jon S.
 
 
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis. And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what Peirce wrote.

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this is....blah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and mechanical outline.

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no sense....etc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views - and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se' but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se' -out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation, is the primal force in transforming the input data from the interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of this Representamen and the role it plays in the triadic sign; your view - as I've said before, seems to me to reduce Peirce to mechanics.

I've said before that I won't debate with you. I am sure that there are many who will - and I'll leave that to you and them.

Edwina

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On Tue 28/03/17 1:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Helmut, List:
 
Actually, your first quote below does not corroborate what Edwina wrote.  Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is not necessarily something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a fictional character, or a command, as just a few examples.  Elsewhere, including the other three quotes, he makes it quite clear that the Dynamic Object is always  external to the Sign that represents it.
 
As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of Peirce that redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a way that--to me, anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as Peircean.  For Edwina, the Sign is a triadic function that transforms data from the Object (input) via the Representamen (mediation) to the Interpretant (output); for Peirce, on the other hand, the Sign or Representamen is the first correlate of a triadic relation, the Object is the second correlate, and the Interpretant is the third correlate.  Edwina thus defines the Object, Representamen, and Interpretant as relations within the Sign; whereas Peirce defines them as subjects, one of which (Representamen) is the Sign, and the other two of which (Object and Interpretant)  have relations with the Sign.  This is evident from his division of each correlate and relation into Possibles (1ns), Existents (2ns), and Necessitants (3ns) based on the Universe or Modality of Being to which they belong.  In Peirce's framework, it makes no sense at all to claim--as Edwina did below--that the Representamen exists within the Dynamic Object; rather, it stands for the Object to the Interpretant.
 
I predict that Edwina will now scold me for arrogantly treating "my" interpretation of Peirce as the only correct one, and/or allege that I am being Saussurean/nominalistic/"literal-bound" by adhering carefully to what Peirce actually wrote about these matters.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Edwina,
Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its experience, the second quote says that it is a part of reality, the third says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is what final study would show it to be. Maybe when I will think about it, sometime I might be able to combine these aspects, but now they still seem contradictive to me.
Best,
Helmut
 
---1---
1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 197

the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience.

---2---

1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536

… we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation .

---3---

1906 [c.] | On Signs [R] | MS [R] 793:14

[O]ne must distinguish the Object as it is represented, which is called the Immediate Object, from the Object as it is in itself.

---4---

1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495

As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be. The former I call the Immediate Object, the latter the Dynamical Object. For the latter is the Object that Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science) can investigate.

 27. März 2017 um 21:36 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 

Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are Signs. They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations: Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself', i.e., which exists outside of this interactive process. Certainly, the laws of physics, held within the Representamen, change SLOWLY. As Peirce pointed out, in 1.412 [A Guess at the Riddle] in the development of habits - these habits will emerge and strengthen themselves. So, I'd suggest that early physical laws developed rather than emerged 'intact and final'. And for all we know, these physical laws might change, slowly, in the future. Their stability is, of course, vital as the biological realm with its less stable laws, is therefore enabled to develop diversity.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'events and constellations of the past'.

Again, the Sign, in my view, is a triad. The Representamen, also called the sign [lower case] is a set of habits of formation and exists WITHIN the Sign and therefore, WITHIN the dynamic object. There is no such thing as a Dynamic Object which does not also have its Representamen or set of habits that enable it to exist as such.

I do not agree with viewing the parts of the Sign [the Dynamic Object, the Immediate Object, the Representamen, the Immediate, Dynamic and Final Interpretants] as separate 'stand-alone' entities.

Edwina

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On Mon 27/03/17 3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

List,
Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and constellations from the past do not either, persisting objects may, common concepts do for sure.
Now, given I am right with this, is it so, that the final interpretant of a sign with a changing dyn. object is not only the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical one, but the approximation of immediate and dynamical objects towards each other?
Or is it so, that, as the dynamical object never changes at the time of the sign (because then it is independent from it), only later, and the final interpretant is part of this sign and not of one of the following, it (the final interpretant) also is the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical, theoretically frozen in time, object? Uh, I dont understand myself anymore, so nevermind if you dont either.
Best,
Helmut
27. März 2017 um 20:05 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are continuously changing 'that with which we interact'.

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts [earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the other triadic Signs [earth, sun..].  And my interaction with it, as a Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not garbage to be thrown out.

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set [Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds].. and all these interactions - which are also carried out within triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow; it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect, a bird]...

Edwina

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