Jon Alan, List After a private reply from Jon Alan and to my great regret, I find that it is in my own interest to stop debating with him on this thread. This is not a personal matter. I will soon propose a general reflection on the biases I have identified that prevent a serene scientific debate.
Best regards Robert Le mer. 1 juil. 2020 à 09:53, robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> a écrit : > REP EN > 01/07 > > > > · No it's not entirely clear: Do I understand that you keep your > diagram simply by removing the ovals? If so it's up to you to do it... for > I remind you that you have contrasted your diagram with the one I offers in > an introductory book to semiotics: > > My original message here: > > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00154.html > > Your alternative proposal here: > > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00157.html > > My two animated diagrams can be found here: > > > http://qualisignes.fr/2020/06/23/what-are-the-characteristics-of-the-peircean-sign/ > > > > *This justifies me asking you a new question: are you still opposing an > alternative** to* *my diagram and if so? * > > > > · In the meantime I will discuss your sentence: > > > > > > *"Where it gets interesting (and perhaps contentious) is identifying the > different senses of "determining" and the different pairs of correlates to > which each of them pertains" *You already had in a previous message > written this: > > > > *"This reflects once again our disagreement about the meaning of > "determines" within the process of semeiosis. In my view, it only means > "efficiently causes" when a dynamical object determines an indexical sign > and when a sign token determines a dynamical interpretant (actuality). It > means "formally causes" when a dynamical object determines an iconic sign > and when a sign type determines an immediate interpretant (possibility). > It means "finally causes" when a dynamical object determines a symbolic > sign and when a final interpretant (conditional necessity) determines a > dynamical interpretant. A sign that never actually determines a dynamical > interpretant can still be real and have a final interpretant because > it would produce that effect under ideal circumstances, just as a diamond > that never actually gets rubbed with corundum nevertheless is really hard > because it would resist scratching under those circumstances (CP 5.457, EP > 2:356-357, 1905)".* > > > > We'll see that it's actually *"contentious"* and even more. On the face > of it, one may wonder who would have the legitimacy to create three > additional meanings for a term of its language. Dictionaries record social > language practices, not individual proposals. We can certainly create > different meanings, but we must define them unambiguously correctly and > above all create a new term for any new meaning (CP 2.226). > > Beforehand I recall this quotation which unambiguously fixes the meaning > of "determines": > > > > * We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be > such as it will be,) the Sign in a particular manner.(CP 8.361) (souligné > par moi)* > > > > In linguistics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics>, determinatum (from > the Latin <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin> determinare, to fix the > limits of something) is a part of speech > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Part_of_speech> that is modified by > another part of speech. > > > So we have: > > "determinans determines determinatum" or "determinans modificate > determinatum", which seems to me very close to Peirce's conception which > adds to the common sense a kind of injunction about the very being of the > determinatum. It is clear that it is not the couple (determinans, > determinatum) that can define the meaning of the relationship that binds > them, otherwise one could create as many relationships as couples that one > would be able to define. In your opinion, there should be a distinction: > > · An efficient cause "determinesA" a reality > > · A formal cause "determinesB" a possibility > > · A final cause "determinesC" a necessity > > Why not others? > > This three-way distinction for "determines" should therefore disappear > from your point. In fact, it seems to me that it is of no use. > > > > *So my second question is: **you take it off?* > > > > > > > > > > > Le mar. 30 juin 2020 à 03:00, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > a écrit : > >> Robert, List: >> >> I acknowledge that my diagram looks very much like a Venn diagram, and I >> confess that this is misleading. It is not intended to be understood that >> way, so my error was creating that wrong impression, for which I apologize. >> >> A quasi-mind is not a *set*, it "is itself a sign, a determinable sign" >> (SS 195, 1906). I am trying to illustrate the idea that the commens is the >> *overlap >> *of the uttering and interpreting quasi-minds due to their being "fused" >> or "welded" in a particular sign (cf. EP 2:478, 1906; CP 4.551, 1906). As >> I have suggested before, a better conceptualization is that the utterer >> corresponds to the graphist who scribes existential graphs on the phemic >> sheet, which corresponds to the commens; the interpreter reads them, and >> perhaps modifies them in accordance with the transformation rules (cf. CP >> 4.552-553, 1906). In fact, apart from the ovals, my diagram *is* an >> existential graph expressing three propositions that together comprise the >> sign definition that I quoted from Peirce (EP 2:410, 1907). >> >> - A sign stands in the genuine triadic relation of *mediating *between >> its object and its interpretant. >> - The object stands in the dyadic relation of *determining *the sign. >> - The sign stands in the dyadic relation of *determining* the >> interpretant. >> >> Hence the three correlates are the object as the "essential ingredient" >> of the utterer, the interpretant as the "essential ingredient" of the >> interpreter, and the sign itself. In my view, these align respectively >> with "the *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the >> mind of the utterer" as the dynamical interpretant of a *previous* sign >> of the same object; "the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a >> determination of the mind of the interpreter" as the dynamical interpretant >> of *this *sign; and "the *Communicational* Interpretant, or say the >> *Cominterpretant*, which is a determination of" the commens as the >> (internal) immediate interpretant of *this *sign (EP 2:478). As for the >> notion of "essential ingredient," it comes directly from Peirce, earlier in >> the same text as the quoted sign definition. >> >> CSP: Having found, then, that neither an utterer, nor even, perhaps, an >> interpreter is essential to a sign, characteristic of signs as they both >> are, I am led to inquire whether there be not some ingredient of the >> utterer and some ingredient of the interpreter which not only are so >> essential, but are even more characteristic of signs than the utterer and >> the interpreter themselves. We begin with seeking the essential ingredient >> of the utterer. By calling this quaesitum an *ingredient *of the >> utterer, I mean that where this quaesitum is absent the utterer cannot be >> present ... this quaesitum will function as a sort of substitute for an >> utterer, in case there be no utterer, or at any rate fulfills nearly the >> same, but a more essential, function ... (EP 2:404, 1907) >> >> >> Where there is no object, there can be no utterer; but there can and must >> be an object where there is a sign with no utterer, such as "symptoms of >> disease, signs of the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, >> etc." (ibid). Likewise, where there is no interpretant, there can be no >> interpreter; but there can and must be an interpretant where there is a >> sign with no interpreter, such as pictures woven by a Jacquard loom that >> burn up "before anyone can see them," "automatically recorded" results of >> experiments with model boats that "nobody takes the trouble to study," and >> "the books of a bank" from which no balance sheet is ever drawn up (ibid). >> Such an interpretant is not *actual* (dynamical), but rather *possible >> *(immediate) >> or even conditionally *necessary *(final)--"If a sign has no >> interpreter, its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it *would* >> determine in the interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907). >> >> Does that clear things up? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 3:29 AM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> Le mer. 24 juin 2020 à 02:57, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> a écrit : >>> >>>> Robert, Helmut, List: >>>> >>>> I agree that it is important to recognize not only the genuine *triadic >>>> *relation of "representing" or "mediating" with its three >>>> correlates--sign, object, and interpretant--but also the *dyadic* >>>> relations of "determining" that it involves. That is why I included them >>>> in the diagram >>>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00145/Sign_Model.jpg> >>>> that I posted a couple of days ago. >>>> >>> >>> I start by discussing your diagram >>> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-06/msg00145/Sign_Model.jpg> >>> . >>> >>> · First it presents itself as a two-set Venn diagram with a non-empty >>> intersection. The quasi-mind A is a set called "utterer" represented by a >>> dotted ellipse and the quasi-mind B is a set called "interpreter" >>> represented by a continuous line ellipse. >>> >>> >>> >>> · In quasi-mind A there is an "Object" which you say is an essential >>> ingredient of quasi-mind A and also the Object of the sign. You do not >>> define the term "ingredient" and therefore no more "essential ingredient". >>> However, your diagram shows your "Object" as a "participant" of a >>> triad. We do not know the other two "participants" but we see that they >>> both belong to the "commens" that is another quasi-mind, namely the >>> ensemblist intersection of the other two that you name also "quasi-mind >>> A∩B ". >>> >>> >>> >>> · In the quasi-mind B is an "Interpretant", an essential ingredient >>> of quasi-mind B which is "participant" in another triad of which the other >>> two participants also belong to the "commens". >>> >>> >>> >>> · The elements of the two quasi-mind A and quasi-mind B sets are >>> clearly triads. In the quasi-mind A they are distinguished by the presence >>> of the participant "Object" and in the quasi-mind B by the presence of the >>> participant "Interpretant". That's what distinguishes these two sets*. >>> I note here an error that requires repair*: the intersection of two >>> sets of triads is a subset of triads of each of the two. "Object" and " >>> Interpretant" are elements of another nature and your diagram cut the two >>> triads. It is out of the question that "Object" is an ingredient of the set >>> "quasi-mind A" and the same goes for "Interpretant" in "quasi-mind B". >>> These are two impossibilities that cannot remain as they stand. >>> >>> >>> >>> · *I ask you the question: how do you repair this obvious >>> error? It is an imperative condition to continue the discussion*. >>> >>> >>> >>>> I also agree that it is inappropriate to privilege any one of Peirce's >>>> 76 sign definitions exclusively, although I consider some of them to be >>>> more perspicuous than others. In particular, I share Mats Bergman's >>>> opinion that "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions" is what I quoted a >>>> couple of days ago. >>>> >>>> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, >>>> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both >>>> determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and >>>> determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise >>>> as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the >>>> mediation of this "sign." >>>> The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of >>>> the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP >>>> 2:410, 1907) >>>> >>>> -- Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty?fbclid=IwAR0N4S-t_avO38YlBYcj_-a2YYcsNvl6joIhTkajX0lMQhV8CXRQjQeXXxQ> semiotiquedure.online ; semioticadura.online ; hardsemiotics.online
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