Re: what happens when you put a typo in a DNSBL server?

[Steve Sobol]

On Tue, 16 Jan 2007, John L wrote:
 
> Uh, not quite.  Try looking up 2.0.0.127.abuse.net, and then explain to me 
> why people keep hammering on it.

*cough*

2.0.0.127.abuse.net has address 127.255.255.255

Very cute. :) 

I think this is a PEBKAC** situation, not an architectural issue.

--Steve

** P)roblem E)xists B)etween K)eyboard A)nd C)hair, in this case the KAC 
of the person who isn't checking that he's configured the right hostname 
for the DNSBL.

-- 
Steve Sobol, Professional Geek ** Java/VB/VC/PHP/Perl ** Linux/*BSD/Windows
Victorville, California PGP:0xE3AE35ED

It's all fun and games until someone starts a bonfire in the living room.

Meeting Reminders

[Betty Burke]

All:

We are counting down the days to Toronto! I hope you have taken the time to 
register for NANOG-39.  However, if you have forgotten to do so, a few 
reminders follow.


1.  The hotel room rate increases on Saturday, the 20th.


2.  The full agenda will be posted on Monday the 22nd.  The PC has been 
working hard to bring a strong program to Toronto.



3.  Confirm passport issues have been resolved.


4.  REGISTER!!!


As always, send any all suggestions, questions or concerns to us, 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  We look forward to a great meeting and in 
visiting with all soon.


All best.
Betty
NANOG Project Manager

Meeting Reminders

[Betty Burke]

All:

We are counting down the days to Toronto! I hope you have taken the time to 
register for NANOG-39.  However, if you have forgotten to do so, a few 
reminders follow.


1.  The hotel room rate increases on Saturday, the 20th.


2.  The full agenda will be posted on Monday the 22nd.  The PC has been 
working hard to bring a strong program to Toronto.



3.  Confirm passport issues have been resolved.


4.  REGISTER!!!


As always, send any all suggestions, questions or concerns to us, 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  We look forward to a great meeting and in 
visiting with all soon.


All best.
Betty
NANOG Project Manager

Re: For anyone who hasn't yet asked Ren for an explanation...

[Thomas Leavitt]

... and he doesn't even mention that SBC also acquired Pacific Telesis 
(PacBell, Nevada Bell) and SNET (in addition to Ameritech) before it 
merged with AT&T and Bell South.


Thomas

Majdi S. Abbas wrote:

On Fri, Jan 19, 2007 at 10:55:53AM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
  
...of how this whole AT&T rebranding thing works, Stephen Colbert summs it 
up:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bj1Mtv9cD0I&eurl=



Much along the lines of seeing how fast you can name the
states, or their capitals alphabetically, how fast can *YOU* name the
22 operating companies?

No cheating!

(The converse game is principally played by Bell executives;
how fast can you {rename|acquire} the operating companies?) 


--msa
  



--
Thomas Leavitt - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - 831-295-3917 (cell)

*** Independent Systems and Network Consultant, Santa Cruz, CA ***

Re: For anyone who hasn't yet asked Ren for an explanation...

[Majdi S. Abbas]

On Fri, Jan 19, 2007 at 10:55:53AM -0800, Bill Woodcock wrote:
> ...of how this whole AT&T rebranding thing works, Stephen Colbert summs it 
> up:
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bj1Mtv9cD0I&eurl=

Much along the lines of seeing how fast you can name the
states, or their capitals alphabetically, how fast can *YOU* name the
22 operating companies?

No cheating!

(The converse game is principally played by Bell executives;
how fast can you {rename|acquire} the operating companies?) 

--msa

Drone Armies C&C Report - 19 Jan 2007

[randy_vaughn]

This is a periodic public report from the ISOTF's affiliated group 'DA'
(Drone Armies (botnets) research and mitigation mailing list / TISF
DA) with the ISOTF affiliated ASreport project (TISF / RatOut).

For this report it should be noted that we base our analysis on the data
we have accumulated from various sources, which may be incomplete.

Any responsible party that wishes to receive reports of botnet command
and control servers on their network(s) regularly and directly, feel
free to contact us.

For purposes of this report we use the following terms
openthe host completed the TCP handshake
closed  No activity detected
reset   issued a RST

This month's survey is of 5187 unique, domains (or IPs) with
port suspect C&Cs. This list is extracted from the BBL which
has a historical base of 14723 reported C&Cs. Of the suspect C&Cs
surveyed, 678 reported as Open, 1769 reported as closed,
and 812 issued resets to the survey instrument. Of the C&Cs 
listed by domain name in the our C&C database, 5845 are mitigated.

Top 20 ASNes by Total suspect domains mapping to a host in the ASN.
These numbers are determined by counting the number of domains which
resolve to a host in the ASN.  We do not remove duplicates and some of
the ASNs reported have many domains mapping to a single IP.  Note the
Percent_resolved figure is calculated using only the Total and Open
counts and does not represent a mitigation effectiveness metric.
Percent_
ASN Responsible Party   Total   OpenResolved
19318   NJIIX-AS-1 - NEW JERSEY INTERN124 24 81
13301   UNITEDCOLO-AS Autonomous System of 99 29 71
 4766   KIXS-AS-KR 61 21 66
14779   INKT Inktomi Corporation   58  0100
30058   FDCSE FDCservers.net LLC   58 14 76
16265   LEASEWEB AS43 26 40
23522   CIT-FOONET 42 24 43
 9318   HANARO-AS  38 10 74
 7132   SBC Internet Services  36  5 86
25761   STAMIN-2 Staminus Communications   35 20 43
13213   UK2NET-AS UK-2 Ltd Autonomous Syste33  6 82
  174   Cogent Communications  31 27 13
33597   InfoRelay Online Systems, Inc. 31  0100
 4837   CHINA169-Backbone  31  7 77
 8560   SCHLUND-AS 29 14 52
15083   IIS-129 Infolink Information Servic28  1 96
 3786   ERX-DACOMNET   26 12 54
12832   Lycos Europe   24  0100
28753   NETDIRECT AS NETDIRECT Frankfurt   23  8 65
 4134   CHINANET-BACKBONE  22  7 68

Top 20 ASNes by number of active suspect C&Cs.  These counts are
determined by the number of suspect domains or IPs located within
the ASN completed a connection request.
Percent_
ASN Responsible Party   Total   OpenResolved
13301   UNITEDCOLO-AS Autonomous System of 99 29 71
  174   Cogent Communications  31 27 13
16265   LEASEWEB AS43 26 40
23522   CIT-FOONET 42 24 43
19318   NJIIX-AS-1 - NEW JERSEY INTERN124 24 81
 4766   KIXS-AS-KR 61 21 66
25761   STAMIN-2 Staminus Communications   35 20 43
 8560   SCHLUND-AS 29 14 52
30058   FDCSE FDCservers.net LLC   58 14 76
 3786   ERX-DACOMNET   26 12 54
 9318   HANARO-AS  38 10 74
31103   KEYWEB-AS Keyweb AG10  8 20
28753   NETDIRECT AS NETDIRECT Frankfurt   23  8 65
 4837   CHINA169-Backbone  31  7 77
 9930   TTNET-MY8  7 13
 4134   CHINANET-BACKBONE  22  7 68
18942   WEBHO-3 WebHostPlus Inc11  7 36
 6140   ImpSat  8  7 13
 1781   KAIST-DAEJEON-AS-KR Korea Advanced  8  7 13
12322   PROXAD AS for Proxad ISP8  7 13

A version of this report with addition rankings can be found
via the isotf.org home page. 


Randal Vaughn Gadi  Evron
Professor ge at linuxbox.org
Baylor University
Waco, TX
(254) 710 4756
randy_vaughn at baylor.edu

For anyone who hasn't yet asked Ren for an explanation...

[Bill Woodcock]

...of how this whole AT&T rebranding thing works, Stephen Colbert summs it 
up:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bj1Mtv9cD0I&eurl=

-Bill

Weekly Routing Table Report

[Routing Analysis Role Account]

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan.
Daily listings are sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

For historical data, please see http://thyme.apnic.net.

If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.

Routing Table Report   04:00 +10GMT Sat 20 Jan, 2007

Analysis Summary


BGP routing table entries examined:  208300
Prefixes after maximum aggregation:  112624
Deaggregation factor:  1.85
Unique aggregates announced to Internet: 101475
Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 24172
Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:   21051
Origin ASes announcing only one prefix:   10192
Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:3121
Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 78
Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table:   3.6
Max AS path length visible:  32
Max AS path prepend of ASN (20858)   18
Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 4
Unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:   7
Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:0
Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 27
Number of addresses announced to Internet:   1660997452
Equivalent to 99 /8s, 0 /16s and 207 /24s
Percentage of available address space announced:   44.8
Percentage of allocated address space announced:   63.6
Percentage of available address space allocated:   70.5
Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations:  106510

APNIC Region Analysis Summary
-

Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes:46255
Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   18724
APNIC Deaggregation factor:2.47
Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks:   43822
Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks:19170
APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:2827
APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:793
APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:422
Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:3.6
Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 16
Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet:  276302048
Equivalent to 16 /8s, 120 /16s and 8 /24s
Percentage of available APNIC address space announced: 86.4

APNIC AS Blocks4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431
(pre-ERX allocations)  23552-24575, 37888-38911
APNIC Address Blocks   58/7, 60/7, 121/8, 122/7, 124/7, 126/8, 202/7
   210/7, 218/7, 220/7 and 222/8

ARIN Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes:102695
Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:60728
ARIN Deaggregation factor: 1.69
Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:75619
Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 28899
ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:11274
ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:4311
ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:1039
Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.4
Max ARIN Region AS path length visible:  21
Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet:   313853056
Equivalent to 18 /8s, 181 /16s and 4 /24s
Percentage of available ARIN address space announced:  69.3

ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106
(pre-ERX allocations)  2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153
   3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466
   7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407
   18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591,
   26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791
   35840-36863, 39936-40959
ARIN Address Blocks24/8, 63/8, 64/5, 72/6, 76/8, 96/6, 199/8, 204/6,
   208/7 and 216/8

RIPE Region Analysis Summary


Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 43136
Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation:28202
RIPE Deaggregation factor: 1.53
Prefixes being announced from the RIPE 

Re: HTML email, was Re: Phishing and BGP Blackholing

[Fergie]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -- Stephane Bortzmeyer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>> a combination of retarded registry policies (pitting business
>> interests against common technical sense)
>
>In a capitalist country, I do not see how you could do otherwise. In a
>non-capitalist country, there is still hope, I'll talk to Fidel about
>that, next time we meet.
>

Whatever. :-)

I'm sure that all 30,090 results of a search for "ebay" are
legit:

 http://domain-search.domaintools.com/?q=ebay

Cheers,

- - ferg

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: PGP Desktop 9.5.2 (Build 4075)

wj8DBQFFsP8Aq1pz9mNUZTMRAvxTAJ0dDPpqcUhEDirzpEQNrdBf9jWdlACg7GmU
3EeA9OZ5veYUQfooHsUFh58=
=Waoa
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


--
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 Engineering Architecture for the Internet
 fergdawg(at)netzero.net
 ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

Re: HTML email, was Re: Phishing and BGP Blackholing

[Joe Provo]

On Thu, Jan 18, 2007 at 07:05:25AM -0800, Matthew Black wrote:
[snip]
> This presupposes that corporations have a more significant claim
> to domain names than individuals. 

Wrong; that kind of policy does -and did when enforced back in 
the InterNIC days when the generic TLDs were meaningful- no such 
thing. 

> Does anybody recall the fiasco
> between ETOY.COM and ETOYS.COM? The former was created by an artist
> years before the now defunct toy retailer. ETOYS' corporate bullying
> took away the artist's longstanding domain claiming it might confuse
> consumers.

Wrong again; etoy won. I'm sure I'm not alone for having my copy
of the toywar soundtrack and share[s].

> That is the real problem.

Post-NSF, the failure of a distributed directory naturally lead 
to the dns & whois being treated as one.  In hindsight, any 
managed list wasn't what was needed, but certainly seemed natual 
to ma bell. A more dynamic, less-intermediated service *was* 
needed and the collective we worked around the problem, 
unfortunately pushing it down into the infrastructure.  The 
thing that rankles me most is that is where it frankly shouldn't 
*matter*, but there was this great hammer so naturally 'we' could
pound the nail...

> Phishing problems will not be corrected without multinational
[snip]

...reputation clearinghouses, one of the many drums long beaten 
by the anti-spam and general anti-abuse camp, is the answer. Like 
the other such drums before it, folks will listen well after it 
is too late and only after it directly affects them.

Cheers,

Joe

-- 
 RSUC / GweepNet / Spunk / FnB / Usenix / SAGE

The Cidr Report

[cidr-report]

This report has been generated at Fri Jan 19 21:46:43 2007 AEST.
The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router
and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table.

Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report.

Recent Table History
Date  PrefixesCIDR Agg
12-01-07204271  133133
13-01-07204375  133206
14-01-07204384  133265
15-01-07204415  133375
16-01-07204613  133603
17-01-07204729  133630
18-01-07204880  133706
19-01-07205110  133867


AS Summary
 24071  Number of ASes in routing system
 10183  Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
  1528  Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS
AS7018 : ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services
  90870272  Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)
AS721  : DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center


Aggregation Summary
The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only
when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as 
to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also
proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes').

 --- 19Jan07 ---
ASnumNetsNow NetsAggr  NetGain   % Gain   Description

Table 205128   1337587137034.8%   All ASes

AS4134  1236  300  93675.7%   CHINANET-BACKBONE
   No.31,Jin-rong Street
AS18566  986  104  88289.5%   COVAD - Covad Communications
   Co.
AS4755  1052  179  87383.0%   VSNL-AS Videsh Sanchar Nigam
   Ltd. Autonomous System
AS9498   930   87  84390.6%   BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET
   LTD.
AS4323  1061  303  75871.4%   TWTC - Time Warner Telecom,
   Inc.
AS22773  713   48  66593.3%   CCINET-2 - Cox Communications
   Inc.
AS11492  910  329  58163.8%   CABLEONE - CABLE ONE
AS19262  760  185  57575.7%   VZGNI-TRANSIT - Verizon
   Internet Services Inc.
AS7018  1528  990  53835.2%   ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet
   Services
AS17488  584   50  53491.4%   HATHWAY-NET-AP Hathway IP Over
   Cable Internet
AS6197  1022  508  51450.3%   BATI-ATL - BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS19916  568   71  49787.5%   ASTRUM-0001 - OLM LLC
AS18101  511   32  47993.7%   RIL-IDC Reliance Infocom Ltd
   Internet Data Centre,
AS17676  503   66  43786.9%   JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan
   Network Information Center
AS721707  289  41859.1%   DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network
   Information Center
AS15270  496   82  41483.5%   AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec.net -a
   division of
   PaeTecCommunications, Inc.
AS8151   848  438  41048.3%   Uninet S.A. de C.V.
AS4766   725  317  40856.3%   KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom
AS9583  1024  622  40239.3%   SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited
AS2386  1107  737  37033.4%   INS-AS - AT&T Data
   Communications Services
AS6467   414   45  36989.1%   ESPIRECOMM - Xspedius
   Communications Co.
AS4812   427   68  35984.1%   CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom
   (Group)
AS3602   524  187  33764.3%   AS3602-RTI - Rogers Telecom
   Inc.
AS16852  392   67  32582.9%   BROADWING-FOCAL - Broadwing
   Communications, Inc.
AS33588  422  120  30271.6%   BRESNAN-AS - Bresnan
   Communications, LLC.
AS6517   405  115  29071.6%   YIPESCOM - Yipes
   Communications, Inc.
AS6198   552  263  28952.4%   BATI-MIA - BellSouth Network
   Solutions, Inc
AS855558  274  28450.9%   CANET-ASN-4 - Bell Aliant
AS7011   720  446  27438.1%   FRONTIER-AND-CITIZENS -
   Frontier Com

BGP Update Report

[cidr-report]

BGP Update Report
Interval: 05-Jan-07 -to- 18-Jan-07 (14 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS4637

TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds %  Upds/PfxAS-Name
 1 - AS28751   22688  1.9% 163.2 -- CAUCASUS-NET-AS Caucasus 
Network Tbilisi, Georgia
 2 - AS478818516  1.5%  10.1 -- TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet 
Service Provider
 3 - AS306 17798  1.5%  98.3 -- DNIC - DoD Network Information 
Center
 4 - AS24326   13280  1.1% 121.8 -- TTT-AS-AP TT&T Public Company 
Limited, Service Provider,Bangkok
 5 - AS580012265  1.0% 141.0 -- DDN-ASNBLK - DoD Network 
Information Center
 6 - AS17974   12038  1.0%  33.9 -- TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT 
TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA
 7 - AS702 11240  0.9%  15.9 -- AS702 MCI EMEA - Commercial IP 
service provider in Europe
 8 - AS462110494  0.9%  77.7 -- UNSPECIFIED UNINET-TH
 9 - AS4618 9667  0.8% 134.3 -- INET-TH-AS Internet Thailand 
Company Limited
10 - AS4775 8781  0.7%  48.5 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom 
Carrier  /  ISP Plus +
11 - AS4795 7961  0.7%  32.4 -- INDOSAT2-ID INDOSATM2  ASN
12 - AS308907805  0.6%  36.6 -- EVOLVA Evolva Telecom
13 - AS126546259  0.5% 156.5 -- RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS 
project
14 - AS721  6097  0.5%   7.9 -- DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network 
Information Center
15 - AS9583 6061  0.5%   6.0 -- SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited
16 - AS337836042  0.5%  55.4 -- EEPAD
17 - AS341605977  0.5% 221.4 -- TRANSTRUM Transtrum
18 - AS182315914  0.5%  44.8 -- EXATT-AS-AP Exatt Technologies 
Private Ltd.
19 - AS218265444  0.5%  34.7 -- Internet Cable Plus C. A.
20 - AS4249 5320  0.4%  39.4 -- LILLY-AS - Eli Lilly and Company


TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix)
Rank ASNUpds %  Upds/PfxAS-Name
 1 - AS354893708  0.3%3708.0 -- TOTO-TECH-AS Toto Ltd.
 2 - AS315943459  0.3%3459.0 -- FORTESS-AS Fortess LLC Network
 3 - AS274071398  0.1%1398.0 -- FRISCHS-INC - Frisch's 
Restaurants, Inc.
 4 - AS314801288  0.1%1288.0 -- GLOBAL-TS-AS CJSC Global 
TeleSystems
 5 - AS157741043  0.1%1043.0 -- MEDIANAT LLC "MEDIANAT", ISP 
primarily for educational institution
 6 - AS101004014  0.3%1003.5 -- ASN-AP-UBSW  # AS-AP-UBSW 
CONVERTED TO ASN-AP-UBSW FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE UBS Warburg Autonomous System 
Asia-Pacific
 7 - AS34378 964  0.1% 964.0 -- RUG-AS Razguliay-UKRROS Group
 8 - AS3043 3435  0.3% 858.8 -- AMPHIB-AS - Amphibian Media 
Corporation
 9 - AS381344010  0.3% 802.0 -- IMUB-AS-KR INCHEON MUSIC 
BROADCASTING.CO.,LTD
10 - AS392501440  0.1% 720.0 -- COLOPROVIDER-AS Colo Provider
11 - AS274621125  0.1% 562.5 -- KDVTECH-AS - KDV Technology and 
Consulting Services
12 - AS12922 525  0.0% 525.0 -- MULTITRADE-AS Bank Outsourcer
13 - AS8349  515  0.0% 515.0 -- IPI-UA
14 - AS39610 996  0.1% 498.0 -- LCH-CLEARNET LCH Clearnet
15 - AS23917 982  0.1% 491.0 -- BRIBIE-NET-AS-AP Bribie Island 
Net Multihomed, Brisbane
16 - AS31527 481  0.0% 481.0 -- TELEPOL-AS Telepol Security
17 - AS33188 919  0.1% 459.5 -- SCS-NETWORK-1 - Sono Corporate 
Suites
18 - AS213911311  0.1% 437.0 -- TDA-AS TDA AS Maintainer
19 - AS4678 4347  0.4% 434.7 -- FINE CANON NETWORK 
COMMUNICATIONS INC.
20 - AS146993910  0.3% 391.0 -- BTCBCI - Bloomingdale 
Communications Inc


TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes
Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name
 1 - 222.127.32.0/194571  0.3%   AS4775  -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom 
Carrier  /  ISP Plus +
 2 - 61.0.0.0/8 4337  0.3%   AS17607 -- ATT7192-AS-KR ATT GNS korea
 AS4678  -- FINE CANON NETWORK 
COMMUNICATIONS INC.
 3 - 147.60.0.0/16  4001  0.3%   AS10100 -- ASN-AP-UBSW  # AS-AP-UBSW 
CONVERTED TO ASN-AP-UBSW FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE UBS Warburg Autonomous System 
Asia-Pacific
 4 - 62.213.176.0/233708  0.3%   AS35489 -- TOTO-TECH-AS Toto Ltd.
 5 - 194.242.124.0/22   3459  0.2%   AS31594 -- FORTESS-AS Fortess LLC Network
 6 - 209.140.24.0/243432  0.2%   AS3043  -- AMPHIB-AS - Amphibian Media 
Corporation
 7 - 216.32.206.0/242858  0.2%   AS20473 -- AS-CHOOPA - Choopa, LLC
 8 - 138.187.128.0/18   2690  0.2%   AS3303  -- SWISSCOM Swisscom Solutions Ltd
 9 - 89.4.131.0/24  2206  0.1%   AS24731 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering 
Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA)
10 - 203.177.144.0/23   2083  0.1%   AS4775  -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom 
Carrier  /  ISP Plus +
11 - 203.223.32.0/201987  0.1%   AS17726 -- CAMNET-AS CAMNET is an ISP of 
Minist

Re: HTML email, was Re: Phishing and BGP Blackholing

[Stephane Bortzmeyer]

On Fri, Jan 19, 2007 at 06:46:00AM +,
 Fergie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote 
 a message of 60 lines which said:

> a combination of retarded registry policies (pitting business
> interests against common technical sense)

[Disclaimer: I work for a registry.]

In a capitalist country, I do not see how you could do otherwise. In a
non-capitalist country, there is still hope, I'll talk to Fidel about
that, next time we meet.

Re: Network end users to pull down 2 gigabytes a day, continuously?

[Travis H.]

On Sat, Jan 13, 2007 at 06:11:32PM -0800, Roland Dobbins wrote:
> This is a very important point - perceived disintermediation,  
> perceived unbundling, ad reduction/elimination, and timeshifting are  
> the main reasons that DVRs are so popular

I am an unusual case, not having much time or interest in passive
entertainment, but I have moved to a MythTV box for my entertainment
center.  I don't have cable TV and my broadcast quality is such that
I don't bother with it.  I can find sufficient things on the net to
occupy those idle times, and can watch them on my limited schedule
and terms.  The BBC in particular has some interesting documentaries,
and I point you to a doubly relevant video series below.

Some others have mentioned that a pay system that was significantly
easier to use than the infringing technologies would turn the tide in
illicit copying.

Those interested in the direction things are going should read up on
Peter Gutmann's paper on the costs of Vista Content Protection.  It
is unfortunate the content owners are more interested in making illicit
copying hard than in making legal purchase and use of the content easy.

I don't intend to pay for systems that I don't control, don't intend
to store my data in formats I don't have documentation for, and don't
anticipate paying for DRM-encoded files ever, mostly because I'd have
to pay for a crippled system which reminds me of buying a car with the
hood welded shut in order to have the privilege of renting content.
Usually in such situations the industry is willing to engage in some
loss leaders; I'd take a free crippled media player, but probably in
the end would resent its closed nature, its lack of flexibility or
expandability, and all the things that led me to personal computers
and software in the first place.

> As to an earlier comment about video editing in order to remove ads,  
> this is apparently the norm in the world of people who are heavy  
> uploaders/crossloaders of video content via P2P systems.  It seems  
> there are different 'crews' who compete to produce a 'quality  
> product' in terms of the quality of the encoding, compression,  
> bundling/remixing, etc.; it's very reminiscent of the 'warez' scene  
> in that regard.

This is an interesting free video series on the illicit movie copying
"scene":

http://www.welcometothescene.com/

It is somewhat unusual in that most of the videos are split screenshots,
and most of the conversation is typed, and that an understanding of
various technical topics is necessary to be able to follow the show at
all.

> It's an interesting  
> question as to whether or not the energy and 'professional pride' of  
> this group of people could somehow be harnessed in order to provide
> and distribute content legally (as almost all of what people really  
> want seems to be infringing content under the current standard  
> model), and monetized so that they receive compensation and  
> essentially act as the packaging and distribution arm for content  
> providers willing to try such a model.

IMHO I fail to see how they would be (or remain) any different from
the current distribution channels.  It's akin to asking if the
open-source community could somehow be harnessed and paid for creating
software.  Yes; it's already being done, and there are qualitative
differences in the results.  When there is no financial interest,
artisanship and craftsmanship predominate as motivators.  When driven
by financial interests, often those languish, and the market forces of
suckification move the product inexorably from one which is the most
desirable to use, to one with as many built-in annoyances and
advertisements as the end-user will tolerate, all the useless features
necessary to confuse the purchaser into rational ignorance, and all
plausible mechanisms to lock the user in over time (or otherwise raise
their switching costs).  But I'm not cynical... ;-)

This is way off charter, but I recently read of a study where art students
were asked to create some artwork.  One group was given a financial
reward.  The results were anonymized, and evaluators judged the results.
Once unblinded, the study found that the group with the financial reward
was statistically significantly judged as less creative and as producing
lower-quality work.

> As a side note, it seems there's a growing phenomenon of 'upload
> cheating' taking place in the BitTorrent space, with clients such as
> BitTyrant and BitThief becoming more and more popular while at the
> same time disrupting the distribution economies of P2P networks.
> This has caused a great deal of consternation in the infringing-
> oriented P2P community of interest, with the developers/operators of
> various BitTorrent-type systems such as BitComet working at
> developing methods of detecting and blocking downloading from users
> who 'cheat' in this fashion; it is instructive (and more than a
> little ironic) to watch as various elements within the infringing-
> orien