Washington Post Dangerous Indecision in Iraq By Jim Hoagland Thursday, April 1, 2004
The Bush administration went into Iraq with a bold political vision of regime change and a daring military strategy that used speed instead of armored mass to conquer the battlefield. A year later clarity and decisiveness have gone missing in both the political and military spheres in Iraq. Fewer than 100 days remain before "sovereignty" and presumably power are to be transferred from the U.S.-British occupation authority in Baghdad to . . . ? I can't tell you. Neither can the White House, which drifts toward subcontracting the job of organizing a sovereign interim Iraqi authority to the United Nations. Washington has also decided that a new U.N. Security Council resolution should provide the legal basis for the continuing presence of nearly 150,000 American and other foreign troops in Iraq after the June 30 turnover -- even though the administration had agreed last autumn to negotiate a status-of-forces agreement with Iraq's Governing Council. Washington takes for granted that the Iraqis, who have not been consulted, will accept this quiet reversal. As the U.N. role grows under U.S. prodding, the sovereign political powers that were supposed to be turned over to Iraqis by July 1 seem to shrink. So perhaps does President Bush's political exposure to unpredictable events -- and unpredictable Iraqis -- during this particularly heated campaign season. That, of course, would be coincidental, the White House will tell you. But with time growing short both for the Iraqi power transfer and the U.S. election, the administration seems to put less emphasis every day on time-consuming persuasion and negotiation with the Iraqis. There is also less coalition concern manifested about the deep insecurities of the majority Shiite community over the political future. This new impatience surfaced in the ill-advised closing by U.S. troops of the radical weekly newspaper Al Hawza on Sunday. Some of the uncertainty and confusion a year after the controversial invasion of Iraq is inevitable, and it does not undo the enormous progress that has been made. The ouster of Saddam Hussein last April was the first necessary step in returning Iraq to the family of nations after 30 years of genocidal misrule and tyranny, of shameful global silence about the huge mass graves filled with those who opposed or merely displeased the Baathist regime. Moreover, infrastructure repairs will be accelerated and social tensions should decline as $18 billion in reconstruction spending makes its way through the system this spring and summer. The United States and its allies do not face inevitable defeat in Iraq. But the boldness that was essential to destroying the old regime has given way to hesitation and retreat. This is seen in Washington's continuing push for an enhanced role for Lakhdar Brahimi, the talented U.N. mediator from Algeria. Brahimi is to launch a new round of consultations in Iraq this week, despite the clear unhappiness of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other Shiite leaders with the diplomat's trip there in February, when he predicted "civil war" if Sistani's desire for early elections was pursued. Brahimi unsettles the Shiite majority for much the same reason he reassures the Sunni minority that benefited from and supported Baathist rule. He is a dedicated Arab nationalist with a long history of ties to the Sunni governments that dominate the Arab world. And Brahimi's return to Iraq comes as Bush administration officials in private and senior Senate Democrats in public are arguing stridently for restrictions to be lifted on the employment and activities of former Baath Party officials, most of whom are Sunnis. For Shiites, the de-Baathification process has been a guarantee against renewed Sunni domination. Casual trashing of the restrictions by U.S. politicians can only deepen Shiite insecurity. Three months ago Sistani's reservations on the political future were at the center of official Washington's concerns. Today there seems to be greater urgency in enlisting the political cooperation of the Sunni minority. Sunni territory has been the springboard for the deadly insurgency being waged by Baathist death squads and al Qaeda-type terror gangs, and Arab governments are exerting great pressure on Washington on behalf of the Sunnis. But every bomb blast, and every appalling massacre, such as the butchering of four American contractors in Fallujah yesterday, is a message meant for Washington: "You have not beaten us. We have regrouped in a Sunni heartland that you never conquered, whatever your president announced." Bush has claimed the mantle as a war president. He must respond personally, and forcefully, to such barbaric challenges with his own words and show of resolution. He must ensure that his military commanders in Iraq have every resource they need to deal with the killers in Fallujah and their supporters. U.S. flexibility is important to winning this war. But a constant shifting of strategy, of clients, of goals and methods for establishing political structures, all under the pressure of the calendar, is a self-defeating exercise -- especially if it is carried out by fiat and with an air of imperviousness. Neither Americans nor Iraqis can be content with the policy message that we will "leave it to Lakhdar." [EMAIL PROTECTED]
