> No, you're right, sort of. You haven't vandalized it, you've denial of > serviced it temporarily, in that everybody else's sessions will be > automatically restarted. I should probably map each user to > a single one of those 30 login names, so they can at most every > vandalize 1/30 of the other users. Thoughts? Here 30 can be > made arbitrarily large...
Why is there the limitation of 30 (or 900, 10000, or $n$)? How about actually creating a UNIX user per notebook user? This way we wouldn't have to fiddle with permissions but everything is secured by the trustworthy UNIX user model? Signing up requires some effort (we could add a captcha as a Turing test) so I wouldn't expect the notebook to get millions of sign-ups per second. I am not aware that having many (>100.000) logins on a system is like a Denial-of-Service (but I could be wrong here) and we might even remove all accounts that have been inactive for some time. To further motivate this: The SAGE notebook is a free shell on a remote machine (plus some math stuff :-)) with no prior checks whatsoever. So it should be secured like a real shell via the UNIX security model. Also, as William wants to count active notebook users as SAGE users (which I think is reasonable) we should make sure that the probability of some weird script kidding killing all your work is way below $number_of_tries * 1/30. Thoughts? Martin -- name: Martin Albrecht _pgp: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x8EF0DC99 _www: http://www.informatik.uni-bremen.de/~malb _jab: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ To post to this group, send email to sage-devel@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/sage-devel URLs: http://sage.scipy.org/sage/ and http://modular.math.washington.edu/sage/ -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
