Helmut, Gary F., List It seems to me essential to highlight, in any diagrammatic presentation of the sign, the internal determinations of the sign by the object and of the interpretant by the sign. Peirce does so from 1905 (see the appendix of https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM). I am always amazed when in a presentation of Peirce's semiotics I read "Peirce defines the sign in this or that way" without any prior justification for this choice. About 25 years ago, I created a website that included elements of a book written for beginners in the form of questions and answers. It has been translated into Spanish in Argentina. I simply presented the dynamics of the sign and semiosis with small animated gifs. Here is the corresponding page translated into English : http://qualisignes.fr/2020/06/23/what-are-the-characteristics-of-the-peircean-sign/ It is a contribution at the debate. Robert
Le mar. 23 juin 2020 à 16:49, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit : > List, > > The difference between mediation and relation rings a bell to me. There > are two kinds of relation: Relatio rationalis and relatio naturalis. > Relatio rationalis is a by a mind supposed relation, without the need of > both parts actually to take part, or communicate with each other. Relatio > naturalis is a real relation with both related parts taking part. A > mediation that produces a relatio rationalis insofar is not a triadic > action, but two dyadic ones. This is the case with the mediation of the > representamen, not "between", but towards both the dynamic object and the > interpretant. A triadic mediation would be to have the mediator make the > two mediated participants communicate, and somehow agree or disagree with > each other, at least acknowledge each other. The outcome would be a relatio > naturalis. This is the case with the mediation by the representamen between > the immediate object and the interpretant. Is that so? Anyway, I think, > this is an example of the value of blending non-Peircean concepts (relatio > rationalis and -naturalis) into a Peirce-related discussion, and be it > merely to better understand Peirce in the end, after having done so and > discussed about it. > > Best, > > Helmut > > > *Gesendet:* Dienstag, 23. Juni 2020 um 14:25 Uhr > *Von:* g...@gnusystems.ca > *An:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Betreff:* [PEIRCE-L] diagrams of semiosis > > Jon, list, > > I decided to change the subject line, as we’re not really talking about > communication here. > > JAS: In CP 1.345-347 (1903), Peirce is talking about genuine triadic > relations, and "representing" or (more generally) "mediating" is just such > a relation with three subjects--the sign, its object, and its interpretant. > > GF: I think this is a misleading schema if it obscures the fact that > mediation is a *process* and the description of it as a *relation* is > abstracted from that process. It doesn’t explain how mediation *works,* > or how it differs from other genuine triadic relations. Merrell’s inserting > it into a circular process diagram, and his verbal reading of it, is an > attempt to explain the relation in terms of the process it is abstracted > from. Whether it’s a successful attempt or not is a judgment call that > every interpreter will have to make. I included it in *Turning Signs* > because I read it as quite consistent with the theory of semiosis rest of > the book. I must admit that its language does not sound much like Peirce’s > speculative grammar as developed from 1903 on. Merrell’s approach is > perhaps summed up in the final sentence of the quote I included in the > “Comminding” section <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x05> of my book: > “We sense, once again, the spiralling process of signs becoming signs, > signs translated, translating themselves, into other signs.” > > There’s a Peirce quote elsewhere in my book > <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ldm.htm#x12>, from 1902 (R 599), which does > sound more Merrellian, and I think helps to explain why the distinction > between interpreter and interpretant should not be made “with an axe,” as > Peirce puts it in his critique of dualism. So I’ll leave the last word to > Peirce: > > CSP: The sign is never the very object itself. It is, therefore a sign of > its object only in some aspect, in some respect. Thus, a sign is something > which brings another sign into objective relation to that sign which it > represents itself, and brings it into that relation in some measure in the > same respect or aspect in which it is itself a sign of the same sign. If we > attempt to say what respect or aspect it is in which a sign is a sign of > its object, that respect or aspect must then appear itself as a sign. Its > own full aspect, the sign cannot evoke or endeavor to evoke. It is only > some aspect of that aspect that it can aim to reproduce. Here again there > will be an endless series. But this aspect is only a character of the > necessary imperfection of a sign. A sign is something which in some measure > and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is > itself the sign. It is like a mean function in mathematics. We call φ*x,y* > a mean function of *x* and *y*, if it is such a function that when *x* > and *y* are the same, it is itself that same. So a sign which merely > represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing itself. The two > infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other forward toward > the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate present. The type > of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of past memory and > delivers a portion of it to future memory. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 22-Jun-20 20:48 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > GF: I anticipated this kind of puzzlement on the part of some readers, > and that’s why I inserted this warning just before the Merrell quote > > > > I took that warning into account, which is why I talked about the > "experiencing bodymind" rather than the "subject." I assume that Merrell > is referring to what Peirce typically calls the "interpreter," at least in > his later writings. > > > > GF: Yes, a *graph *with three tails represents a genuine triadic > relation; but here you are forgetting that a *graph *is itself a sign, > and in this context (part of Lowell Lecture 3), Peirce does not use the > “tripod” to represent the O-S-I relation. It represents a generic *proposition > *with three *subjects *(the lines of identity) connected to a “spot” > representing the *predicate *(and labelled with a letter). > > > > I am not forgetting or overlooking any of that. In CP 1.345-347 (1903), > Peirce is talking about genuine triadic relations, and "representing" or > (more generally) "mediating" is just such a relation with three > subjects--the sign, its object, and its interpretant. Hence the > proposition expressed by the relevant graph is "a sign represents its > object to its interpretant" or "a sign mediates between its object and its > interpretant." What still puzzles me accordingly about Merrell's > incorporation of the "tripod" into his diagram is his evident association > of both a sign and its interpretant with the "experiencing bodymind"; as > you put it, "his description of the semiosic process makes it almost > entirely internal to the 'subject' organism." > > > > GF: There is no way that a single *graph* can represent an *interpretant > *as such, because the generation of an interpretant is a *process*, and > the only way to represent a process in EGs is by means of the *sequence *of > graphs determined by the transformation rules. > > > > My understanding is that real *semeiosis *is a continuous process, while > an individual sign token's determination of an individual interpreter to > an individual (dynamical) interpretant is a discrete *event *that > we prescind from that process. The interpretant *itself *is neither a > process nor an event, but rather the resulting *effect *of a particular > sign token on a particular interpreter--either a feeling, an exertion, or > another sign; again, something discrete that we prescind from the > continuous process of real semeiosis. That being the case, a single graph > *can > *represent an interpretant when it is a sign, especially when it is a > proposition; for example, the interpretant of an argumentation is its > conclusion. > > > > GF: Here again I read Peirce as affirming the *continuity *of > interpreter and interpretant as an aspect of the continuity of semiosis as > process. > > > > I agree, but I believe that we must still carefully distinguish an > *interpreter > *as a quasi-mind from an *interpretant *as a determination of that > quasi-mind by a sign. On the other hand, as I have noted previously, > according to Peirce a "quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" > (SS 195, 1906); so there is a sense in which, at any given moment, an > interpreter is the *combined *interpretant of *all *the signs that have > previously determined it. "For any set of Signs which are so connected > that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be > Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*" (CP 4.550, 1906). Is > this what you have in mind? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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