Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 13-août-06, à 12:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > > Bruno Marchal writes: > I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA shows why. The answer is: the computer which is running are the relative universal number which exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many are they? 2^aleph_zero. I have already explain it here: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some difficulties. >>> >>> Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part >>> of the UDA >>> as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you >>> *can't* >>> know the details of your implementation, such as what type of >>> computer >>> you are >>> being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays >>> in >>> the program, >>> and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of >>> 100 >>> PC's in >>> the basement of the local university computer science department, but >>> everyone >>> is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out >>> what's going on >>> all by myself?! >> >> >> >> Did you read my old post to Brett Hall: >>> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html >> Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. >> It >> is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that >> a >> machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual >> nature >> of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ... >> you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person >> expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a >> measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching >> such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated >> with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I >> explain more, again in a "steppy" fashion (but the point is different >> from the UDA). >> To sum up that point: >> 1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us. >> 2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by >> *all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the >> "actuality" itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and >> eventually "indexicality" is treated through the logic of >> self-reference (G and G*). > > I did read the cited post. I can see that given step 7 - from the > inside, we > cannot tell if we are in a physical world emulation or a Platonia > emulation - > we could say that we are emulated by all appropriate computations. OK. Even in a sort of "simultaneous" way. In a *probabilistic* sense we are in all those appropriate computations. Like I said to Peter, even if we are in a material universe (if that means something), then one instant later we are not (with probability 1 minus epsilon). > [I think > it is still logically possible that we are emulated at any instant by > one > computation in the ensemble, and that there might still be a separate > physical world, at this point at least.] Yes. It is logically possible. But arithmetically or probabilistically quasi-improbable. > I can see that step 8 is right: > if we are simulated in a massive real world computer, to make a > prediction > about the future we must take into account all the computations passing > through our present state and define a measure on them. All right, but then you should see that physics (let us see it as a science of concrete and exact prediction) is already given by a purely mathematical measure on a mathematical set (the set of computations going through my actual comp state). > I will accept step > 9 on your authority, although this seems amazing: we can derive the > laws of > physics from a measure on first person computational histories. I guess you mean that you don't see how to make the extraction. UDA just shows that IF comp is true, then physics has to be derivable from computer science/number theory. To see how we can do the extraction is another matter. I do it by asking UDA, no more to *you*, but to an universal machine. > Now, step 10 > is my problem: if the laws of physics as per step 9 turn out to match > our > experimentally verifiable reality, then we are no more simulated by > the physical > computer than by any of the non-physical ones in Platonia. > > Why does it mean that we are no more simulated by the physical computer > than one of the non-physical ones if the laws of physics match the > prediction > from the assumption that we are being simulated? Surely all that it > suggests is > that we are indeed being simulated - somewhere. I
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal writes: > >> I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is > >> running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the > >> UDA > >> shows why. The answer is: > >> the computer which is running are the relative universal number which > >> exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a > >> universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many > >> are they? 2^aleph_zero. > >> I have already explain it here: > >> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html > >> > >> It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some > >> difficulties. > > > > Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part > > of the UDA > > as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you > > *can't* > > know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer > > you are > > being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in > > the program, > > and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 > > PC's in > > the basement of the local university computer science department, but > > everyone > > is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out > > what's going on > > all by myself?! > > > > Did you read my old post to Brett Hall: > > http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html > Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. It > is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that a > machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual nature > of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ... > you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person > expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a > measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching > such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated > with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I > explain more, again in a "steppy" fashion (but the point is different > from the UDA). > To sum up that point: > 1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us. > 2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by > *all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the > "actuality" itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and > eventually "indexicality" is treated through the logic of > self-reference (G and G*). I did read the cited post. I can see that given step 7 - from the inside, we cannot tell if we are in a physical world emulation or a Platonia emulation - we could say that we are emulated by all appropriate computations. [I think it is still logically possible that we are emulated at any instant by one computation in the ensemble, and that there might still be a separate physical world, at this point at least.] I can see that step 8 is right: if we are simulated in a massive real world computer, to make a prediction about the future we must take into account all the computations passing through our present state and define a measure on them. I will accept step 9 on your authority, although this seems amazing: we can derive the laws of physics from a measure on first person computational histories. Now, step 10 is my problem: if the laws of physics as per step 9 turn out to match our experimentally verifiable reality, then we are no more simulated by the physical computer than by any of the non-physical ones in Platonia. Why does it mean that we are no more simulated by the physical computer than one of the non-physical ones if the laws of physics match the prediction from the assumption that we are being simulated? Surely all that it suggests is that we are indeed being simulated - somewhere. You also state in step 10 that "...to say we belong to the massive computer has no real meaning: if it stops, nothing can happen to "us" for example...". That is true, but it does not mean that we are not actually being simulated in a particular computer, just that we cannot *know* which computer it is unless we have external knowledge. But in any case, this is just what I was saying before: you can't know which computer you are being simulated on. Are you disagreeing with this statement because you believe you *can* narrow it down to knowing that you are not being simulated on a physical computer? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this gro
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes: > Precisely my point! > > On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no > > > difference, or only a > > > small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia? > > > > You can't "make a difference" in Platonia. There is no time there, > > no change, and no causality. It's like making a difference in a material, deterministic world, which we assume has time, change and causality aplenty. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes: > Precisely my point! > > On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no > > > difference, or only a > > > small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia? > > > > You can't "make a difference" in Platonia. There is no time there, > > no change, and no causality. It's like making a difference in a material, deterministic world, which we assume has time, change and causality aplenty. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 10-août-06, à 14:16, Stathis Papaioannou wrote : >> Bruno: I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for >> example, and it >> is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist >> (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at >> least >> could be relatively more frequent than others. > > Stathis: Sure, but it's the details that are mind-boggling. Why do > dog-computations > bark and cat-computations meow? If there is a definite mathematical > answer > how do we even begin to fathom it? I think there is a "definite (but necessarily partial) " mathematical answer once we assume the comp hyp. It seems to me that the UD argument explains informally what shape this "mathematical answer" could have: a measure problem. Now I am not sure I understand why you don't see it. This is because I can infer by most of your posts that you handle well the relevant thought experiments. You certainly convince me I should explain more about the UDA in the roadmap-summary, before explaining the lobian interview. > Or would you go the reductionist route > of starting with basic physical laws, on which chemistry, biology, > psychology > etc. are built, the more basic sciences supporting the less basic? Except that the UDA is supposed to help to understand that the basic-ness of science could be the other way round: psychology/theology being more fundamental than physics. I hope I will be clear on that. I have put a first version of the "roadmap" in the trash, because it was too long and at the same time it was not even addressing some difficulties which I am guessing many people have through your post. It is hard because I try to write a short text, and simultaneously I try to anticipate the sort of objections I find reasonable through my reading of the current many posts on the notion of persons. >> I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is >> running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the >> UDA >> shows why. The answer is: >> the computer which is running are the relative universal number which >> exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a >> universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many >> are they? 2^aleph_zero. >> I have already explain it here: >> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html >> >> It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some >> difficulties. > > Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part > of the UDA > as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you > *can't* > know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer > you are > being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in > the program, > and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 > PC's in > the basement of the local university computer science department, but > everyone > is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out > what's going on > all by myself?! Did you read my old post to Brett Hall: > http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html Perhaps you could comment it and tell me what does not convince you. It is indeed correct that the earlier parts of the UD Argument show that a machine cannot know about comp-delays, or about the real/virtual nature of a computer which would support the machine's computation until ... you realize that for exactly those reasons the machine first person expectations can only be computed (exactly and in principle) through a measure on all possible computations (reducing physics to searching such a measure). But then the first person can no more be associated with *any* particular computations. Read the Brett Hall post where I explain more, again in a "steppy" fashion (but the point is different from the UDA). To sum up that point: 1) comp shows we cannot know which computations supported us. 2) digging deeper in comp, this means eventually we are supported by *all* (relative) computations (relative to some actual state; the "actuality" itself is handled in the traditional indexical way, and eventually "indexicality" is treated through the logic of self-reference (G and G*). >>> Yes, I think what you mean by "relative probabilities" is that if >>> there were >>> several possible versions of "me next moment", then I would be more >>> likely >>> to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the >>> other >>> possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference. >> >> >> Ah but you get the point now! > > So, as long as this *relative* measure does not come into play, the > absolute > measure makes no difference? But physics arise (or should arise, with the comp hyp.) from the *relative* measure, and physics will be what makes possible for consciousness to be able to manifest itself. George asked
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > >>> ...a controlled > >>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving > >>> everything else > >>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in > >>> perfect > >>> lockstep. > >> > >> > >> I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex > >> is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, > >> Mallah, etc.). OK? > > > > I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind > > around > > the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists. > > > I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it > is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist > (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least > could be relatively more frequent than others. Sure, but it's the details that are mind-boggling. Why do dog-computations bark and cat-computations meow? If there is a definite mathematical answer how do we even begin to fathom it? Or would you go the reductionist route of starting with basic physical laws, on which chemistry, biology, psychology etc. are built, the more basic sciences supporting the less basic? > >> > >> I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some > >> "Bell > >> inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows > >> indirectly the presence of some alternate computations. > > > > I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers > > are > > running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same > > initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there > > is any way > > for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question > > is > > even meaningful) or how many computers were running. > > > I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is > running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA > shows why. The answer is: > the computer which is running are the relative universal number which > exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a > universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many > are they? 2^aleph_zero. > I have already explain it here: > http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html > > It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some > difficulties. Well now I'm confused! I thought the whole point of the earlier part of the UDA as discussed in the cited post (and many others of yours) is that you *can't* know the details of your implementation, such as what type of computer you are being run on, how fast it is running, if there are arbitrary delays in the program, and so on. Are you now saying that if I am being run on the 3rd of 100 PC's in the basement of the local university computer science department, but everyone is keeping this a secret from me, there is a way I can figure out what's going on all by myself?! > >>> If I > >>> were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple > >>> computers running > >>> is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I > >>> wouldn't > >>> care if there > >>> were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. > >> > >> Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is > >> equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your > >> "normal" measure. > > > > Yes, I think what you mean by "relative probabilities" is that if > > there were > > several possible versions of "me next moment", then I would be more > > likely > > to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the > > other > > possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference. > > > Ah but you get the point now! So, as long as this *relative* measure does not come into play, the absolute measure makes no difference? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
WC writes: > >Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, > >but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think, > >that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how > >good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the > >"substitution level") in order to feel himself to be the "same" person. But > >as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect duplication > >to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to > >moment in everyday life. > > > > Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists. > If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life), > I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the > origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.) > of this universe should have been solved. Are you saying that you believe a copy of a person must be *exactly* the same to be the same person? (Note that even this is more than some people would concede, as there are some who hold that even an exact copy would not suffice.) But what about the fact that people do change, physically and mentally, from moment to moment? Surely this implies that we don't need the copy to be exact, but we need to determine how close to exact it has to be. Also, I don't see how practical teleportation would solve the other problems you mention. It is useful as a thought experiment in the philosophy of personal identity, in particular, but all that is required in these arguments is the *theoretical* possibility. I think this is where you err: the sorts of arguments we have been discussing would be neither more nor less convincing if teleportation became a practical reality tomorrrow. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 15:54, W. C. a écrit : > >> From: Bruno Marchal >> >> ... >> I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I >> find it >> somehow ambiguous. >> Let me comment anyway. >> Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will >> not be >> possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some >> lucky >> cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be developed with >> graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through progress in >> harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will take >> time). Only >> latter will come "purely" artificial digital brain, and even this >> will be a >> matter of piece by piece progress (artificial hypocampus, artificial >> limbic >> system, until artificial cortex (this one will take perhaps a >> millenium), and pionner of immortality will have hard time for many >> technical but also social and ethical reasons. > > Thanks for your patience. I can see that you are really very patient > because > you often reply many similar > questions that you may have replied hundreds of times before. > Although I appreciate your patience, I still don't agree with you > about the > teleportation. > When we say teleportation, we mean we send someone from location A to > location B *like a magic* (Start Trek stuff). > The person at A is *exactly* the same as the one at B. This really has > little to do with digital or artificial stuff. > Human body and brain are analog, same for A & B. It's useless to use > digital > or artificial conversion (since I assume no substitution level). But then there is really no problem between us. We just have a different starting hypothesis. You assume the negation of comp. That's all. But analog machine can in general be simulated by digital machine. Only analog machine using explicitly infinite thrid person information in finite time will be non turing emulable. It is up to you to explain us why you think "infinite third person information" is needed for having a genuine person. (First person infinite information will not work given that comp predicts that first person are associated directly to a continuum (high infinite) of information flows. > If I have a scar on my left hand, you need to teleport this scar also. > Same > for any of my old memories. > We are not talking about the teleportation of some *standard PC parts* > (like > the CPU/HDD) from A to B. > >> But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even >> if it >> needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable >> probability, will >> not really help us in understanding the brain and its functioning. It >> just >> happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the copy of a brain is >> almost >> infinitely easier that the understanding of how a brain work (even >> assuming >> some high substitution level). > > Assume no substitution level, if you can teleport me (a male) from A > to B > and let me agree completely that I am *exactly* (body, memory, > consciousness > etc.) the same me, > I think it will let us own the complete understanding of the so-called > consciousness, existence of soul? ... such big questions. > >> To be sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains >> will >> never completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 >> AD >> humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD >> human's >> brain, but only true their own bigger "brain" (including >> self-developing >> machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A little like >> bacteria >> and amoeba "learns" to reproduce themselves without any higher level >> understanding of what is going on. > > See my comment above. Sooner or later, I think human beings will have > answers. No problem per se (withouit comp). With comp, I can explain why we can have better and better answers, but there is no last answer. But then comp explains why. > >> >> Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental >> principles >> which are at the "logical origin" of the realities (that's what >> we are >> discussing now). >> > Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > difference, or only a
> > small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
>
> You can't "make a difference" in Platonia. There is no time there,
> no change, and no causality.
>
>
>
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no > difference, or only a > small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia? You can't "make a difference" in Platonia. There is no time there, no change, and no causality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > > > >>> ...a controlled > >>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving > >>> everything else > >>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in > >>> perfect > >>> lockstep. > >> > >> > >> I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex > >> is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, > >> Mallah, etc.). OK? > > > > I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind > > around > > the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists. > > > I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it > is the reason why we can put a measure on it. I'm confused. In previous conversations you have claimed not to known what "exists" means. > All computations exist > (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least > could be relatively more frequent than others. If computation are simply integers, they all have the same measure. If there is some more complex relation, the existence of computations is not guaranteed by the existence of integers. Any computer progamme can be represented as a sting of 1's and 0's, but only int the context of some particular computer. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal wrote: > My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have > empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that "physical reality" is the > result of interfering computable waves. Quantum weirdness is entirely compatible with materialism-contingency-empiricism. Schrodinger's equation is a contingent fact about the world, derived from observation, which describs what matter can and can't do. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > >> > >> Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like > >> observing > >> your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an > >> electron. > > > > Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more > > closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have > > other > > arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of > > computations > > underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the > > fact that > > you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels > > and > > sublevels of computation? > > Comp predicts that if you look closely enough you will see reality > blurring. The evidence from empirical science (quantum physics) is that > indeed reality blurs, but of course "informal comp" does not give the > details of the blurring process. One thing we *do* know for sure is that Harry Potter universes -- *literal* HP universes -- are computable, since the special effects in the Harry Potter movies were computer generated! Therefore the problem with everythingism is that it predicts *too much* weirdness. (And, as I am forever pointing out, materialism-contingency-empiricism [*] doesn't exclude quantum fuzziness or many worlds, providing there are contingent facts about how much fuzziness and how many worlds). [*] my term for the non-everythingist philosophy. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
W. C. wrote: > Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists. > If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life), > I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the > origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.) > of this universe should have been solved. If you can first solve the How To Detect A Zombie problem... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >> Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like >> observing >> your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an >> electron. > > Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more > closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have > other > arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of > computations > underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the > fact that > you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels > and > sublevels of computation? Comp predicts that if you look closely enough you will see reality blurring. The evidence from empirical science (quantum physics) is that indeed reality blurs, but of course "informal comp" does not give the details of the blurring process. (That is why I get technical at some point). When we look at an electron in some well defined state of energy around the nucleus, we "see" literally a map of accessible worlds. The electron behaves as if it blurs around the nucleus, and what chemists call an orbital is really a map of where you can find the position of the electron would you decide to measure it. The microscope image is somehow misleading, because both with comp and already with the quantum, the many histories can manifest themselves through *isolation* only, like the Schroedinger cat in its box. Practically a hot macroscopic box does interact too heavily with the environment so that we cannot really isolate it, so we cannot make our comp history completely independent of what happen in the box, and thats why confirmation or refutation of comp or of the quantum needs the microscopic world. But macro-effects are not excluded and are arguably already present for the quantum (superfluid, superconductivity, violation of Bell's inequality on large distance, etc.) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal > >... >I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it >somehow ambiguous. >Let me comment anyway. >Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be >possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some lucky >cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be developed with >graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through progress in >harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will take time). Only >latter will come "purely" artificial digital brain, and even this will be a >matter of piece by piece progress (artificial hypocampus, artificial limbic >system, until artificial cortex (this one will take perhaps a >millenium), and pionner of immortality will have hard time for many >technical but also social and ethical reasons. Thanks for your patience. I can see that you are really very patient because you often reply many similar questions that you may have replied hundreds of times before. Although I appreciate your patience, I still don't agree with you about the teleportation. When we say teleportation, we mean we send someone from location A to location B *like a magic* (Start Trek stuff). The person at A is *exactly* the same as the one at B. This really has little to do with digital or artificial stuff. Human body and brain are analog, same for A & B. It's useless to use digital or artificial conversion (since I assume no substitution level). If I have a scar on my left hand, you need to teleport this scar also. Same for any of my old memories. We are not talking about the teleportation of some *standard PC parts* (like the CPU/HDD) from A to B. >But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even if it >needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable probability, will >not really help us in understanding the brain and its functioning. It just >happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the copy of a brain is almost >infinitely easier that the understanding of how a brain work (even assuming >some high substitution level). Assume no substitution level, if you can teleport me (a male) from A to B and let me agree completely that I am *exactly* (body, memory, consciousness etc.) the same me, I think it will let us own the complete understanding of the so-called consciousness, existence of soul? ... such big questions. >To be sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains will >never completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 AD >humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD human's >brain, but only true their own bigger "brain" (including self-developing >machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A little like bacteria >and amoeba "learns" to reproduce themselves without any higher level >understanding of what is going on. See my comment above. Sooner or later, I think human beings will have answers. > >Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental principles >which are at the "logical origin" of the realities (that's what we are >discussing now). > _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes: > > Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical > > computers (that is, what > > we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) > > has almost twice > > the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, > > there would > > be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite > > hard disk. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > It does not change the measure of the computation in Platonia. I think > that is the clear message from COMP. But it does change the measure > within the "physical" universe that we inhabit. > > Backing up things is to improve robustness in the face of noise (or > equivalently the second law). I don't know of anybody doing it to > increase measure per se. > > On the other hand printing 100 copies of my book is all about > increasing the measure of my book within our physical universe, and > not backing it up (5 copies distributed to the main libraries of the > world would suffice for that!) By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no difference, or only a small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia? For example, if all the matter in the universe were converted to computers repeatedly calculating "2+2=4" would that give "2+2=4" a bit of an edge over "3+3=6" in Platonia? What about the far more complex computations underlying human consciousness: my understanding was that the appearance of an orderly physical world that goes along with these is not an optional extra, but a necessary consequence of the type of computation under consideration. That would mean that all of the measure attributed to a conscious moment is in fact tied up in the (apparent) physical world, because there are no computations of the required type possible that don't give the appearance of a physical world. (If there are, we have to explain why we don't experience them.) So if you increase the measure locally by duplicating and running a sentient program, you are increasing the measure in Platonia as a whole, since there isn't anywhere else where sentient programs of the sort with which we are familiar might be hiding. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 01:11:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
> computers (that is, what
> we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
> has almost twice
> the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise,
> there would
> be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite hard
> disk.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
It does not change the measure of the computation in Platonia. I think
that is the clear message from COMP. But it does change the measure
within the "physical" universe that we inhabit.
Backing up things is to improve robustness in the face of noise (or
equivalently the second law). I don't know of anybody doing it to
increase measure per se.
On the other hand printing 100 copies of my book is all about
increasing the measure of my book within our physical universe, and
not backing it up (5 copies distributed to the main libraries of the
world would suffice for that!)
Cheers
--
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email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > >>> ...a controlled >>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving >>> everything else >>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in >>> perfect >>> lockstep. >> >> >> I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex >> is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, >> Mallah, etc.). OK? > > I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind > around > the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists. I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least could be relatively more frequent than others. >> >> I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some >> "Bell >> inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows >> indirectly the presence of some alternate computations. > > I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers > are > running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same > initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there > is any way > for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question > is > even meaningful) or how many computers were running. I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA shows why. The answer is: the computer which is running are the relative universal number which exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many are they? 2^aleph_zero. I have already explain it here: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg05272.html It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some difficulties. > >>> If I >>> were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple >>> computers running >>> is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I >>> wouldn't >>> care if there >>> were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. >> >> Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is >> equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your >> "normal" measure. > > Yes, I think what you mean by "relative probabilities" is that if > there were > several possible versions of "me next moment", then I would be more > likely > to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the > other > possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference. Ah but you get the point now! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 08:00, W. C. a écrit : > But I still can't see that ""matter" is the result of a sum on an > infinity > of interfering computations". > Can you tell me why? My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that "physical reality" is the result of interfering computable waves. Now, why comp makes this necessary (not just empirically inferable) is what I try to explain to the list since sometime (and that relies in fine on some not so well known results in theoretical computer science). I can only ask you to read carefully either old posts, or my papers, or to follow carefully futures explanations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 05:49, W. C. a écrit : > >> From: Stathis Papaioannou >> >> ... >> Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum >> level, >> but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I >> think, >> that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately >> obvious how >> good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the >> "substitution level") in order to feel himself to be the "same" >> person. But >> as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect >> duplication >> to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to >> moment in everyday life. >> > > Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level > exists. > If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my > life), > I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? > the > origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.) > of this universe should have been solved. I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it somehow ambiguous. Let me comment anyway. Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some lucky cryogenisation process). Artificial brain will first be developed with graft of genetically engineered animals neurons, through progress in harnessing the immune system and prion diseases (that will take time). Only latter will come "purely" artificial digital brain, and even this will be a matter of piece by piece progress (artificial hypocampus, artificial limbic system, until artificial cortex (this one will take perhaps a millenium), and pionner of immortality will have hard time for many technical but also social and ethical reasons. But where I think you are wrong is that articial brain and body, even if it needs a millenium of work to succeed with some reasonable probability, will not really help us in understanding the brain and its functioning. It just happens that, even if it is *very* difficult, the copy of a brain is almost infinitely easier that the understanding of how a brain work (even assuming some high substitution level). To be sure here comp says something rather negative: humans brains will never completely understand the human brain. It is true that the 3000 AD humans will perhaps eventually understand the basics of 2000 AD human's brain, but only true their own bigger "brain" (including self-developing machine) which will be beyond their comprehension. A little like bacteria and amoeba "learns" to reproduce themselves without any higher level understanding of what is going on. Of course if comp is correct we can understand very fundamental principles which are at the "logical origin" of the realities (that's what we are discussing now). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 08-août-06, à 10:10, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > > Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit : >> Can you tell me why? > > Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell > you. > > If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go > continue polluting the mailing list. Hi Quentin, Take it easy. Perhaps you are just quicker than me, but up to now I would say W. C. has some *genuine* misunderstanding, perhaps shared by other people too who are too shy to send a post (I know some). Apparently W. C. does not believe in comp (he said he does not believe in the existence of a substitution level), nor does he believe in the QM-MWI (he said he read the FOR book a long time ago and that he has not been convinced). This makes him (or her?) quite coherent. W. C. seems to defend Naturalism, but the fact that he/she follows the list shows that he/she is at least open to some doubt and that he/she has some open-mindness. I have met bad faith people in comparison with which W. C. is still quite reasonable, imo. Conversation with him or her can help to understand difficulties. Nevertheless, there is one important point in one of his/her recent message where he/she is deadly wrong, and that is the subject of my next message. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit : > Can you tell me why? Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell you. If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go continue polluting the mailing list. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal writes: > Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit : > > > > >> From: Bruno Marchal > >> ... > >> Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that > >> you > >> survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will > >> simulate > >> not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following > >> prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood > >> sufficiently > >> close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing > >> the > >> relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel > >> computations. > > > > Are you talking about meditation? > > > Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing > your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an > electron. Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more closely you see more and more detail, and I understand that you have other arguments suggesting that this is all due to the ensemble of computations underpinning the physical reality, but are you suggesting that the fact that you can observe these levels is *by itself* evidence for these levels and sublevels of computation? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: W. C. > > >From: Bruno Marchal > >... > >Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing > >your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an > >electron. > >... > >Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification & >resolution to see it? >I need to find one to try what you said. > I tried to check my finger as you said with different resolutions of microscopes. But I still can't see that ""matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations". Can you tell me why? Thanks. WC. _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Stathis Papaioannou > >... >Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, >but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think, >that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how >good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the >"substitution level") in order to feel himself to be the "same" person. But >as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect duplication >to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to >moment in everyday life. > Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists. If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life), I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.) of this universe should have been solved. Thanks. WC.. _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > > ...a controlled > > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving > > everything else > > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect > > lockstep. > > > I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex > is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, > Mallah, etc.). OK? I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind around the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists. > > > > (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, > > which would > > not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything > > if half the > > computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be > > impossible for the AI > > to notice that anything had changed without receiving external > > information. > > > I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some "Bell > inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows > indirectly the presence of some alternate computations. I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers are running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there is any way for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question is even meaningful) or how many computers were running. > > If I > > were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple > > computers running > > is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't > > care if there > > were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. > > Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is > equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your > "normal" measure. Yes, I think what you mean by "relative probabilities" is that if there were several possible versions of "me next moment", then I would be more likely to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the other possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish: > On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in > > parallel, > > you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective > > time > > period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as > > long. There > > is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a > > cracked > > idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only > > half-plausible > > subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. > > > > I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will > > appear > > more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a > > controlled > > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything > > else > > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect > > lockstep. > > (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, > > which would > > not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if > > half the > > computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for > > the AI > > to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. > > If I > > were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers > > running > > is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care > > if there > > were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this > list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any > difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's > work, assuming COMP (which you have to anyway to consider the thought > experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a > particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth > presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the > actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer > to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete > universe hypothesis altogether. Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical computers (that is, what we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) has almost twice the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, there would be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite hard disk. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal >... >Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing >your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an >electron. >... Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification & resolution to see it? I need to find one to try what you said. Thanks. WC. _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have > more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say. Not much more. Physical MWI is a materialist-contingent-empiricst theory and therefore just as much opposed to your idealist-necessitarian-rationalist approach as single-universe physics. > To be sure I don't take a "many or even all physicists think this or > that" as an argument for this or that. Because you don't believe in empriricism, but that is all rather circular. > Of course it is nice to justify > why such "wrong" belief can rise. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit : > >> From: Bruno Marchal >> ... >> Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that >> you >> survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will >> simulate >> not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following >> prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood >> sufficiently >> close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing >> the >> relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel >> computations. > > Are you talking about meditation? Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an electron. > I still can't see how "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of > interfering computations". > Common people can touch and feel the matter (this physical universe). > They > don't need this strange process to see it. I would say that here we are trying to explain those "touch and feel the matter" without begging the question. My working hypothesis is comp. > Your explanation is rather strange. > As said before, I don't think substitution level exists. So Comp. and > UDA > won't work here. Are you saying that your hypothesis is some negation of comp. Then there is no problem with my work of course. (Except that many consequences that I extract from comp remains derivable by much weaker version of comp). > >> So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course >> experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they >> infer >> Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their >> observations can >> be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp. >> (This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the >> conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the >> consequences >> of comp, more or less). > > I think many good physicist won't agree with you. Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say. To be sure I don't take a "many or even all physicists think this or that" as an argument for this or that. Of course it is nice to justify why such "wrong" belief can rise. > >> To be sure "negative interferences" remains quite astonishing (after >> such >> an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the results >> in >> computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence that >> "negative >> interference" appears as related to some variant of the incompleteness >> phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to justify in >> "french". More in a summary which should come asap. I hope this >> already >> helps. >> > > Please provide more explanation. > > Thanks. Asap. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal >... >Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that you >survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will simulate >not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following >prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood sufficiently >close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing the >relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel computations. Are you talking about meditation? I still can't see how "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations". Common people can touch and feel the matter (this physical universe). They don't need this strange process to see it. Your explanation is rather strange. As said before, I don't think substitution level exists. So Comp. and UDA won't work here. >So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course >experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they infer >Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their observations can >be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp. >(This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the >conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the consequences >of comp, more or less). I think many good physicist won't agree with you. >To be sure "negative interferences" remains quite astonishing (after such >an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the results in >computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence that "negative >interference" appears as related to some variant of the incompleteness >phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to justify in >"french". More in a summary which should come asap. I hope this already >helps. > Please provide more explanation. Thanks. WC. _ No masks required! Use MSN Messenger to chat with friends and family. http://go.msnserver.com/HK/25382.asp --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 07-août-06, à 01:44, W. C. a écrit : > >> From: Bruno Marchal >> ... >> But it is easy to explain that this is already a "simple" consequence >> of >> comp. Any piece of "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of >> interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be >> "clonable" without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any >> internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence). >> ... > > I remember you said "comp can be tested experimentally due to others > consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, > etc.)". > Can you provide more details on how to do the experiment to see > "matter" is > the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations??? Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that you survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will simulate not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following prediction: if you look at yourself or at you neighborhood sufficiently close enough, you can in principle detect, indirectly, (by computing the relative comp histories) the presence of all the sublevel computations. So it is enough to observe closely your neighborhood. But of course experimental physicists does exactly that, and the fact that they infer Many-Worlds (many Histories/many computations) from their observations can be seen retrospectively as a confirmation of comp. (This explains that up to now, only people with a good grasp of the conceptual difficulties of the quantum theory can swallow the consequences of comp, more or less). To be sure "negative interferences" remains quite astonishing (after such an informal reasoning), but then if you take into account the results in computer science and mathematical logic, there are evidence that "negative interference" appears as related to some variant of the incompleteness phenomena. This is somehow counter-intuitive and hard to justify in "french". More in a summary which should come asap. I hope this already helps. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 06-août-06, à 15:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Russell Standish writes: > >> This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in >> polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in >> this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st >> person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome >> without getting anywhere. >> >> The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection >> between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast >> to your statement of "nothing" however, a lower measure OM will appear >> more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure >> decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory >> "erasure", in the sense of quantum erasure. > > My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running > in parallel, > you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given > objective time > period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as > long. I certainly doubt that! > There > is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why > it's a cracked > idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the > only half-plausible > subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. The (relative) number or proportion of emulation will never change a content of an experience, but could change the relative probabilities, both in comp and in QM. > > I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will > appear > more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a > controlled > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving > everything else > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect > lockstep. I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, Mallah, etc.). OK? > > (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, > which would > not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything > if half the > computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be > impossible for the AI > to notice that anything had changed without receiving external > information. I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some "Bell inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows indirectly the presence of some alternate computations. > If I > were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple > computers running > is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't > care if there > were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your "normal" measure. Bruno > > Stathis Papaioannou > >> On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure >>> in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra >>> the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting >>> observation >>> that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems >>> subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, >>> would >>> seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. >>> One >>> explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us >>> around >>> in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. >>> This >>> would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries >>> and millenia >>> would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age >>> and our >>> measure continuously drops. >>> >>> I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this >>> phenomenon is more >>> likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you >>> are a young child) >>> but it's an interesting idea. >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>>> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 >>>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >>&
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal >... >But it is easy to explain that this is already a "simple" consequence of >comp. Any piece of "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of >interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be >"clonable" without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any >internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence). >... I remember you said "comp can be tested experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, etc.)". Can you provide more details on how to do the experiment to see "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations??? Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in
> parallel,
> you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective
> time
> period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as long.
> There
> is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a
> cracked
> idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only
> half-plausible
> subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.
>
> I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear
> more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a
> controlled
> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else
> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect
> lockstep.
> (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which
> would
> not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if
> half the
> computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for
> the AI
> to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information.
> If I
> were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers
> running
> is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care
> if there
> were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this
list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any
difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's
work, assuming COMP (which you have to anyway to consider the thought
experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a
particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth
presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the
actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer
to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete
universe hypothesis altogether.
Cheers
--
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is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes: > This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in > polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in > this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st > person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome > without getting anywhere. > > The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection > between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast > to your statement of "nothing" however, a lower measure OM will appear > more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure > decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory > "erasure", in the sense of quantum erasure. My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in parallel, you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective time period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as long. There is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a cracked idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only half-plausible subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will appear more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a controlled experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything else the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect lockstep. (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, which would not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if half the computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for the AI to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. If I were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers running is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care if there were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. Stathis Papaioannou > On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure > > in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra > > the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting observation > > that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems > > subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would > > seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One > > explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around > > in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This > > would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and > > millenia > > would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our > > measure continuously drops. > > > > I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is > > more > > likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a > > young child) > > but it's an interesting idea. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 > > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > > > > > > > > > Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've > > > lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed > > > here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded. > > > > > > What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one > > > will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast > > > as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that > > > it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a > > > certain age. > > > > > > Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due > > > to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age, > > > total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which > > > can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of > > > quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious > > > organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 19:17:21 +1000 > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > > > This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in > polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in > this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st > person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome > without getting anywhere. > > The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection > between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast > to your statement of "nothing" however, a lower measure OM will appear > more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure > decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory > "erasure", in the sense of quantum erasure. > > Cheers > > On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure > > in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra > > the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting observation > > that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems > > subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would > > seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One > > explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around > > in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This > > would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and > > millenia > > would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our > > measure continuously drops. > > > > I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is > > more > > likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a > > young child) > > but it's an interesting idea. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 > > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > > > > > > > > > Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've > > > lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed > > > here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded. > > > > > > What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one > > > will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast > > > as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that > > > it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a > > > certain age. > > > > > > Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due > > > to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age, > > > total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which > > > can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of > > > quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious > > > organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this > > > might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few > > > standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve > > > consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If > > > we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving > > > consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise > > > enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The > > > distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example. > > > > > > So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave > > > this notion as a conjecture :) > > > > > > Cheers > > > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper > > > > was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to > > > > not following the argument too well, nor RTFA. > > > > > > > > My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multive
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome without getting anywhere. The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast to your statement of "nothing" however, a lower measure OM will appear more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory "erasure", in the sense of quantum erasure. Cheers On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure > in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra > the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting observation > that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems > subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would > seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One > explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around > in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This > would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and > millenia > would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our > measure continuously drops. > > I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is > more > likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a > young child) > but it's an interesting idea. > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > > > > > > Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've > > lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed > > here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded. > > > > What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one > > will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast > > as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that > > it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a > > certain age. > > > > Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due > > to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age, > > total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which > > can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of > > quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious > > organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this > > might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few > > standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve > > consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If > > we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving > > consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise > > enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The > > distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example. > > > > So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave > > this notion as a conjecture :) > > > > Cheers > > > > On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote: > > > Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper > > > was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to > > > not following the argument too well, nor RTFA. > > > > > > My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the > > > measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a > > > certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or > > > faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age. > > > > > > So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving > > > rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect > > > only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of > > > Lambda. > > > > > > We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but > &g
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Hi Stathis, I agree with what you say. Note that quantum information is very different from classical information. Quantum information in general cannot be copied or cloned, so that there is no relative local back-up possible. That is why in quantum teleportation, the annihilation of the "original" is unavoidable. But it is easy to explain that this is already a "simple" consequence of comp. Any piece of "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be "clonable" without cloning the whole UD, but this would not change any internal measures (by Church thesis and machine independence). Of course we can prepare quantum identical states, as the UD cannot not emulates them all, or their rational approximations, which by linearity of the quantum laws, are enough (from the 1-person point of view). QM explains well how bits emerge from qubits, but comp promises a reversed transformation: how qubits are necessarily "dreamed" by bits. Bruno Le 05-août-06, à 15:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > CW writes: > >> It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 >> particles in >> QM. >> But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human >> beings >> (or simple animals). >> Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like "scerir"???) in this list >> can >> provide useful ref. > > There is a distinction between quantum teleportation and classical > teleportation. > Quantum teleportation involves transmitting the exact quantum state of > an entity > and has actually been demonstrated experimentally with handfuls of > particles in > the past decade. Here is reasonably simple summary: > > http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/ > > The cited article states that for reasons of *engineering* difficulty > we won't be > teleporting people around in the near future, but there is no > theoretical reason > why it couldn't eventually be done. A person who quantum teleports > from A to > B would arrive at B in an *identical* physical state, which is > actually more than > can be said if he had walked, since our quantum state changes every > moment. > So, if we remain the same person when walking, we should remain the > same > person when quantum teleporting. It is theoretically possible that > there is some > non-physical factor necessary for consciousness which does not survive > perfect > physical duplication but there is no reason whatsoever to believe > this. It would be > like saying that there is some non-physical factor in my computer, and > a perfect > physical copy of it would not be functionally equivalent because it > would lack this > factor. > > Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum > level, but > rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think, > that this is > theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how good the > copy of a > person would have to be (what Bruno calls the "substitution level") in > order to > feel himself to be the "same" person. But as mentioned above, I don't > think we > need to insist on perfect duplication to the quantum level, because > this doesn't > even happen from moment to moment in everyday life. > > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314 > -9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
CW writes: > It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in > QM. > But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings > (or simple animals). > Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like "scerir"???) in this list can > provide useful ref. There is a distinction between quantum teleportation and classical teleportation. Quantum teleportation involves transmitting the exact quantum state of an entity and has actually been demonstrated experimentally with handfuls of particles in the past decade. Here is reasonably simple summary: http://www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation/ The cited article states that for reasons of *engineering* difficulty we won't be teleporting people around in the near future, but there is no theoretical reason why it couldn't eventually be done. A person who quantum teleports from A to B would arrive at B in an *identical* physical state, which is actually more than can be said if he had walked, since our quantum state changes every moment. So, if we remain the same person when walking, we should remain the same person when quantum teleporting. It is theoretically possible that there is some non-physical factor necessary for consciousness which does not survive perfect physical duplication but there is no reason whatsoever to believe this. It would be like saying that there is some non-physical factor in my computer, and a perfect physical copy of it would not be functionally equivalent because it would lack this factor. Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level, but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think, that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno calls the "substitution level") in order to feel himself to be the "same" person. But as mentioned above, I don't think we need to insist on perfect duplication to the quantum level, because this doesn't even happen from moment to moment in everyday life. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure
in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra
the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting observation
that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems
subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, would
seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. One
explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us around
in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. This
would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries and millenia
would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age and our
measure continuously drops.
I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this phenomenon is more
likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a young
child)
but it's an interesting idea.
Stathis Papaioannou
> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>
>
> Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
> lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
> here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
>
> What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
> will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
> as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
> it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
> certain age.
>
> Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
> to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
> total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
> can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
> quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
> organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
> might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
> standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
> consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
> we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
> consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
> enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
> distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
>
> So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
> this notion as a conjecture :)
>
> Cheers
>
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
> > Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
> > was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
> > not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
> >
> > My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
> > measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
> > certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
> > faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
> >
> > So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
> > rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
> > only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
> > Lambda.
> >
> > We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
> > presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
> > years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
> >
> > Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
> > is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
> >
> > Cheers
>
> --
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
> virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
> email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
> may safely ignore this attachment.
>
>
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
>
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 04-août-06, à 15:18, W. C. a écrit : > I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept > that > there is no physical universe. > Even Buddhists won't say that. Sorry. I was short. All what I say is that IF we take the comp hyp seriously enough THEN we can see that "physical" is not a primitive things (this follows from the UD reasoning, you can ask question). I was meaning there is no "primitive" or "substantial" or "primary" physicalness. Naïve primitive Matter is a form of "ether" (assuming comp). On the contrary "physics", as the science of observable patterns reemerge as a study of relative measure on computations (more exactly quotient of set of computations by a relation of undistinguishability related to person's point of view). Those are well defined through the Church thesis in computer science. Now the objective idealist (not solipsist) type of reality we are lead to from the comp assumption has been defended by many buddhist schools (mainly from the Mahayana), and has been more or less the orthodox way to consider reality during a millennium of greek philosophy/theology. You are right it hurts common sense. The rest of your post has been well answered by Stathis and Quentin, imo. I have nothing to add. Recall that nobody asks you to believe that comp is correct, just to assume it for the sake of the argument. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Stathis Papaioannou > >Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory >and what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his >fingers is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of >physics making it a theoretical impossibility. A person flying to Alpha >Centauri in 5 minutes is logically possible, but the laws of physics make >it theoretically impossible. A person being simultaneously taller than >180cm and shorter than 170cm is a logical impossibility. These three >examples for everyday purposes are equally unlikely to happen, but they are >fundamentally different from a philosophical standpoint. In the case of >classical teleportation, there is nothing in the laws of physics making it >theoretically impossible, and it is certainly not logically impossible. >Time travel is much more dubious: it may be a physical impossibility, and >it may even be a logical impossibility. > Thank you for a very clear explanation of these 3 theoretical/practical/logical possibility differences. I remember I saw some papers before saying that time travel is theoretically possible, although it remains an open question. It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in QM. But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings (or simple animals). Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like "scerir"???) in this list can provide useful ref. Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
CW writes: > >c) Accepting "a)" and "b)" you assume "physical laws" making time travel > >possible (which is of course controversial; this could be in principle > >possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in > >principle with other assumption). > > Time travel is as possible as teleportation of human beings. > > >If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions > >which are making things "possible in principle". Up to here, I can follow > >you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions). > > Of course, there are many details and assumptions to say PUA is possible. > My point is that PUA is possible just like teleportation of human beings. > I think they have similar possibility. Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory and what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his fingers is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of physics making it a theoretical impossibility. A person flying to Alpha Centauri in 5 minutes is logically possible, but the laws of physics make it theoretically impossible. A person being simultaneously taller than 180cm and shorter than 170cm is a logical impossibility. These three examples for everyday purposes are equally unlikely to happen, but they are fundamentally different from a philosophical standpoint. In the case of classical teleportation, there is nothing in the laws of physics making it theoretically impossible, and it is certainly not logically impossible. Time travel is much more dubious: it may be a physical impossibility, and it may even be a logical impossibility. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast
as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that
it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a
certain age.
Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due
to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age,
total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which
can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of
quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a conscious
organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this
might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few
standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve
consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If
we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving
consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise
enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The
distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example.
So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can leave
this notion as a conjecture :)
Cheers
On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
> Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
> was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
> not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
>
> My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
> measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
> certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
> faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
>
> So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
> rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
> only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
> Lambda.
>
> We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
> presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
> years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
>
> Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
> is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
>
> Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal >Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, just >to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give me your >fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are assuming the >following: >a) there is a physical universe (well, with comp this is already >impossible) I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept that there is no physical universe. Even Buddhists won't say that. >b) accepting "a)" you assume that that universe has an origin (this would >be impossible even in principle in case there is no origin) Just like everything, it's more reasonable that there was an origin than no origin, even for the universe. >c) Accepting "a)" and "b)" you assume "physical laws" making time travel >possible (which is of course controversial; this could be in principle >possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in >principle with other assumption). Time travel is as possible as teleportation of human beings. >If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions >which are making things "possible in principle". Up to here, I can follow >you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions). Of course, there are many details and assumptions to say PUA is possible. My point is that PUA is possible just like teleportation of human beings. I think they have similar possibility. >Your "2" and "3" are unfortunately definitely impossible with comp without >deciding your PU (your Perfect Universe) being trivial. This is not obvious >(but follows from diagonalization similar to those I have already >illustrated). Let me just say that it can be shown that if you want your PU >enough rich for Universal machine to appear, then you cannot, even in >principle, filter those "bad" machines will easily makes your PU unperfect. Just like I can make a PC program running perfectly. I don't see why *this* universe can't be perfect. >So the PUA *is* incompatible with comp. The most basic contradiction is >given by the consequence of the UDA: there is no physical universe: only >computations/dreams some of which "coheres" so as to provides local first >person plural notion supervening on them. But even in the case those >coherence would define "for all practical purposes" a "physical universe", >and even if it has some sort of physical origin and you can teleport >yourself to its origin, the laws of computer science will eventually >prevent you of reprogramming "the universe" to satisfy your goal of making >it perfect. Which laws of computer science? My computer science says I can make a perfect program. >From: Stathis Papaioannou >Yes, but it's still possible to imagine what would happen *if* something >were done that at the moment seems impossible. If sodium chloride were >produced by a machine which causes the transmutation of hydrogen into other >elements, would it still taste salty? I would say that the answer is "of >course", whether or not such a machine could ever be built. I don't even >see how it is *logically* possible that pure NaCl could taste different >depending on where it came from. I still can't compare teleportation of human beings with NaCl. Too far away! Thanks. WC. _ No masks required! Use MSN Messenger to chat with friends and family. http://go.msnserver.com/HK/25382.asp --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 04-août-06, à 08:03, W. C. a écrit : > >> From: Bruno Marchal >> All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such >> substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in >> many > >> fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is >> based on >> the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the >> entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing >> emulable, >> then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your >> "generalized" brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and >> that is >> enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of >> physics >> emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps >> of the >> reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not >> relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be >> tested >> experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable >> interference >> among many computations, etc.). OK? > > I have an idea (or dream) for some time. Let's call it the "perfect > universe > argument" (PUA). > The purpose of PUA is to produce a perfect universe (a perfect world > without > any crimes, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc.). > It's as follows: > (1) I teleport myself to the origin of the universe. Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, just to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give me your fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are assuming the following: a) there is a physical universe (well, with comp this is already impossible) b) accepting "a)" you assume that that universe has an origin (this would be impossible even in principle in case there is no origin) c) Accepting "a)" and "b)" you assume "physical laws" making time travel possible (which is of course controversial; this could be in principle possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in principle with other assumption). If you do theoretical reasonings you have to make clear the assumptions which are making things "possible in principle". Up to here, I can follow you (I can imagine such fundamental assumptions). > (2) I adjust some parameters of the universe. (This is like adjusting > some > parameters in a modern PC program > so that you can get the perfect result when running the program.) > (3) The adjustment changes the whole universe immediately and the > universe > becomes perfect. Your "2" and "3" are unfortunately definitely impossible with comp without deciding your PU (your Perfect Universe) being trivial. This is not obvious (but follows from diagonalization similar to those I have already illustrated). Let me just say that it can be shown that if you want your PU enough rich for Universal machine to appear, then you cannot, even in principle, filter those "bad" machines will easily makes your PU unperfect. > PUA is possible in principle, right? Does it agree to Comp. and UDA? So the PUA *is* incompatible with comp. The most basic contradiction is given by the consequence of the UDA: there is no physical universe: only computations/dreams some of which "coheres" so as to provides local first person plural notion supervening on them. But even in the case those coherence would define "for all practical purposes" a "physical universe", and even if it has some sort of physical origin and you can teleport yourself to its origin, the laws of computer science will eventually prevent you of reprogramming "the universe" to satisfy your goal of making it perfect. Now, honestly this is a good news. "Perfection" is a virtue, and comp makes it impossible to define any virtue from inside the "universe", and this saves our freeness, and explains why even Gods cannot conceive "sufficiently rich" universe with build-in perfection. > >> From: Stathis Papaioannou >> Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you >> created at >> point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to >> the same >> extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If >> you >> answer "no" then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that >> would >> not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be >> physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there >> is >> some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not >> teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to >> believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved. > > I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since > teleportation is still a fiction now. But classical teleportation is possible in principle once we assume comp. Now I don't want to argue for comp, but there is no contradiction between comp and any known facts. To be sure I did believe in non-comp at the time I thoug
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
CW writes: > >From: Stathis Papaioannou > >Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at > >point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same > >extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you > >answer "no" then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would > >not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be > >physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is > >some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not > >teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to > >believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved. > > I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since > teleportation is still a fiction now. > It's also unknown if there is something non-physical in human (or living) > beings. Yes, but it's still possible to imagine what would happen *if* something were done that at the moment seems impossible. If sodium chloride were produced by a machine which causes the transmutation of hydrogen into other elements, would it still taste salty? I would say that the answer is "of course", whether or not such a machine could ever be built. I don't even see how it is *logically* possible that pure NaCl could taste different depending on where it came from. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>From: Bruno Marchal >All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such >substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many > >fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on >the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the >entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing emulable, >then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your >"generalized" brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and that is >enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of physics >emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps of the >reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not >relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be tested >experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference >among many computations, etc.). OK? I have an idea (or dream) for some time. Let's call it the "perfect universe argument" (PUA). The purpose of PUA is to produce a perfect universe (a perfect world without any crimes, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc.). It's as follows: (1) I teleport myself to the origin of the universe. (2) I adjust some parameters of the universe. (This is like adjusting some parameters in a modern PC program so that you can get the perfect result when running the program.) (3) The adjustment changes the whole universe immediately and the universe becomes perfect. PUA is possible in principle, right? Does it agree to Comp. and UDA? >From: Stathis Papaioannou >Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at >point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same >extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you >answer "no" then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would >not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be >physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is >some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not >teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to >believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved. I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since teleportation is still a fiction now. It's also unknown if there is something non-physical in human (or living) beings. Thanks. WC. _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
CW writes: > Hi, Bruno, > > Sorry for my na鴳e question. > Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the > teleportation > example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction. > Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation > of human beings is really workable. > I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment. Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you answer "no" then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 02-août-06, à 10:20, C. W. a écrit : Hi, Bruno, Sorry for my na鴳e question. Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the teleportation example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction. Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation of human beings is really workable. I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment. All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing emulable, then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your "generalized" brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and that is enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of physics emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps of the reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be tested experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference among many computations, etc.). OK? Bruno PS (I am alas again busy. Please be patient for the replies). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Hi, Bruno, Sorry for my na鴳e question. Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the teleportation example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction. Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportation of human beings is really workable. I really wonder if it's OK to use teleportation as thought experiment. Thanks. WC. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 5:38 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees Le 26-juil.-06, ?13:34, Russell Standish wrote : > > Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees, > and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment > on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well. > > Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean > effort to get other to think along your lines. All what I say is that IF we assume the Comp Hypothesis then there is no choice in the matter. I have already done the Herculean effort under the UDA. I don't think there is problem with that. Even in this list, if you look carefully, critics always converge toward a critics of COMP, not of the reasoning. I would say in the average 50% of those who really doesn't like the idea of the reversal Physics/psycho-bio-theo-logy-number-theory will criticize the "yes" doctor or the Arithmetical realism (until they see what I mean by it). I have never met a critics of Church thesis, except the physicalist reinterpretation done by David Deutsch (which does not work). ... ... ... _ MSN 人氣搜尋，有齊城中熱門話題 http://www.msn.com.hk/hothits/default.asp --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Russell Standish writes, regarding http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227 :
> Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
> was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
> not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
>
> My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
> measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
> certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
> faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
I had a similar thought. I am curious to know your reasoning or
justification for why this should be true.
I have not read the papers referenced by this one, but the authors allude
to previous work: "Given some a priori distribution of the values of
the fundamental constants across the ensemble, the probability for a
'typical' obserer to measure a certain value of one or more of these
constants is usually taken to be proportional to the number of observers
(or the number of observers per baryon)."
It is this last parenthetical comment I found interesting. Apparently
there has been a difference in previous work about whether the measure
should be proportional to observers vs observers per baryon. Consider
two cases: one observer in a universe of a given size, or one observer
in a universe twice that big. These would be considered the same by a
number-of-observers measure, but the first would have twice the measure
if it was observers per baryon.
I argued some time past, based on some hand-wavey arguments, that the
latter measure is better - we attribute a portion of a universe's measure
to an observer, proportional to the fraction of the universe that the
observer takes up. This came from the UDASSA concept I was describing
in detail last year. It amounts to the observers-per-baryon measure.
It's interesting that physicists have considered a similar idea.
In terms of time, like Russell I would say that ancient observer-moments
should get less measure than early ones, for the same basic reason -
it takes more information to specify the location of the "physical"
system that instantiates the OM within the universe. My reasoning
though would imply that measure should be inversely proportional to
age, rather than Russell's suggestion of an exponential decay. So I am
curious where he got that. I could describe my reasoning in more detail
if there is interest.
> So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
> rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
> only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
> Lambda.
>
> We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
> presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
> years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
I don't know if I know enough physics to figure that out. I'll take
another look at the paper.
I see that I misstated the reason why the CC limits observation.
It's not that the universe becomes uninhabitable. Rather, computation
and observation is assumed to be proportional to internal energy divided
by external universe temperature. It turns out that the optimal strategy
is to accumulate and store up as much energy as you can, as the universe
expands and cools. Then, when the universe is all cooled down, you go
ahead and do all your observations and calculations.
In a universe with a high CC, you can't accumulate as much energy,
because it expands more quickly and hence mass-energy thins out faster.
It cools down sooner and you don't have as much stored up at that time,
so you can't do as much.
So what we would have to say is that that strategy is no longer optimal
because such distant observer-moments will have low measure, and we care
more about OMs which have high measure. (I admit that few people take
the idea seriously that seemingly undetectable OM measure changes should
matter, but I can assume that this is a super-advanced civilization and
everyone is smart, so of course they will agree with me!)
Instead, the optimal strategy maximizes the total measure of OM-
computations, and that requires doing more computations early. OTOH,
it is more efficient to wait until the universe is cooler, we can do more
computing with the same amount of energy. Maximizing the product of these
two effects would require a detailed model for how quickly measure decays
with time. (We'd also have to consider whether measure should change with
temperature, which it might in my model, I have to think about it more.)
> Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
> is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
I think what you're saying is that if this is the only universe, and if
civilizations adopt the strategies advocated in this paper, then most
OMs will be far in the future, hence by the ASSA we are unlikely to be
experiencing present-day OMs. This was the basic
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 26-juil.-06, à 13:34, Russell Standish wrote : > > Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees, > and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment > on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well. > > Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean > effort to get other to think along your lines. All what I say is that IF we assume the Comp Hypothesis then there is no choice in the matter. I have already done the Herculean effort under the UDA. I don't think there is problem with that. Even in this list, if you look carefully, critics always converge toward a critics of COMP, not of the reasoning. I would say in the average 50% of those who really doesn't like the idea of the reversal Physics/psycho-bio-theo-logy-number-theory will criticize the "yes" doctor or the Arithmetical realism (until they see what I mean by it). I have never met a critics of Church thesis, except the physicalist reinterpretation done by David Deutsch (which does not work). Let me quote Danny who send this message sometime ago, + an answer I wrote at that time but never send, and which can give clue why the reversal will ndeed take time to be swallowed. In one word: it is just that theology is a taboo field since the Roman made theology reserved for political purposes. Dogmatic Materialist and Atheist has always benefit of this by an apparent reaction which really goes in the same Aristotelian direction. Danny wrote (some times ago): > I doubt Marchal's ideas will be made widely known or popularized in > the foreseeable future. The problem isn't with the name of his > theory, or with any problem with Bruno per se beyond this: There > doesn't seem to be an easily reducible way to summarize the theory in > a manner that is digestible to anyone beyond the highly specialized in > similar fields. I certainly understand the basics of some of his > ideas, but when it gets into all his logical analysis I just have > never found myself willing to devote myself to the time required to > really get into the detail of where he is coming from. And I would > consider myself highly interested in these topics and at least > reasonably intelligent. > > Even something as mundane as the MWI (to this group at least) runs > into a brickwall when presented to the layperson. You should see the > conversations I have with my wife. Tell people everything is made of > strings. Or space and time can be warped and curved. They may not > understand the science and math behind it at all, but at least you are > speaking their language. > > The world is not ready for his ideas. Even for the most part the > world of scientists in my opinion. An old attempt toward an answer: << Let us go back at the eve of humanity ... Since humans are humans, mainly two very opposite ways to handle fundamental questions has been developed. Note that ten thousand intermediate positions between those two ways exists. Those two ways are: 1) Close your eyes, and think. 2) Open your eyes, and think. We could call the first way the mystical way, and the second the empirical way. Unfortunately today we are living with some prejudices, and many "scientist" would say that the mystical way are unscientific and that only the empirical way would be scientific. Personally I doubt very much that such a separation should be done there. Empirist can be as irrational as some mystics can be. And history tells us that mysticism can lead to rationalism. Indeed, in our civilization mystical rationalism has lead to about one millenium of *rational* mysticism or rational theology from Pythagoras to Proclus: it can be called "platonism". The main gift of that rational mysticism (platonism) has been the *science* of mathematics (as opposed as its art and technic which Pythagoras knew by its many travels in the east and south). Today "1)" is close to the theoretical minded mind, and "2)" is close to the experimentalist minded mind, and I don't think it would be an exaggeration to say everybody believes science has developed through a perpetuating back and forth between both theories and experimentations. And a darwinist could add that we have now empirical reasons to believe that such a back and forth between theory/representation and experiment/practice has begun well before humanity. Our evolved genome and brain is already reflecting the presence of build-in "theories" (innate ideas) an trials. Nevertheless, although locally "1)" and "2)" are both necessary for surviving, it seems to me that at a deeper level, with respect to the fundamental inquiries, the difference between "1)" and "2)" cannot been neglected. The difference culminated through the work of Plato and Aristotle with their very different conceptions of reality. For Plato (and many eastern researchers) , grosso modo, reality should explain what we see without taking it
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After a
certain point in time, the measure probably decreases exponentially or
faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age.
So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving
rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect
only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of
Lambda.
We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, but
presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10}
years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda?
Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single universe -
is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse?
Cheers
On Thu, Jul 27, 2006 at 11:08:04AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta. I had
> seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down. Here is the abstract:
>
> The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
> longer in universes with smaller CC's. The CC eventually puts an end
> to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
> fast and there is no longer enough energy density. The higher the CC,
> the sooner this happens. With CC's as high as what we observe, the
> theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
> with smaller CC's.
>
> The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
> CC can be measured in a given universe. This makes low-CC universes
> have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
> longer in those. Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
> for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
> be explained anthropically.
>
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Saibal Mitra writes:
> From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
> > it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
> > The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
> > systematic exploration. Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
> > universes, are even worse.
>
> I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse.
I should clarify, I meant that our ideas are even worse in terms of
systematic exploration of all the possibilities, because we generally
consider an infinity of possible universes, while the string theory
landscape predicts (some people say) about 10^500 possible universes.
> If you read some recent articles,
> e.g.:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227
>
> you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
> probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
> "handwaving" stage.
This is actually a very interesting paper, by Starkman and Trotta. I had
seen some mention of it but hadn't tracked it down. Here is the abstract:
"We revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value
of the cosmological constant. We argue that different ways of assigning
probabilities to candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic
predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different
universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an
extremely small probability for observing a value of Lambda equal to or
greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic reasoning
within the framework of probability as frequency is ill-defined and
that it cannot be used to explain the value of Lambda, nor, likely,
any other physical parameters."
The paper is pretty technical but I thought I could understand the gist
of it. The cosmological constant ("Lambda") is a repulsive force which
drives galaxies apart in the Big Bang model. Until a few years ago it was
thought to be entirely theoretical, but since then observations indicate
that it is real, and that the universal expansion is accelerating.
The question then becomes what would happen in universes with different
values of the CC.
The paper basically shows that observers (or civilizations) can last
longer in universes with smaller CC's. The CC eventually puts an end
to the observations that can be made, because the expansion gets too
fast and there is no longer enough energy density. The higher the CC,
the sooner this happens. With CC's as high as what we observe, the
theoretical lifetime of civilization is much shorter than in universes
with smaller CC's.
The authors choose to use as their measure, the number of times the
CC can be measured in a given universe. This makes low-CC universes
have a much higher measure, because the window for CC observations is
longer in those. Hence they conclude that the highest probability is
for a CC much smaller than we observe, and so our own CC value cannot
be explained anthropically.
This is in contrast to earlier results which used different measures, such
as the number of galaxies, and found that our CC results were consistent
with anthropic considerations. The authors argue that their measure is
at least as philosphically justifiable as those earlier papers, and their
real point is that no measure can be justified as better than another,
hence all anthropic reasoning is just hand-waving.
In our terms we might put it like this. The new paper essentially uses a
measure which is the number of possible observer-moments in the universe.
Universes with a high CC go through a "big rip" process eventually,
accelerating to a super-expansion mode and presumably putting an end
to observers. Universes with a low or zero CC go through this much
later or not at all, allowing for more observer-moments. Hence this
measure gives a bonus to universes that last a long time.
Earlier papers apparently looked at a snapshot of time similar to the
present day, and in effect based the measure on the number of observers
(assumed to be proportional to the number of galaxies). So we have a
distinction between an observer-moment measure and an observer measure.
The two apparently give very different results, the OM measure preferring
long-lasting universes while the observer measure is more interested in
the size of the universe.
I guess I'll stop here and see if there is more interest. To leave with
a few questions: Is there any fundamental way to decide which measure
is "best"? Do the OM measure and the observer measure really give
different results, and is that significant? Are there other measures
that might be used, and what results would they get? And finally, will
this apparent failure of anthropic reasoning discredit the concept among
working physicists? As I mentioned, I've already seen it used in a blog
common on Woit's blog that I pointed to the other day, in just that way.
Hal Finney
--~--~--
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
- Original Message - From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation, > it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions. > The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for > systematic exploration. Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible > universes, are even worse. Physicists see acceptance of anthropic > explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make > quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom. > I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse. If you read some recent articles, e.g.: http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227 you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure, probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the "handwaving" stage. Saibal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.
Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean
effort to get other to think along your lines.
Cheers
On Wed, Jul 26, 2006 at 04:21:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees:
>
>
> > So I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue
> > between science and theology
> >
>
>
> With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand
> that science is just modesty, and that it is not domain dependent. I
> favor collaboration of scientists from many disciplines on the
> fundamental questions which by their very nature ask for
> interdisciplinary open mindness. You can do theology with a 100%
> scientific attitude. Not doing that is the same as abandoning theology
> to authoritative argument. In that case, it is not astosnihing that
> theology looks irrational and unscientific.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees: So I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue between science and theology With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand that science is just modesty, and that it is not domain dependent. I favor collaboration of scientists from many disciplines on the fundamental questions which by their very nature ask for interdisciplinary open mindness. You can do theology with a 100% scientific attitude. Not doing that is the same as abandoning theology to authoritative argument. In that case, it is not astosnihing that theology looks irrational and unscientific. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Danny Mayes writes: > Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees > Which approximates my ideas on the nature of reality and the possible role > of intelligence. Well, no offense to Martin or you, but that's pretty ordinary stuff which we have been discussing on this list since 1998. There is an entire website devoted to the speculation that Rees describes, the possibility that we live in a simulation: simulation-argument.com, by former list member Nick Bostrom. It's always kind of disconcerting to read popularizations of the kinds of ideas we discuss here. Writers have to approach them so delicately, taking such pains to marvel at the amazing and perhaps outlandish imagination it takes to consider them seriously. I always read these articles with a sinking feeling, knowing that they aren't going to say anything new to me and frustrated that the concepts can't just be delivered straight, the way we take them here. I've been wanting to write something about the collision between physics and the anthropic principle, and maybe this is a good time. As Rees describes, recent developments in string theory, have introduced the idea of a "landscape" of possible stable models. Each point on the landscape would correspond to a possible set of particles and physical laws. I haven't gotten a clear picture of whether this landscape is actually infinite or merely very large; most writers seem to think the distinction is unimportant, because the "large" is so "very". Rees is typical in how he inconsistently says first one and then the other. (I imagine that most of us would see the distinction as rather more important.) Anyway, as Rees describes, this is forcing physicists to consider the possibility that the fundamental physics of our universe is no more meaningful than the distance from the earth to the sun: a mere accident of nature, with the anthropic principle explaining why we are here to see it and ask about it. I've seen this same earth-sun analogy used in talks by other physicists. But what Rees does not say is that many or most physicists are being dragged down this path kicking and screaming. Physics is not going gently into the anthropic night. Most physicists, I think, see this as the death of physics. Rees himself admits that it in effect blurs the line between physics and philosophy. It calls into question the entire program of fundamental physics, to explain why the universe is the way it is. The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation, it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions. The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for systematic exploration. Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible universes, are even worse. Physicists see acceptance of anthropic explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom. Now, granted, predictions may still be possible in principle - given that the string theory landscape is finite, you could in theory explore every part of it and create probabilistic predictions contingent on what has been observed so far. The problem is that there is no prospect of actually being able to do this. Clearly it can't be done by brute force. Maybe someone will come up with some kind of clever sampling approach, or perhaps some structure can eventually be found in the landscape. But at this point there is no reason to believe that such efforts will amount to anything. The result is that string theory in particular has reached a dead end. This is what physicists have been banking on for twenty years to achieve a grand unification, a theory of everything. And instead, they have found within the past couple of years that it is more like a "theory of anything", in the sense that seemingly any hypothetical universe might be consistent with string theory. Such a theory is no theory at all, to physicists. The situation has gotten so bad that there is a growing backlash against string theory. Proponents of rival theories, who have labored in obscurity for decades, are coming out of the woodwork and demanding their share of attention (and the substantial research funding of which string theory has long received the lion's share). Two major books are coming out this fall which proclaim the death of string theory. One is "Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory And the Search for Unity in Physical Law" by Peter Woit (his blog of the same name is here, http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/ ). The other is by Lee Smolin: "The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next". Amazon even pairs the books for you so you can get a double dose of anti-string theory. These books have been well reviewed and there seems to be a sense that indeed, the general approach of physics needs to be substantially rethought. So the bottom line is that Rees leaves us with
