Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
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}Agreed - uniformity and habit-taking are negentropic. But Firstness
is entropic in nature.
The habits are not Mind but are the result of the actions of Mind.
Mind has three properties: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. That is,
I am including randomness or spontaneity within Mind as well as the
instantiations of habit in Mind.
Edwina
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On Wed 05/04/17 3:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Clark, List:
ET: To the contrary, Mind ends up as generalities. "In endless
time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of
thinking.a generalization of order" 6.490 Since Mind refers to
the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the ultimate
limit, in my view, is not matter but habit.
It might be helpful to review the entire context that quote.
CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens
necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be
given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time,
since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any
and every previous time. But in endless time it is destined to think
all that it is capable of thinking. Order is simply thought embodied
in arrangement; and thought embodied in any other way appears
objectively as a character that is a generalization of order, and
that, in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce,
"Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The idea may be
caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity are
particular varieties. Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far
as it is manifested in time, appear as having a character related to
the habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to
uniformity. (CP 6.490; 1908)
According to Peirce, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind" is such
that "in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable
of thinking." What is "a generalization of order" is not Mind
itself, but "Super-order"; i.e., how "thought embodied in any other
way" than order itself "appears objectively." The "habit-taking
capacity" is also not Mind itself; rather, "Pure mind, as creative of
thought," appears in time to have "a character related to the
habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to uniformity."
Since uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the
habit-taking capacity is evidently a particular variety of the
thought-creating character of pure mind.
I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation,
except that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that
standpoint, uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic
in nature.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Clark, list - at the moment, I'm going to disagree - that is, I'm
not entirely convinced by your outline.
The way I see it, is that Mind doesn't 'end up in the Final
Interpretant phase' as particular instantiations. To the contrary,
Mind ends up as generalities.
"In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of
thinking.a generalization of order" 6.490
Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears
to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits
don't move toward more differentiation but towards more generality.
What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus,
entropic dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of
matter. Peirce repeatedly refers to the 'breaking up of habit' [see
Man's Glassy Essence, 6.264] in which he writes of 'the manner in
which habits generally get broken up", because "matter never does
obey its ideal laws with absolute precision, but that there are
almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity, these will
produce, in general, minute effects. But protoplasm is in an
excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of
unstable equilibrium that near that point excessively minute causes
may produce startlingly large effects""Now this breaking up of
habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law
of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of feeling".
My reading of the above is that Firstness, which is a basic
foundational law of the universe, could be defined as entropy, or the
force that continuously breaks up stability. Therefore - I don't get
your conclusion that Firstness is anti-entropy or that it violates
entropy. If Firstness were supreme then, we would in a sense, see the
heat-death of the univ
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, Clark, List: ET: To the contrary, Mind ends up as generalities. "In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking.a generalization of order" 6.490 Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. It might be helpful to review the entire context that quote. CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium* would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But *in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking*. Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied in any other way appears objectively as a character that is *a generalization of order*, and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The idea may be caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity are particular varieties. Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having a character related to *the habit-taking capacity*, just as super-order is related to uniformity. (CP 6.490; 1908) According to Peirce, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind" is such that "in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking." What is "a generalization of order" is not Mind itself, but "Super-order"; i.e., how "thought embodied in any other way" than order itself "appears objectively." The "habit-taking capacity" is also not Mind itself; rather, "Pure mind, as creative of thought," appears in time to have "a character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to uniformity." Since uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the habit-taking capacity is evidently a particular variety of the thought-creating character of pure mind. I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint, uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in nature. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Clark, list - at the moment, I'm going to disagree - that is, I'm not > entirely convinced by your outline. > > The way I see it, is that Mind doesn't 'end up in the Final Interpretant > phase' as particular instantiations. To the contrary, Mind ends up as > generalities. > > "In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of > thinking.a generalization of order" 6.490 > > Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be > the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move > toward more differentiation but towards more generality. > > What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic > dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce > repeatedly refers to the 'breaking up of habit' [see Man's Glassy Essence, > 6.264] in which he writes of 'the manner in which habits generally get > broken up", because "matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute > precision, but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from > regularity, these will produce, in general, minute effects. But protoplasm > is in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of > unstable equilibrium that near that point excessively minute causes may > produce startlingly large effects""Now this breaking up of habit and > renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law of mind, be > accompanied by an intensification of feeling". > > My reading of the above is that Firstness, which is a basic foundational > law of the universe, could be defined as entropy, or the force that > continuously breaks up stability. Therefore - I don't get your conclusion > that Firstness is anti-entropy or that it violates entropy. If Firstness > were supreme then, we would in a sense, see the heat-death of the universe > since matter would dissipate to its lowest state or even non-existence. > What prevents this is Thirdness, the taking of habits - which enables > particular articulations of these habits to emerge and live their > short/long exisentialities. But Firstness, as a basic principle of the > universe, is quite ready to destabilize those habits and insert 'minute > differences - i.e, to act as entropy. > > That's where I see it at the moment. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 05/04/17 1:29 PM , Clark Goble
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Clark, list - at the moment, I'm going to disagree - that is, I'm not entirely convinced by your outline. The way I see it, is that Mind doesn't 'end up in the Final Interpretant phase' as particular instantiations. To the contrary, Mind ends up as generalities. "In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking.a generalization of order" 6.490 Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward more differentiation but towards more generality. What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce repeatedly refers to the 'breaking up of habit' [see Man's Glassy Essence, 6.264] in which he writes of 'the manner in which habits generally get broken up", because "matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision, but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity, these will produce, in general, minute effects. But protoplasm is in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of unstable equilibrium that near that point excessively minute causes may produce startlingly large effects""Now this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law of mind, be accompanied by an intensification of feeling". My reading of the above is that Firstness, which is a basic foundational law of the universe, could be defined as entropy, or the force that continuously breaks up stability. Therefore - I don't get your conclusion that Firstness is anti-entropy or that it violates entropy. If Firstness were supreme then, we would in a sense, see the heat-death of the universe since matter would dissipate to its lowest state or even non-existence. What prevents this is Thirdness, the taking of habits - which enables particular articulations of these habits to emerge and live their short/long exisentialities. But Firstness, as a basic principle of the universe, is quite ready to destabilize those habits and insert 'minute differences - i.e, to act as entropy. That's where I see it at the moment. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 05/04/17 1:29 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent: On Apr 3, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, feeling, chance - but - is entropy. Could you unpack that a little more? I *think* I understand what you’re getting at — how chance undermines order — but I’m not quite sure. Or, put an other way, if habit is the opposite of a rise in entropy then movement away from habit (substance being the ultimate limit) would increase entropy. The place where of course Peirce has some difficulty here is with the second law of thermodynamics. The heat death thesis is the clearest example of this. Now one might say that Peirce’s conception of substance as the limit of semiosis is heat death, but I don’t think that’s right. The heat death is basically the interaction between things leading to a broad distribution of energy so you lose differentiation. But for Peirce of course habits are moving towards more differentiation. While we see that locally we don’t see that globally. So far as I know not a lot has been written on Peirce and the second law of thermodynamics. Which is surprising given how much has been written on Peirce and chance - particularly related to classic epicureanism and stoicism. Given Peirce’s background in physics and chemistry he knew thermodynamics but from what I can tell didn’t really apply it to his cosmology. One of the few articles on the subject in Andrew Reynolds “Peirce’s Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics” in Transactions. There he notes Peirce’s conception of the first law (conservation) was that it was just an algebraic relationship and not an ontological condition (the way most physicists take it). So for him it simply doesn’t prescribe that the total amount of energy in the universe is constant. Merely that in any system you have algebraic connections between energy flow. (See CP 6.602) He next distinguishes between forces for growth, that are irreversible, from those tied to the conservation of energy which are reversible. Since Perice thought growth had stronger evidence than conservation, growth was the exception. (6.613) He adopts the position of Carus in which the brain is primarily physical and thus subject to conservation laws except that “there are present states of awareness….Neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed on any scales….” (CP 6.614) In explaining that quote from Carus, Peirce says, “It escapes materialism. It supposes a direct dynamical action between mind and
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
> On Apr 5, 2017, at 11:29 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I know that was all long, but I want to return to Edwina’s initial comment > that firstness is both chance and entropy. For Peirce, I’ve hopefully shown, > those are actually opposed. Firstness is what violates entropy. It is > anti-entropy. Sorry that was already long enough but rereading it there’s a crucial point I should make. Not everyone agrees on this point. So I don’t want to convey to Edwina this is settled. In particular Esposito sees tychism as an entropic factor and synechism as an opposing negentropic factor” (Evolutionary Metaphysics, 1980, 169) I’ll confess I’ve not read Esposito, only references to his work. So I can’t speak to his argument. From references I’ve seen scattered in various works over the years I think Esposito sees the topic through habit and what forms habits versus what breaks habits. My previous post sees chance as performing both those roles. Esposito sees chances as breaking habit (thus Edwina’s view of firstness as entropy). I think though Peirce saw chance as simply something different (whether he was correct in that or not is an other matter) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
> On Apr 3, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, feeling, > chance - but - is entropy. Could you unpack that a little more? I *think* I understand what you’re getting at — how chance undermines order — but I’m not quite sure. Or, put an other way, if habit is the opposite of a rise in entropy then movement away from habit (substance being the ultimate limit) would increase entropy. The place where of course Peirce has some difficulty here is with the second law of thermodynamics. The heat death thesis is the clearest example of this. Now one might say that Peirce’s conception of substance as the limit of semiosis is heat death, but I don’t think that’s right. The heat death is basically the interaction between things leading to a broad distribution of energy so you lose differentiation. But for Peirce of course habits are moving towards more differentiation. While we see that locally we don’t see that globally. So far as I know not a lot has been written on Peirce and the second law of thermodynamics. Which is surprising given how much has been written on Peirce and chance - particularly related to classic epicureanism and stoicism. Given Peirce’s background in physics and chemistry he knew thermodynamics but from what I can tell didn’t really apply it to his cosmology. One of the few articles on the subject in Andrew Reynolds “Peirce’s Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics” in Transactions. There he notes Peirce’s conception of the first law (conservation) was that it was just an algebraic relationship and not an ontological condition (the way most physicists take it). So for him it simply doesn’t prescribe that the total amount of energy in the universe is constant. Merely that in any system you have algebraic connections between energy flow. (See CP 6.602) He next distinguishes between forces for growth, that are irreversible, from those tied to the conservation of energy which are reversible. Since Perice thought growth had stronger evidence than conservation, growth was the exception. (6.613) He adopts the position of Carus in which the brain is primarily physical and thus subject to conservation laws except that “there are present states of awareness….Neither states of awareness nor their meanings can be weighed on any scales….” (CP 6.614) In explaining that quote from Carus, Peirce says, “It escapes materialism. It supposes a direct dynamical action between mind and matter, such as not been supposed by any eminent philosopher that I know of for centuries.” Regarding entropy again, Peirce’s platonic cosmology is kind of the inverse of what physicists would expect. The end is not heat death but a system “in which mind is at last crystalized in the infinitely distant future” (6.33) Reynolds argues that we ought distinguish between 20th century views of entropy from Peirce’s 19th century views. (I don’t know enough about the detailed history here to know how accurate he is - I’m assuming he’s getting it right) Peirce praises the Maxwell/Boltzmann statistical interpretation of entropy. (Reasoning, 220) The Boltzmann interpretation is that entropy holds only statistically. But Peirce sees real chance as working in a direction counter to the increase of entropy. “But although no force can counteract this tendency, chance may and will have the opposite influence. Force is in the long run dissipative; chance is in the long run concentrative. The dissipation of energy by the regular laws of nature is by those very laws accompanied by circumstances more and more favorable to its reconcentration by chance.” (Writings 4.551) Reynolds argues Peirce is thinking of what later was called the Poincare Recurrence Theorem. However Peirce for mechanism favors Boltzmann and thus something like the heat death but due to chance thinks this won’t happen. He recognizes the problem with entropy but sees himself as an ontological evolutionist. Since “the universe as a whole…should be conceived of as growing” (6.613) that growth ontologically escapes both conservation and entropy. The way he does this is to see that there are temporary violations due to chance but that there’s then a tendency towards entropy. So it’s that combination that he thinks will let him achieve a final state, but which because of growth won’t be a heat death state. Now of course none of this is terribly satisfying - especially to scientists who tend to see the laws of entropy as ontological or absolute laws. Indeed physicists seem quite willing to give up on most laws except thermodynamics. It’s this reason that I personally find Peirce’s cosmology so troubling, although I don’t think I’ve explained that before now. I know that was all long, but I want to return to Edwina’s initial comment that firstness is both chance and entropy. For Peirce, I’ve hopefully shown, those are actually opposed. Firstn
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, List: ET: That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, feeling, chance - but - is entropy. I guess I need to get more up to speed on how Sign-action works in the physico-chemical and biological realms before we can tie up this particular loose end. Please keep me posted on any further changes that you might end up making to your model in light of our collaborative adjustments so far. ET: This I will have to think about, since my definition of habits gives it the ability to adapt and evolve. I'm not sure if the Final Interpretant has this ability. Understood. I was careful to suggest that it is a *tendency*, rather than something strictly *deterministic*, precisely because habits can be modified over time. ET: HABIT does govern which 'actual effects the sign tends to produce from its range of possible effects'...but is the Final Interpretant - which Peirce acknowledges is open and may never be reached - is it the same as 'habit'? There is a strong case for saying: Yes - as long as it has that ability to adapt and evolve. Agreed. My impression is that Peirce was never fully satisfied that he had properly worked out the details of all three Interpretants and their relations with the Sign--especially the Final Interpretant, given that he wrote, "I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536; 1906). However, he did explicitly describe the final *logical *intepretant as a habit (CP 5.491, EP 2:418; 1907), and I have decided to run with that hint by proposing to define the Final Interpretant as a habit of feeling (1ns), action (2ns), or thought (3ns). Thanks, Jon On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > See my comments: > > > 1) ET: But what happens when an instantiation is isolated from > interaction with other instances? > > > JAS: This sounds like "existing outside semeiosis." Is that even > possible? Once a Sign is "born"--determined by a Dynamic Object to be > capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant--can it ever "die"; i.e., > cease to be a Sign? I suppose that it might somehow lose that > capability; i.e., no longer have an Immediate Interpretant, which would > mean that it no longer qualifies as a Sign. Is that what you have in > mind, or something else? > > EDWINA: No- I'm claiming that there is no such thing as an existence > outside semiosis. Let's say, again, a molecule of hydrogen. Its Dynamic > Objects are the hydrogen atoms; its Immediate Objects are these 'trapped > hydrogen atoms; its Representamen/sign is the laws of chemical formation > which have 'trapped' the atoms in their laws; its Immediate Interpretant is > the result of this - the Hydrogen molecule which instantiates as the > Dynamic Interpretant, the Hydrogen molecule. Now - IF this Hydrogen > molecule is isolated - it will dissipate. That is - the categorical mode of > Firstness is built into the semiosic system such that stability for > infinity - is impossible. The first to dissipate will be the external > existence, the Dynamic Interpretant - that molecule. Can the Representamen > dissipate if not used/ articulated as instantiations? I'd suggest: YES. > That means that its capacity to produce an Immediate Interpretant also > dissipates. This would happen very rarely if at all, but, the possibility > of its occurrence is real. > > Take another example. a cell, which is composed of various smaller > cells/molecules etc, and is organized according to habits. The cell is a > Dynamic Interpretant of the Dynamic ObjectS [and there are multiple DOs] as > organized by the semoisic interaction of the IO- Representamen-II. Now, IF > that cell is isolated from interaction - since Firstness or dissipation is > built into the system - then, it will dissipate. > > That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, > feeling, chance - but - is entropy. > === > > 2] ET: A cell that has only itself, isolate from all other cells - will > die and decompose. The fact that the cell includes 'habits' of its > formation won't help keep it alive; it MUST interact with the external envt > or it will decompose. > > > Agreed, although it seems to me that semeiosis continues to happen--the > dead cell is still, in some sense, interacting with its external > environment to bring about that very decomposition. Obviously, though, > that interaction is very different from when it was alive. > > EDWINA: Agreed - semiosis continues, in a different form than when it was > alive. > > > 3] JASWe really have not yet touched on where habits belong in our new > model. As I have said before, I see them as Final Interpretants; and I did > not want to bring those up until we finished sorting out the Immediate and > Dynamic Interpretants. This is right off the top of my head, but if the > Immediate Interpretant is inte
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }See
my comments:
1) ET: But what happens when an instantiation is isolated from
interaction with other instances?
JAS: This sounds like "existing outside semeiosis." Is that even
possible? Once a Sign is "born"--determined by a Dynamic Object to
be capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant--can it ever "die";
i.e., cease to be a Sign? I suppose that it might somehow lose that
capability; i.e., no longer have an Immediate Interpretant, which
would mean that it no longer qualifies as a Sign. Is that what you
have in mind, or something else?
EDWINA: No- I'm claiming that there is no such thing as an existence
outside semiosis. Let's say, again, a molecule of hydrogen. Its
Dynamic Objects are the hydrogen atoms; its Immediate Objects are
these 'trapped hydrogen atoms; its Representamen/sign is the laws
of chemical formation which have 'trapped' the atoms in their laws;
its Immediate Interpretant is the result of this - the Hydrogen
molecule which instantiates as the Dynamic Interpretant, the Hydrogen
molecule. Now - IF this Hydrogen molecule is isolated - it will
dissipate. That is - the categorical mode of Firstness is built into
the semiosic system such that stability for infinity - is impossible.
The first to dissipate will be the external existence, the Dynamic
Interpretant - that molecule. Can the Representamen dissipate if not
used/ articulated as instantiations? I'd suggest: YES. That means
that its capacity to produce an Immediate Interpretant also
dissipates. This would happen very rarely if at all, but, the
possibility of its occurrence is real.
Take another example. a cell, which is composed of various smaller
cells/molecules etc, and is organized according to habits. The cell
is a Dynamic Interpretant of the Dynamic ObjectS [and there are
multiple DOs] as organized by the semoisic interaction of the IO-
Representamen-II. Now, IF that cell is isolated from interaction -
since Firstness or dissipation is built into the system - then, it
will dissipate.
That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality,
feeling, chance - but - is entropy.
===
2] ET: A cell that has only itself, isolate from all other cells -
will die and decompose. The fact that the cell includes 'habits' of
its formation won't help keep it alive; it MUST interact with the
external envt or it will decompose.
Agreed, although it seems to me that semeiosis continues to
happen--the dead cell is still, in some sense, interacting with its
external environment to bring about that very decomposition.
Obviously, though, that interaction is very different from when it
was alive.
EDWINA: Agreed - semiosis continues, in a different form than when
it was alive.
3] JASWe really have not yet touched on where habits belong in our
new model. As I have said before, I see them as Final Interpretants;
and I did not want to bring those up until we finished sorting out the
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. This is right off the top of my
head, but if the Immediate Interpretant is internal (1ns) and the
Dynamic Interpretant is external (2ns), then perhaps the Final
Interpretant is what mediates between them (3ns). In other words, as
a habit, the Final Interpretant governs which actual effects the Sign
tends to produce from its range of possible effects. What do you
think?
EDWINA: This I will have to think about, since my definition of
habits gives it the ability to adapt and evolve. I'm not sure if the
Final Interpretant has this ability. HABIT does govern which
'actual effects the sign tends to produce from its range of possible
effects'...but is the Final Interpretant - which Peirce acknowledges
is open and may never be reached - is it the same as 'habit'? There
is a strong case for saying: Yes - as long as it has that ability to
adapt and evolve.
EDWINA - yes - incredible - but we do agree, and I think that this
model - that basic internal triad, but necessarily related to an
external Dynamic Objects or indeed to multiple Dynamic Objects -
gives the internal triad a tremendous flexibility and adaptive
capacity. Just what I've been looking for!
Wow. This will be a day long remembered--in a very good way! I
will be quite interested in learning whether and how this adjustment
affects your model in other ways as you contemplate and implement it
further.
Thanks,
Jon
On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
See my replies:
1] ET: I agree with the above outline - except, again, for my
concern over confining the Sign-as-a-triad to its internal
composition. I'm thinking of, for example, a paramecium. Is it, as an
existential reality, confined only to its internal composition or is
it necessarily existential only because it is semiosically connected
to external information processes?
JAS: By Peirce's definition,
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, List: Who could have imagined, even just a few days ago, that this outcome--involving both of us modifying our initial views in order to achieve consensus--was remotely possible? This seems like a real triumph for the collaborative purpose of the List. Only a few loose ends left to tie up ... ET: An 'existential reality' doesn't react just with 'other like things' - but with many material things; eg, a fish reacts to water, to water temperature, to chemicals in the water, to bacterium, etc. Agreed, I take Peirce to mean "other like things" in exactly that broad sense of "other *existing *things." ET: Again, where I am dithering is my view that that 'internal sign' cannot even be that 'internal sign' unless it is networked to the external reality. Agreed, since every Sign (Oi-R-Ii triad) *must *be determined by an *external *Dynamic Object, and *capable *of determining an *external *Dynamic Interpretant. ET: My thoughts on the modal categories in the physic-chemical realm would be that feeling is akin to the acknowledgement of one chemical to another chemical; just the acknowledgement of a molecule of hydrogen to a molecule of oxygen. Action is the reaction of acceptance [or rejection] of both molecules to each other. Thought is the habits of the chemical interaction that bonds them into the larger Water Molecule. Again, I need to think through these; but you have given me a helpful start, which I appreciate. ET: But what happens when an instantiation is isolated from interaction with other instances? This sounds like "existing outside semeiosis." Is that even possible? Once a Sign is "born"--determined by a Dynamic Object to be capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant--can it ever "die"; i.e., cease to be a Sign? I suppose that it might somehow *lose *that capability; i.e., no longer have an *Immediate *Interpretant, which would mean that it no longer *qualifies *as a Sign. Is that what you have in mind, or something else? ET: A cell that has only itself, isolate from all other cells - will die and decompose. The fact that the cell includes 'habits' of its formation won't help keep it alive; it MUST interact with the external envt or it will decompose. Agreed, although it seems to me that semeiosis continues to happen--the dead cell is still, in some sense, interacting with its external environment to bring about that very decomposition. Obviously, though, that interaction is very different from when it was alive. We really have not yet touched on where *habits *belong in our new model. As I have said before, I see them as Final Interpretants; and I did not want to bring those up until we finished sorting out the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. This is right off the top of my head, but if the Immediate Interpretant is internal (1ns) and the Dynamic Interpretant is external (2ns), then perhaps the Final Interpretant is what mediates between them (3ns). In other words, as a habit, the Final Interpretant governs which *actual *effects the Sign *tends* to produce from its range of *possible* effects. What do you think? EDWINA - yes - incredible - but we do agree, and I think that this model - that basic internal triad, but necessarily related to an external Dynamic Objects or indeed to multiple Dynamic Objects - gives the internal triad a tremendous flexibility and adaptive capacity. Just what I've been looking for! Wow. This will be a day long remembered--in a very good way! I will be quite interested in learning whether and how this adjustment affects your model in other ways as you contemplate and implement it further. Thanks, Jon On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > See my replies: > > 1] ET: I agree with the above outline - except, again, for my concern > over confining the Sign-as-a-triad to its internal composition. I'm > thinking of, for example, a paramecium. Is it, as an existential reality, > confined only to its internal composition or is it necessarily existential > only because it is semiosically connected to external information processes? > > > JAS: By Peirce's definition, anything that is properly described as "an > existential reality" is something that reacts with other like things in the > environment. If that is what you mean by being "semiosically connected to > external information processes," then we are in agreement here, even if we > confine the term "triad" to the Sign as (internally) Oi-R-Ii. There still > must also be the (external) triadic relation Od-S-Id, unless the Sign never > actually determines a Dynamic Interpretant, in which case I guess we have > only the dyadic relation Od-S; i.e., brute reaction without mediation. > > EDWINA: An 'existential reality' doesn't react just with 'other like > things' - but with many material things; eg, a fish reacts to water, to > water temperature, to chemicals in the water, to bacterium, etc. Again, > where I am dithering is my view that that 'int
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
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my replies:
1] ET: I agree with the above outline - except, again, for my
concern over confining the Sign-as-a-triad to its internal
composition. I'm thinking of, for example, a paramecium. Is it, as an
existential reality, confined only to its internal composition or is
it necessarily existential only because it is semiosically connected
to external information processes?
JAS: By Peirce's definition, anything that is properly described as
"an existential reality" is something that reacts with other like
things in the environment. If that is what you mean by being
"semiosically connected to external information processes," then we
are in agreement here, even if we confine the term "triad" to the
Sign as (internally) Oi-R-Ii. There still must also be the
(external) triadic relation Od-S-Id, unless the Sign never actually
determines a Dynamic Interpretant, in which case I guess we have only
the dyadic relation Od-S; i.e., brute reaction without mediation.
EDWINA: An 'existential reality' doesn't react just with 'other like
things' - but with many material things; eg, a fish reacts to water,
to water temperature, to chemicals in the water, to bacterium,
etc. Again, where I am dithering is my view that that 'internal
sign' cannot even be that 'internal sign' unless it is networked to
the external
reality.---
2]ET: As Peirce said - protoplasm feels. If I use as an example, a
plant, then feeling would be its 'awakening' to the warmth of the sun.
Action is of course its actions of intake of water and nutrients,
production of flowersand thought is its adaptive actions.
Thanks, I need to think through these and other examples. In
addition, how do we properly attribute feeling, action, and thought
to the non-living physico-chemical realm?
EDWINA: My thoughts on the modal categories in the physic-chemical
realm would be that feeling is akin to the acknowledgement of one
chemical to another chemical; just the acknowledgement of a molecule
of hydrogen to a molecule of oxygen. Action is the reaction of
acceptance [or rejection] of both molecules to each other. Thought is
the habits of the chemical interaction that bonds them into the larger
Water
Molecule.--
3] ET: I agree with the above - and each triad is distinct -
otherwise, not only would one not be able to pick out the particular
combinations but, the 'subject' would be unable to interact. The end
of distinctness is the withdrawal from semiosis - i.e., the death of
the subject.
Could you please elaborate on that last statement? I want to be
sure that I understand what you mean by "distinctness" and
"withdrawal" in this context, as well as "death" since I was thinking
that semeiosis is not limited to living things. Or do you just mean
"death" in Peirce's sense of "the complete induration of habit" at
the end of the universe?
EDWINA: It has some comparison ...but..- I don't mean death in the
Peircean sense of the 'complete induration of habit which is where
the laws swallow all ability to instantiate those laws. That would
only happen if the asymmetry between the laws and their
instantiations disappeared. That would only happen if one finally
reached the Truth, the ultimate Final Interpretant.
But what happens when an instantiation is isolated from interaction
with other instances? This is what I am talking about. A cell that has
only itself, isolate from all other cells - will die and decompose.
The fact that the cell includes 'habits' of its formation won't help
keep it alive; it MUST interact with the external envt or it will
decompose. How stable is a single isolate
molecule?--
4) ET: Yes - the above is a good model - my only quibble is what I
see as the necessity for that Internal Sign entity, so to speak, of
engaging with a Dynamic Object and possibly expressing a Dynamic
Interpretant. My point is that I don't see how a Sign, operative
only within its internal semiosic actions, can exist - as a Sign.
I hope it is clear by now that I agree with you on all of this.
Your concern, as I understand it, is that if we only use the term
"Sign" for the internal triad (Oi-R-Ii), someone might be misled into
thinking that a Sign in this sense can "exist" in isolation from
everything else. My concern is actually similar--if we also use the
term "Sign" for the external triadic relation (Od-S-Id), someone
might still be misled into thinking that a Sign in this sense can
"exist" in isolation from everything else. Furthermore, I see a lot
of value--besides just more closely matching Peirce's typical
usage--in carefully distinguishing between the possible/internal and
actual/external aspects of the Sign. In particular, I think
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, List: ET: I agree with the above outline - except, again, for my concern over confining the Sign-as-a-triad to its internal composition. I'm thinking of, for example, a paramecium. Is it, as an existential reality, confined only to its internal composition or is it necessarily existential only because it is semiosically connected to external information processes? By Peirce's definition, anything that is properly described as "an existential reality" is something that reacts with other like things in the environment. If that is what you mean by being "semiosically connected to external information processes," then we are in agreement here, even if we confine the term "triad" to the Sign as (internally) Oi-R-Ii. There still must also be the (external) triadic relation Od-S-Id, unless the Sign never actually determines a Dynamic Interpretant, in which case I guess we have only the dyadic relation Od-S; i.e., brute reaction *without *mediation. ET: As Peirce said - protoplasm feels. If I use as an example, a plant, then feeling would be its 'awakening' to the warmth of the sun. Action is of course its actions of intake of water and nutrients, production of flowersand thought is its adaptive actions. Thanks, I need to think through these and other examples. In addition, how do we properly attribute feeling, action, and thought to the *non-living* physico-chemical realm? ET: I agree with the above - and each triad is distinct - otherwise, not only would one not be able to pick out the particular combinations but, the 'subject' would be unable to interact. The end of distinctness is the withdrawal from semiosis - i.e., the death of the subject. Could you please elaborate on that last statement? I want to be sure that I understand what you mean by "distinctness" and "withdrawal" in this context, as well as "death" since I was thinking that semeiosis is not limited to *living *things. Or do you just mean "death" in Peirce's sense of "the complete induration of habit" at the end of the universe? ET: Yes - the above is a good model - my only quibble is what I see as the necessity for that Internal Sign entity, so to speak, of engaging with a Dynamic Object and possibly expressing a Dynamic Interpretant. My point is that I don't see how a Sign, operative only within its internal semiosic actions, can exist - as a Sign. I hope it is clear by now that I agree with you on all of this. Your concern, as I understand it, is that if we *only *use the term "Sign" for the *internal *triad (Oi-R-Ii), someone might be misled into thinking that a Sign in *this *sense can "exist" in isolation from everything else. My concern is actually similar--if we *also *use the term "Sign" for the *external *triadic relation (Od-S-Id), someone might *still *be misled into thinking that a Sign in *this *sense can "exist" in isolation from everything else. Furthermore, I see a lot of value--besides just more closely matching Peirce's typical usage--in carefully distinguishing between the possible/internal and actual/external aspects of the Sign. In particular, I think that we can more successfully maintain the inescapable interconnectedness of all Signs if we limit that label to the (internal) Oi-R-Ii triad while emphasizing that the (external) Od and Id are always *necessary *and *possible*, respectively. ET: But again - I do see the value of your model, for it enables multiple and diverse connections with different Dynamic Objects and multiple and diverse expressions of Dynamic Interpretants. ...while maintaining a certain stability-in-itself - which would prevent pure randomness. That is, a cell would be able to change - only up to a certain level, because its capacity for reacting to a DO and expressing a DI - are constrained by its basic internal system. Exactly! I think that my proposed adjustment to your model also conforms better to how we "count" signs, as Short put it. The same Dynamic Object can determine multiple Signs, and the same Sign can determine multiple Dynamic Interpretants. However, any two Signs that have the same Immediate Object and Immediate Intepretant are really the same Sign. So what do you think--can we agree that going forward, we will only use "Sign" for the Oi-R-Ii triad, but always stress the *necessity *of Od and *possibility *of Id as the other two correlates in a triadic relation with any such Sign? Regards, Jon On Mon, Apr 3, 2017 at 8:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Jon, list - see my comments below: > -- > > > 1] ET: I think we have, remaining, ONE 'difference', which is in point 4 > below. > > > That is what I anticipated, but I thought it was important to confirm it > so that we are not surprised if and when it comes up again in the future. > > ET: I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL triad. There has to > be, in my view, a triadic networking going on outside of this internal one. > > > This is basically the same sticking point as #4, righ
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
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Jon, list - see my comments below:
--
1] ET: I think we have, remaining, ONE 'difference', which is in
point 4 below.
That is what I anticipated, but I thought it was important to
confirm it so that we are not surprised if and when it comes up again
in the future.
ET: I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL triad. There
has to be, in my view, a triadic networking going on outside of this
internal one.
This is basically the same sticking point as #4, right? I am now on
board with conceiving the Sign as a triad consisting of the
Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant, since
Peirce described the Oi and Ii as "internal to" or "within" the Sign.
I also agree that there is, always and everywhere, "triadic
networking" of the Sign with the Dynamic Object and (when it has one)
the Dynamic Interpretant. However, since Peirce described the Od and
Id as "external to" or "without" the Sign, and the Od as "independent
of" the Sign, I remain uncomfortable with also calling this a triad,
and especially with calling this the Sign. I would personally prefer
to stick with Peirce's terminology, in which S, Od, and Id are three
correlates (i.e., subjects) of a triadic relation; and I honestly
believe that this still captures the idea of ubiquitous "triadic
networking" that you rightly insist on maintaining. More below.
EDWINA: I agree with the above outline - except, again, for my
concern over confining the Sign-as-a-triad to its internal
composition. I'm thinking of, for example, a paramecium. Is it, as an
existential reality, confined only to its internal composition or is
it necessarily existential only because it is semiosically connected
to external information
processes?-
2] ET: IF, for example, the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of
Firstness, then, the other two Interpretants must be in the same
mode, i.e., they can't add information.
Right, if a Sign is only "interpretable" by a feeling--i.e., that is
its only possible effect--then obviously any actual effect of that
Sign will be a feeling, as well as any resulting habit. On the other
hand, if a Sign is interpretable by a thought, then it is also
interpretable by an action or a feeling; so its actual effects and
resulting habits may be any of these. Again, I am interested in
learning what might correspond in the physico-chemical and biological
realms to feeling, action, and thought in the human realm as the three
kinds of effects that a Sign can produce.
EDWINA: As Peirce said - protoplasm feels. If I use as an example, a
plant, then feeling would be its 'awakening' to the warmth of the sun.
Action is of course its actions of intake of water and nutrients,
production of flowersand thought is its adaptive
actions.--
3] ET: I understand your saying that this INTERNAL triad is the
first correlate - and the DO as the second correlate and the DI as
the third correlate. I understand what you are setting up - but my
view is that the semiosic action cannot allow distinct subjects. That
is, there is nothing on this planet that exists, as I see it, outside
of the semiosic 'network' so to speak.
I wonder if at this point our remaining disagreement is mostly a
modeling issue. I can absolutely endorse your last statement here,
while still maintaining that there are distinct subjects. After all,
in order for there to be real relations, there must be real subjects
that are thus related--and that is precisely what I take Peirce to
mean by "correlates." Calling them "distinct" does not entail that
they are "separate," as I wrongly said a while back, let alone
"isolated" such that they somehow "exist outside of semiosis." Even
in your current model, each individual triad is "distinct" (or at
least distinguishable) from the others, despite being integrally
networked with them; otherwise, you would not be able to pick out
particular combinations of Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as
examples.
EDWINA: I agree with the above - and each triad is distinct -
otherwise, not only would one not be able to pick out the particular
combinations but, the 'subject' would be unable to interact. The end
of distinctness is the withdrawal from semiosis - i.e., the death of
the
subject.
What I am basically suggesting is that we make the model a bit more
granular, in a way that I believe is more consistent with Peirce's
own model. We would use "Sign" to refer only to the triad of
Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. We
would say that every such Sign is the first correlate of a triadic
relation, and that its Dynamic Object (which determines it) and its
Dynamic Interpretant (which it determines) are the other two
correlates. We would recognize that these three subjects are
embedded within a comprehens
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, List: ET: I think we have, remaining, ONE 'difference', which is in point 4 below. That is what I anticipated, but I thought it was important to confirm it so that we are not surprised if and when it comes up again in the future. ET: I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL triad. There has to be, in my view, a triadic networking going on outside of this internal one. This is basically the same sticking point as #4, right? I am now on board with conceiving the Sign as a triad consisting of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant, since Peirce described the Oi and Ii as "internal to" or "within" the Sign. I also agree that there is, always and everywhere, "triadic networking" of the Sign with the Dynamic Object and (when it has one) the Dynamic Interpretant. However, since Peirce described the Od and Id as "external to" or "without" the Sign, and the Od as "independent of" the Sign, I remain uncomfortable with also calling *this *a triad, and especially with calling *this *the Sign. I would personally prefer to stick with Peirce's terminology, in which S, Od, and Id are three correlates (i.e., subjects) of a triadic relation; and I honestly believe that this still captures the idea of ubiquitous "triadic networking" that you rightly insist on maintaining. More below. ET: IF, for example, the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, then, the other two Interpretants must be in the same mode, i.e., they can't add information. Right, if a Sign is *only *"interpretable" by a feeling--i.e., that is its only *possible *effect--then obviously any *actual* effect of that Sign will be a feeling, as well as any resulting *habit*. On the other hand, if a Sign is interpretable by a thought, then it is *also *interpretable by an action or a feeling; so its actual effects and resulting habits may be any of these. Again, I am interested in learning what might correspond in the physico-chemical and biological realms to feeling, action, and thought in the human realm as the three kinds of effects that a Sign can produce. ET: I understand your saying that this INTERNAL triad is the first correlate - and the DO as the second correlate and the DI as the third correlate. I understand what you are setting up - but my view is that the semiosic action cannot allow distinct subjects. That is, there is nothing on this planet that exists, as I see it, outside of the semiosic 'network' so to speak. I wonder if at this point our remaining disagreement is mostly a modeling issue. I can absolutely endorse your last statement here, while still maintaining that there are distinct subjects. After all, in order for there to be real *relations*, there must be real *subjects *that are thus related--and that is precisely what I take Peirce to mean by "correlates." Calling them "distinct" does not entail that they are "separate," as I wrongly said a while back, let alone "isolated" such that they somehow "exist outside of semiosis." Even in your current model, each individual triad is "distinct" (or at least distinguishable) from the others, despite being integrally networked with them; otherwise, you would not be able to pick out particular combinations of Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as examples. What I am basically suggesting is that we make the model a bit more granular, in a way that I believe is more consistent with Peirce's own model. We would use "Sign" to refer only to the triad of Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. We would say that every such Sign is the first correlate of a triadic relation, and that its Dynamic Object (which determines it) and its Dynamic Interpretant (which it determines) are the other two correlates. We would recognize that these three subjects are embedded within a comprehensive network of further relations with *other *subjects, all of which can play any of the three roles--Sign, Dynamic Object, or Dynamic Interpretant; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n1; 1905). I certainly do not expect you to change your mind immediately, but I hope that you will think about it. Thanks, Jon On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > See my comments below - and yes, I think we are making progress in > understanding each other's views better. I think we have, remaining, ONE > 'difference', which is in point 4 below. > -- > > On Sat 01/04/17 4:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > It is very gratifying to make so much progress in (finally) understanding > each other better. I am sincerely sorry that we were not able to get to > this point sooner. > > 1) ET: I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate Interpretant to a > potentiality held within the Representamen although - I see your point and > it seems valid. > > > JAS: I did not mean to imply that the Immediate Interpretant is "held
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
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See my comments below - and yes, I think we are making progress in
understanding each other's views better. I think we have, remaining,
ONE 'difference', which is in point 4 below.
--
On Sat 01/04/17 4:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
It is very gratifying to make so much progress in (finally)
understanding each other better. I am sincerely sorry that we were
not able to get to this point sooner.
1) ET: I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate Interpretant
to a potentiality held within the Representamen although - I see your
point and it seems valid.
JAS: I did not mean to imply that the Immediate Interpretant is
"held within the Representamen"; rather, it is within the Sign, which
is a triad consisting of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and
Immediate Interpretant.
EDWINA: OK - I accept this triad but I'm going to consider it only
ONE triad. That is, I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL
triad. There has to be, in my view, a triadic networking going on
outside of this internal one.---
2) ET: ... so my question is - as potential - is [the Immediate
Interpretant] always in a mode of Firstness? ... If the Immediate
Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be within
the other two modes?
It depends on what we mean by "mode." In my working hypothesis, the
Immediate, Dynamic, and Final Interpretants are indeed manifestations
of 1ns as possibility, 2ns as actuality, and 3ns as habituality,
respectively. However, each is still divisible into its own
trichotomy, which corresponds to 1ns as feeling, 2ns as action, and
3ns as thought. So the Immediate Interpretant is the range of
possible feelings (Ejaculative), actions (Imperative), or thoughts
(Significative) that the Sign may produce; the Dynamic Interpretant
is any actual feeling (Sympathetic/Congruentive), action
(Shocking/Percussive), or thought (Usual) that the Sign does produce;
and the Final Interpretant is a habit of feeling (Gratific), action
(To produce action), or thought (To produce self-control) that the
Sign would produce through repetition of various Dynamic
Interpretants. Every Sign has an Immediate Interpretant within
itself, but some Signs never produce a Dynamic Interpretant, and some
of those Signs never produce a Final Interpretant.
Once again, the terminology here seems more directly applicable to
Sign-action involving human minds, rather than the physico-chemical
and biological realms. I am open to suggestions for how to transfer
the concepts from one context to the other. I suspect that the key
is remembering that Peirce did not confine feeling, action, and
thought to humans--or even just to living things.
EDWINA: OK - I see what you have done, by dividing the three
Interpretants, effectively, into the 'range of possible'; the
actuality and the habit. You have, therefore, said that an ACT of
feeling is in a mode of Firstness - within the Dynamic Interpretant,
while a physical ACTis in a mode of Secondness within that same
DI. I see your point. ..though I'm not sure about this - IF, for
example, the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, then,
the other two Interpretants must be in the same mode, i.e., they
can't add information. But I do see what you are doing and it makes
sense.-
3) ET: The Interpretant in a Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a
demonstrative pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is, I think,
externalized by the modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the other
correlates. How does this fit in with your outline?
JAS: My understanding of Peirce's three-trichotomy, ten-Sign
classification--and what I have found to be the nearly unanimous
consensus in the secondary literature that I have read--is that the
third trichotomy does not divide the Interpretant itself, but the
relation between the Sign and its Interpretant; i.e., how the
Interpretant represents the Sign.
CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according
as the sign in itself is a mere quality [Qualisign], is an actual
existent [Sinsign], or is a general law [Legisign]; secondly,
according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the
sign's having some character in itself [Icon], or in some existential
relation to that Object [Index], or in its relation to an Interpretant
[Symbol]; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a
sign of possibility [Rheme], or as a sign of fact [Dicent], or as a
sign of reason [Argument]. (EP 2:291-292; 1903)
JAS: Hence a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is a Sign that is a general
law, which is in some existential relation to its Object, and which is
represented by its Interpretant as a sign of possibility. A
demonstrative pronoun, such as "this" or "that," is a Legisign
because it is applicable to a wide variety of situations, rather than
being t
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
Edwina, List: It is very gratifying to make so much progress in (finally) understanding each other better. I am sincerely sorry that we were not able to get to this point sooner. ET: I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate Interpretant to a potentiality held within the Representamen although - I see your point and it seems valid. I did not mean to imply that the Immediate Interpretant is "held within the Representamen"; rather, it is within the Sign, which is a triad consisting of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. ET: ... so my question is - as potential - is [the Immediate Interpretant] always in a mode of Firstness? ... If the Immediate Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be within the other two modes? It depends on what we mean by "mode." In my working hypothesis, the Immediate, Dynamic, and Final Interpretants are indeed manifestations of 1ns as possibility, 2ns as actuality, and 3ns as habituality, respectively. However, each is still divisible into its own trichotomy, which corresponds to 1ns as feeling, 2ns as action, and 3ns as thought. So the Immediate Interpretant is the range of *possible* feelings (Ejaculative), actions (Imperative), or thoughts (Significative) that the Sign *may *produce; the Dynamic Interpretant is any *actual *feeling (Sympathetic/Congruentive), action (Shocking/Percussive), or thought (Usual) that the Sign *does *produce; and the Final Interpretant is a *habit *of feeling (Gratific), action (To produce action), or thought (To produce self-control) that the Sign *would *produce through repetition of various Dynamic Interpretants. Every Sign has an Immediate Interpretant within itself, but some Signs never produce a Dynamic Interpretant, and some of those Signs never produce a Final Interpretant. Once again, the terminology here seems more directly applicable to Sign-action involving human minds, rather than the physico-chemical and biological realms. I am open to suggestions for how to transfer the concepts from one context to the other. I suspect that the key is remembering that Peirce *did not* confine feeling, action, and thought to humans--or even just to living things. ET: The Interpretant in a Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is, I think, externalized by the modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the other correlates. How does this fit in with your outline? My understanding of Peirce's three-trichotomy, ten-Sign classification--and what I have found to be the nearly unanimous consensus in the secondary literature that I have read--is that the third trichotomy does not divide the Interpretant *itself*, but the *relation *between the Sign and its Interpretant; i.e., *how *the Interpretant *represents *the Sign. CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality [Qualisign], is an actual existent [Sinsign], or is a general law [Legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's having some character in itself [Icon], or in some existential relation to that Object [Index], or in its relation to an Interpretant [Symbol]; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility [Rheme], or as a sign of fact [Dicent], or as a sign of reason [Argument]. (EP 2:291-292; 1903) Hence a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is a Sign that is a general law, which is in some existential relation to its Object, and which is represented by its Interpretant as a sign of possibility. A demonstrative pronoun, such as "this" or "that," is a Legisign because it is applicable to a wide variety of situations, rather than being tied to one particular Object; but whenever it is *actually *uttered, that replica is a Sinsign. It is an Index because it only has an Object by virtue of collateral experience that draws attention to that Object, such as the utterer pointing at it. It is a Rheme because its Interpretant includes no information *about *its Object. The possible modes of the Interpretant itself depend on where we insert that trichotomy among the first three--which is something that Peirce never clearly specified, with the result that it has been a topic of considerable debate over the years, on this List and elsewhere. I would suggest that it must come *after *the Sign, since the Sign determines the Interpretant; and it must come *before *the Sign-Interpretant relation, such that the two correlates determine the relation. In my working hypothesis, if it comes *before *the Sign-Object relation, then the Interpretant must be either an action (2ns) or a thought (3ns); and if it comes *after *the Sign-Object relation, then the Interpretant must be either a feeling (1ns) or an action (2ns). Hence it is a matter of which we find more plausible--that the Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign can be a thought, or that it can be a feeling.
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)
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}Jon, list -
OK - I'll take each point.
1)You write: " I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is
never an actual interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range
of possible interpretants that a Sign may produce. In other words,
the Immediate Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an
actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant."
EDWINA: Hmm. I'd have to think about this. I agree that it is never
an actual interpretant. I don't think I'm ready to reduce the
Immediate Interpretant to a potentiality held within the
Representamen although - I see your point and it seems valid.
. I accept the notion of the representamen's capacity to produce an
actual interpretant, the DI, - but the way you are setting it up,
the Immediate Interpretant - which I acknowledge has no actual
existentiality [for that would require that it be external and have
some links to a mode of Secondness]remains purely potential -
i.e., so my question is - as potential - is it always in a mode of
Firstness?
Your suggestion of potentiality would fit in with Peirce's outline
in 8.314, where he writes that "The Immediate Interpretant is what
the Question expresses, all that it immediately expresses' [the
question was the Object]. This would suggest that the Immediate
Interpretant is closely linked to the Object.
Again, he writes: "The Immediate Interpretant consists in the
Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any
actual reaction" 8.315. And he further refers to the Immediate
Interpretant as in a "mode of Presentation' 8.344 - i.e., not in a
Mode of Being or actuality.
Then, he describes the Immediate Interpretant as 'felt' 8.369 - and
acknowledges that it can be in any of the three modes: 'ejaculative
or merely giving utterance to feeling; imperative, including of
course, Interrogative; Significative. ". So - my question is: If the
Immediate Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be
within the other two modes?
Or would - these three modes be within the Relation that the
Representamen has in determining the Immediate Interpretant . In
other words - this would agree with your analysis.
But is this the case? The Interpretant - - in a Rhematic Indexical
Legisign [a demonstrative pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is,
I think, externalized by the modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the
other correlates. How does this fit in with your outline?
Again - your analysis makes sense - but I'll have to think about it.
2) I think that we are merely quibbling over the word 'determines' -
which still has a whiff of authority to it, which I am aware was not
what Peirce meant. Otherwise - I agree with your outline.
3) Yes - I can accept 'Sign as Triad and Correlate of Triadic
Relation'. Good heavens - we are agreeing - and it's real, not a
factor of April 1st!
Edwina
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On Sat 01/04/17 1:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very
enlightening. This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles,
which I hope will prove to be minor.
ET: And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the
sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time.
I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual
interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible
interpretants that a Sign may produce. In other words, the Immediate
Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an actual
interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant. Furthermore, the
Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are internal to the
Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of the
Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. I
suspect that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign
classification did not include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as
distinct trichotomies.
ET: The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but
only in its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the
Sign-vehicle, then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is
in a relationship with the sign. Before that - it is simply an
external Object.
I would suggest that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, rather
than merely interacting with it. In other words, the Dynamic Object
is independent of the Sign in a certain sense, but the Sign is not
independent of the Dynamic Object in the same way; and similarly, the
Sign is independent of the Dynamic Interpretant in a certain sense (as
discussed above), but the Dynamic Interpretant is not independent of
the Sign in the same way
