IRAQ NEWS, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 2004 The lead editorial in Friday's Daily Telegraph explains that yesterday's stunning series of attacks in Iraq look very much to be the work of the old regime, still fighting on.
This differs significantly from the view of Middle Eastern terrorism that has predominated over the past decade. Since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, such terrorism has largely been presented in terms of colorful, if repellant figures, and their "followers" or their "network." First, it was Shaykh Omar. He was jailed, and then it was said to be Osama bin Ladin. Two-thirds of al Qaida's leadership are captured or dead--so now it's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This makes no sense: one man and his followers. The Daily Telegraph provides a far more coherent explanation of yesterday's events. Daily Telegraph Editorial The sophisticated Ba'athist war game June 25, 2004 The spate of highly co-ordinated terrorist attacks in Iraq yesterday displayed intelligence in every sense of the word. It had all the hallmarks of Ba'athist tradecraft, notably of the Special Republican Guard units that melted away during the Allied military operations of 2003. But far from being the work of "irrational" fanatics (who want to bring the country down in some vast Millenarian conflagration with the "Great Satan" of America), the latest act of evil-doing manifests a depressingly shrewd grasp of the dynamics of Iraqi society. Consider, for a moment, those areas that got off comparatively lightly. The Kurdish zone was not heavily hit; much the same goes for the Shia strongholds. The targets, rather, were the Ba'athists' own predominantly Sunni Arab sectors. Far from seeking to plunge the country into sectarian war with the Shias and Kurds - as many American spokesmen believe - the insurgents seem now to be fighting mainly to tilt the balance within the Sunni Arab community. This makes a certain sense in its own bleak terms. The Kurds have enjoyed effective autonomy for years and the Shias (who compose a majority in Iraq but a small minority in the Arab world as a whole) inevitably hope that they will now do better than under Saddam Hussein. The Ba'athists could not be sure of winning any conflict if they took on these forces directly. A far more dangerous development from their viewpoint is the craving of the best elements in the Sunni Arab community - exemplified by the incoming president, Ghazi al Yawr - to break with the past. If they secure a permanent foothold, then all hope of a Ba'athist restoration is gone. But if the remnants of the ancien régime manage to intimidate the Sunni Arabs back into their clutches, a new set of possibilities opens up. If the Saddamites become the "sole legitimate representatives" of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, then they will be able to lay far greater claim to the support of the Sunni majority in the Arab world as a whole. Via such proxies, the Ba'athists will then exert an even greater gravitational pull to tilt Western policy further in an anti-democratic and anti-Shia direction. The task of winning over the Arab Sunnis to the new order has not been made any easier by the terms of the deal cut in April with the Fallujah insurgents, allowing them an easy exit and then handing over security to Ba'athist military officers who are often in collusion with the terrorists. During the American siege of that city, bombings plummeted. Since then, when Fallujah has become a haven for assorted malcontents, such attacks have resumed with a vengeance. Violence has proved to be profitable business, and it will continue for as long as the Allies make it worthwhile.
