<< Disarming the Free Iraqi Forces after the war was a terrible mistake, another example of the State Department and CIA vendetta against Ahmed Chalabi. The allies are now training Iraqi police, and finally a new army. But that process will take far longer than it would have if the U.S. had just accepted the help of the Talabani Kurds and Iraqi National Congress. The U.S. has arrested 32 of the 55 Baathists in its deck of horribles, and 15 of them were nabbed by or with the help of the INC. >>
The Wall Street Journal REVIEW & OUTLOOK The War Isn't Over And Bush opponents are playing into Saddam's hands. Saturday, June 28, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT The big news in Iraq isn't that weapons of mass destruction haven't yet been found, but that Professor Hilal al-Bayyati is leaving. The former prisoner and head of Iraq's National Computer Center, Mr. Bayyati told Patrick Tyler of the New York Times last week that he is abandoning his dream of rebuilding Iraq because he fears the return of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. Better than many Americans, Iraqis like Mr. Bayyati know that the war isn't over. Large elements of Saddam's regime are still around, pursuing almost daily attacks of sabotage. Foreign jihadis are joining them, some of whom may well be allied with al Qaeda. This is the reason GIs continue to die, and it means the U.S. will have to make a much more forceful, systematic effort to kill and punish them if stability is going to be restored. The first step is to stop underestimating the nature of the threat. The CIA keeps telling U.S. officials that there is no "organized" resistance, as if it needs to find some headquarters in a basement to prove it. When oil pipelines are being blown up, Iraqis who work with Americans are assassinated, and GIs are routinely ambushed, the prudent conclusion is that the attacks are organized until proven otherwise. It's possible that this guerrilla strategy was part of Saddam's plan all along. Retired Marine Colonel Gary Anderson predicted much of what is now unfolding in the April 2 Washington Post. Saddam admires Ho Chi Minh and has studied the U.S. debacles in Lebanon and Somalia. Rather than confront the U.S. in a conventional fight they'd lose, the Baathists "seeded the urban and semi-urban population centers of the country with cadres designed to lead such a guerrilla movement." This strategy would explain why the Baathists didn't use chemical weapons; the act would have turned the world irreparably against them. The major fighting also ended before U.S. troops swept into the Sunni areas north of Baghdad, where two Republican Guard divisions were able to blend into the population. Now the Baathists can maintain hope of outlasting the Americans, who they assume will grow tired of taking casualties and turn Iraq over to the U.N. We aren't saying that Iraq is now like Algeria under the French, much less Somalia. The Shiite areas have been far less restive than the Sunni heartland, notwithstanding the attack on British troops this week. Electricity is coming back, commerce is being restored and order in Baghdad is far better than it was a month ago. But the longer we refuse to take the Baathist threat seriously, the more we run the risk that Iraq could become an Algeria. U.S. forces have at least gone back on offense against the Baathists, as in last week's attack on the convoy near Syria. U.S. regent L. Paul Bremer has also pursued a vigorous de-Baathification campaign. This is a huge step forward from the early occupation, when State Department official Robin Raphel said it would be "fascistic" to purge too many Baathists. In one episode reported by Mr. Tyler on May 8, Mr. Bayyati watched in horror as his former Baathist jailer walked past him to meet with Ms. Raphel. Mr. Bremer should go beyond merely screening out Baathists and begin prosecuting them for war crimes. The allies have been reluctant do this, for fear of having to hold hundreds of prisoners, as well as preferring to leave prosecution to a new Iraqi government. But events on the ground have changed. Most Iraqis believe Saddam is still alive, and may well return. His allies are spreading leaflets and word about "the party of return," further scaring Iraqis from assisting any new government. They know that the Yanks can always go home, leaving them to cope with any Baathist revival. Short of finding Saddam himself, the only way to reassure Iraqis that his day is done may be to have public trials for the atrocities that he and his people committed. If there were war crimes trials after World War II in Japan and Germany, and against the Serbs in Kosovo, why delay justice in Iraq? Respected Iraqis could be among the judges. The other urgent need is to speed the process of involving Iraqis in their own government, especially in security. Disarming the Free Iraqi Forces after the war was a terrible mistake, another example of the State Department and CIA vendetta against Ahmed Chalabi. The allies are now training Iraqi police, and finally a new army. But that process will take far longer than it would have if the U.S. had just accepted the help of the Talabani Kurds and Iraqi National Congress. The U.S. has arrested 32 of the 55 Baathists in its deck of horribles, and 15 of them were nabbed by or with the help of the INC. Mr. Bremer will soon start naming a provisional governing council of Iraqis, and the faster the better there too. The sooner the Kurds and majority Shiites see a stake in a new government, the more difficult it will be for the Baathists to pose as spoilers. Our sources say an election has to be put off, because the two most organized forces today are the Baath Party and Shiites allied with Iran. That's a judgment call, though we'd note it is one more reason for bringing Baathists to the justice of public trials. There's also a message here for the U.S. political class: Saddam is counting on the media and politicians to continue their bureaucratic navel-gazing since the main fighting ended. He wants them to re-parse every Pentagon word, and to interview every CIA analyst, to somehow show that liberating Iraq was a mistake. While the Beltway spins, he and his Baathists can plot their return.
