Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

I'm not at all convinced of the following.

GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out
how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more
holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a
snippet at EP2:368].


However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what
is admittedly the firstness that is "the single feeling . . . of that
moment of the phaneron" with the firstnesses of the individual qualities
within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the
qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly *what
each is *in the phaneron.

And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de
Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy'
but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second
being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities
and characters appearing within the phaneron).


So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes:


[T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can
easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to
our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red,
then is a Priman (EP2. 267).


Peirce immediately continues:


[Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling.
Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling
(EP2.267) [Note the plural: "*qualities* of feeling"].


So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological
science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological
experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity,
but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round',
etc.  The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the
phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you
concluded your post:


GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or
only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as
a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.


Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological
experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct.

Best,

Gary R.











*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> Gary, John, list,
>
>
>
> GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality
> or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so
> certain that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it
> happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can
> appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the
> roundness,  the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my
> hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to
> all--of them?
>
>
>
> GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
> Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
> solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
> the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
> feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
> the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon
> reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they
> appear separately. Empiricists generally look at such a "simultaneous"
> experience as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a
> Gestalt, but I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole
> phenomenon, which strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be
> analyzed afterwards into separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist,
> if he's trying to figure out how the brain does perception, has to take the
> multitude of sensations as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying
> to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers
> experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did.
>
>
>
> EP2:368: [[ Contem

RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary, John, list,

 

GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality or
character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so certain
that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it happen
that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear,
so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness,
the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and
without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of
them?

 

GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single
feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are
the products of the "destructive distillation" which follows upon reflection
as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear
separately. Empiricists generally look at such a "simultaneous" experience
as consisting of sensations bundled together by the mind into a Gestalt, but
I think Peirce saw it the other way round, as a whole phenomenon, which
strictly speaking has no parts, although it can be analyzed afterwards into
separate sensations. I suppose the psychologist, if he's trying to figure
out how the brain does perception, has to take the multitude of sensations
as primary; but the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything
can appear to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or
at least I do, and I think Peirce did.

 

EP2:368: [[ Contemplate anything by itself,-anything whatever that can be so
contemplated. Attend to the whole and drop the parts out of attention
altogether. One can approximate nearly enough to the accomplishment of that
to see that the result of its perfect accomplishment would be that one would
have in his consciousness at the moment nothing but a quality of feeling.
This quality of feeling would in itself, as so contemplated, have no parts.
It would be unlike any other such quality of feeling. In itself, it would
not even resemble any other; for resemblance has its being only in
comparison. It would be a pure priman. Since this is true of whatever we
contemplate, however complex may be the object, it follows that there is
nothing else in immediate consciousness. ]]

 

On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one
per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a
proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all
depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis.

 

gary f.

 


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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Richmond]

Gary, John, list,

Responding John's remark that:


I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
is the point I have been trying to make.


Gary F. wrote:


I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced.


I agree, but might restate this slightly to emphasize that since Firstness
is an element of every phenomenon, and that the phenomenal is what we can
experience, then *all *our actual experiences involve firstnesses. Gary F.
continued:


It can be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then
is not a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others.


Agreed. Firstness is not a ground, but is 'present' in all our experience.
Gary F. concluded:


Also, one can't really speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness
does not admit of discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is
Secondness.


Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality or
character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so certain
that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it happen
that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear,
so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness,
 the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and
without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of
them?

Best,

Gary R.


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> John, you wrote,
>
>
>
>
> I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
> difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
> of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
> is the point I have been trying to make.
>
>
>
> I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false).
> I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
> element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
> be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not
> a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
> speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
> discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Stephen C. Rose]

To the extent that I understand Firsts as originating in feelings (derived
I infer from some effort to sense what is "coming up" in one's
consciousness, having willed to seek to plumb it, it seems to me that a
First begins with that feeling and that it is then named with one or more
terms. For example, Loose Ends or Unfinished Business. Naming (using words
to describe signs or feelings) is our editing of reality. We determine what
a first is by such a process of feeling and naming. I am referring to the
actual experience I have when I engage in intentional, conscious thinking.
I wonder if John thinks what I am describing is the "experience of a
first". To continue the exercise i have mentioned, the "experience" might
more generally be called "the past" or "what is not now". It is exactly
what I went through yesterday on returning home from a weekend filled with
things that left me quite overloaded (loose ends, the past, etc. Or so I
felt. The result of my cogitations was a few actions and expressions I
doubt I would have had the "presence of mind" to do if I had not allowed
the process to move through an ethical index and culminate as they did.

*@stephencrose *


On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:

> John, you wrote,
>
>
>
>
> I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
> difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
> of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
> is the point I have been trying to make.
>
>
>
> I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false).
> I would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
> element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
> be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not
> a "ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
> speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
> discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

John, you wrote,

 


I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because of
this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this is
the point I have been trying to make.

 

I think your statement here is close to meaningless (as opposed to false). I
would say that there is no "experience of firsts", but Firstness is an
element of every phenomenon, i.e. anything that can be experienced. It can
be more prominent in some experiences than in others, but even then is not a
"ground" of that experience, let alone of others. Also, one can't really
speak of "firsts" in the plural because Firstness does not admit of
discreteness or plurality. The ground of otherness is Secondness.

 

gary f. 


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