Re: [tor-bugs] #31011 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31011: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when
DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  cjb
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31009| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
--+

Comment (by cjb):

 Replying to [comment:22 teor]:
 > I did a quick review, and saw that the bridge authority is checking the
 address in the routerinfo, not the address in the ServerTransport line in
 the extrainfo,

 Oops, thanks!  Please could you point me towards a preferred way to access
 extrainfo lines from an `ei`?  I couldn't find any similar examples in the
 codebase.  So far I've found things like
 `router_parse_list_from_string()`, `signed_descriptor_get_body()`,
 `munge_extrainfo_into_routerinfo()` (deprecated).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33367 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Goroutine leak in websocketconn

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33367: Goroutine leak in websocketconn
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:11 cohosh]:
 > I would not be surprised if there were goroutine leaks in other parts of
 snowflake as well. We should take this opportunity to check the client,
 proxy-go, broker, and server for leaks.

 The pprof package has a
 [https://golang.org/pkg/runtime/pprof/#WriteHeapProfile WriteHeapProfile]
 analogous to the StartCPUProfile/StopCPUProfile from #33211. I haven't
 tried it but I found [https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/how-i
 -investigated-memory-leaks-in-go-using-pprof-on-a-large-codebase-
 4bec4325e192/ a blog post] about using it to find memory leaks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33389 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without relay mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33389: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without
relay mode.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .2
  2020Q1, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 CI seems to have failed on --disable-module-relay.

 I see a significant number of linker errors here:
 * https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/652774814#L4674

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33388 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to random.SystemRandom.choice()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33388: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to
random.SystemRandom.choice()
+
 Reporter:  agix|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  sbws: unspecified =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #4631 [Core Tor/Tor]: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4631: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-dirauth-email needs-torspec-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  update tor-dirauth robustness voting   |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Let's try it as it stands.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33389 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without relay mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33389: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without
relay mode.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .2
  2020Q1, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33389 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without relay mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33389: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without
relay mode.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .2
  2020Q1, 043-deferred   |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: nickm (removed)
 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 Branch is `extract_routerkeys` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1758

 Adding teor to cc, but review on this one isn't so urgent.

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[tor-bugs] #33389 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without relay mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33389: Disable routerkeys.c and part of connection_or.c when building without
relay mode.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  2020Q1, 043-deferred
Actual Points:  .2   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33388 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to random.SystemRandom.choice()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33388: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to
random.SystemRandom.choice()
+---
 Reporter:  agix|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:  sbws: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by agix):

 * Attachment "0001-Fix-for-31967.-Changed-pseudo-random-generator-to-
 ra.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #33388 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to random.SystemRandom.choice()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33388: Patch for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to
random.SystemRandom.choice()
---+
 Reporter:  agix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB
  Version:  sbws: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
 From fc8b3c59d23b2cc637e4db5cd8385720027f59e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: agix 
 Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 01:24:24 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] Fix for #31967. Changed pseudo-random generator to
  random.SystemRandom.choice()

 ---
  bridgedb/captcha.py | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

 diff --git a/bridgedb/captcha.py b/bridgedb/captcha.py
 index b66972c..485974b 100644
 --- a/bridgedb/captcha.py
 +++ b/bridgedb/captcha.py
 @@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ class GimpCaptcha(Captcha):
  and a challenge string (used for checking the client's
 solution).
  """
  try:
 -imageFilename = random.choice(os.listdir(self.cacheDir))
 +imageFilename =
 random.SystemRandom().choice(os.listdir(self.cacheDir))
  imagePath = os.path.join(self.cacheDir, imageFilename)
  with open(imagePath) as imageFile:
  self.image = imageFile.read()
 --
 2.17.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, |  Actual Points:  0.8
  security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:  #33048   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, |  Actual Points:  0.8
  security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:  #33048   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  ahf => teor
 * reviewer:   => ahf
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33378 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Require chutney node bootstrap before running verify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33378: Require chutney node bootstrap before running verify
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  nickm => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32792 [Core Tor/Tor]: Copy chutney CI diagnostics to Tor's chutney job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32792: Copy chutney CI diagnostics to Tor's chutney job
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, tor-ci, chutney  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 (This ticket is not urgent, please review whenever you have time.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:10 cohosh]:
 > Was this when the client was first starting up or a reconnection through
 a new snowflake?

 It was during reconnection. I was browsing and the browser stopped working
 for 5 minutes, then it came back. The browser had been running for a few
 hours before it happened. I'm actually still using the same browser
 instance now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30992 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs and other cases)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30992: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs 
and
other cases)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-maybe-   |  Actual Points:
  want 043-should|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Plan from today's network team meeting: we should do what we can to figure
 out a real solution here and make sure we know what the bug is.  That can
 land in 0.4.3 if it's simple,and 0.4.4 if it's not.

 We should land something in 0.4.3 (and backport?) to limit the warnings
 here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30992 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs and other cases)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30992: circpadding machines have shutdown sync issues (with intro circ NACKs 
and
other cases)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-maybe-   |  Actual Points:
  want 043-should|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-maybe-want => wtf-pad circpad-
 researchers-maybe-want 043-should
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:9 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > > I also had it happen again today, with the quic snowflake client from
 #6. I left the browser idle for about a half an hour, and when I came
 back the fans were spinning and it was using 160–180% CPU. But just as I
 started to investigate, it resolved itself spontaneously and returned to
 normal levels.
 >
 > I got this again just now, and this time I happened to be watching the
 log. It happened right after my wifi dropped out, which caused the broker
 HTTP request to stall for 5 minutes before timing out. (Side note, we
 should probably reduce that timeout.) The high CPU happened immediately
 after the "connection" timed out" log message. It lasted for less than a
 minute, then went back to normal.
 ...
 > Possibly there is a pent-up timer or other recurrent event that creates
 a lot of work while the client is blocking in the HTTP request.

 Was this when the client was first starting up or a reconnection through a
 new snowflake?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > I also had it happen again today, with the quic snowflake client from
 #6. I left the browser idle for about a half an hour, and when I came
 back the fans were spinning and it was using 160–180% CPU. But just as I
 started to investigate, it resolved itself spontaneously and returned to
 normal levels.

 I got this again just now, and this time I happened to be watching the
 log. It happened right after my wifi dropped out, which caused the broker
 HTTP request to stall for 5 minutes before timing out. (Side note, we
 should probably reduce that timeout.) The high CPU happened immediately
 after the "connection" timed out" log message. It lasted for less than a
 minute, then went back to normal.
 {{{
 2020/02/19 23:25:49 WebRTC: Set local description
 2020/02/19 23:25:49 WebRTC: Got ICE candidate: host [scrubbed]
 2020/02/19 23:25:50 WebRTC: Got ICE candidate: srflx [scrubbed] related
 [scrubbed]
 2020/02/19 23:25:50 WebRTC: Done gathering candidates
 2020/02/19 23:25:50 WebRTC: Got ICE candidate: srflx [scrubbed] related
 [scrubbed]7
 2020/02/19 23:25:50 WebRTC: ICEGatheringStateComplete
 2020/02/19 23:25:50 Negotiating via BrokerChannel...
 Target URL:  snowflake-broker.azureedge.net
 Front URL:   ajax.aspnetcdn.com

 2020/02/19 23:30:57 BrokerChannel Error: read tcp [scrubbed]->[scrubbed]:
 read: connection timed out
 2020/02/19 23:30:57 Failed to retrieve answer. Retrying in 10s
 }}}
 Possibly there is a pent-up timer or other recurrent event that creates a
 lot of work while the client is blocking in the HTTP request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4631 [Core Tor/Tor]: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4631: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-dirauth-email needs-torspec-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  update tor-dirauth robustness voting   |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Do you want me to change the cutoff to `fetch_missing_votes -
 vote_delay/6` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31078 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve docs for config var abstraction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31078: improve docs for config var abstraction
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Current plan from network team meeting is to go ahead with the changes
 above, amended by Teor's suggested names above. We can open tickets for
 more docs and renaming in the future, and treat this as an incremental
 improvement.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32718 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash: Consensus diff src/lib/memarea/memarea.c:147: memarea_chunk_free_unchecked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32718: Crash: Consensus diff src/lib/memarea/memarea.c:147:
memarea_chunk_free_unchecked
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, tor-dir, openbsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information
 * keywords:  crash, tor-dir, 043-must, openbsd, BugSmashFund => crash, tor-
 dir, openbsd
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32672 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32672: Reject 0.2.9 and 0.4.0 in dirserv_rejects_tor_version()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  041-backport, 042-backport, consider-  |
  backport-after-authority-test, fast-fix,   |
  network-health |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We need to check if this patch affects bridges. As far as I recall, the
 last patch affected bridges as well as relays.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32718 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash: Consensus diff src/lib/memarea/memarea.c:147: memarea_chunk_free_unchecked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32718: Crash: Consensus diff src/lib/memarea/memarea.c:147:
memarea_chunk_free_unchecked
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, tor-dir, 043-must, openbsd,   |  Actual Points:
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've been fuzzing all day and I can't find any way to trigger this. Maybe
 this is bsd-only? I'll see if I can find somebody to run libfuzzer on
 openbsd, if it works there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33118 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate clusterfuzz timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33118: Investigate clusterfuzz timeouts
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  clusterfuzz   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  clusterfuzz 043-should => clusterfuzz
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


Comment:

 I believe there's nothing else I can do here on the 0.4.3 timeframe...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33120 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve TROVE-2020-002

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33120: Resolve TROVE-2020-002
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 This has had an initial review on the security list, but I would like
 another.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve TROVE-2020-003

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33137: Resolve TROVE-2020-003
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-must security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1-5?
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I believe this is currently in review, and has had some attention on the
 security list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4631 [Core Tor/Tor]: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4631: Idea to make consensus voting more resistant
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-dirauth-email needs-torspec-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  update tor-dirauth robustness voting   |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 okay, this is looking reasonable to me. Let's squash and merge it after
 the meeting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33374 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix unicode warnings in practracker using python 2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33374: Fix unicode warnings in practracker using python 2
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-backport, consider-backport- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  immediately|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33358 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec for consensus voting improvements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33358: Update dir-spec for consensus voting improvements
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torspec tor-dirauth robustness   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  voting |
Parent ID:  #33050   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM; let's merge when we merge #4631.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33364 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Could not connect to the bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33364: Could not connect to the bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Hmm, if there's a bug in the interaction between uMatrix and Snowflake you
 could create a new ticket for it. It will probably be lower priority for
 us at the moment, but perhaps someone else would like to take a look.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: Making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: Making the tor library size smaller
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-size  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by jnewsome):

 * cc: jnewsome (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33376 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Update the networks in Chutney's CI to match Tor's new test-network*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33376: Update the networks in Chutney's CI to match Tor's new test-network*
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311 |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33050| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 No objection here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: Making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: Making the tor library size smaller
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-size  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by jnewsome):

 Maybe this should be a separate ticket, but another thing to consider
 might be saving space for users that have both TBB and Orbot installed, as
 CrazyAstronaut mentioned in #tor.

 They propose a "thin" version of the Tor Browser that uses Orbot's Tor
 client. Perhaps another possibility would be a "fat" Tor Browser that
 exposes the Tor client for other apps to use (making Orbot unnecessary).
 Assuming doing that adds significant space requirements though, we'd
 presumably want to either offer two versions of TBB (confusing), or...:

 In general a possibility to consider if there's functionality that some,
 but not all, users need, is to separate that functionality into modules
 that can be downloaded and loaded on-demand from within the app itself.
 This would add *significant* complexity of course. Example:
 https://github.com/Instagram/ig-lazy-module-loader.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-must 042-backport  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #33018 | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  nickm, armadev |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 (Have we gotten anybody to test 0.4.2? How is that going?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > My feeling is that the occasional anomalous high CPU usage is something
 else. I'll not that I think I have seen the same symptom in snowflake-
 client as well. I neglected to write it down, but I made it happen in the
 past few weeks running the command-line client. I think that was with a
 non–Turbo Tunnel client. I also had it happen again today, with the quic
 snowflake client from #6. I left the browser idle for about a half an
 hour, and when I came back the fans were spinning and it was using
 160–180% CPU. But just as I started to investigate, it resolved itself
 spontaneously and returned to normal levels. I hadn't one of the programs
 escape from that state before.

 Hmm, well if it's something in pion, that would explain why we're seeing
 it on both the client and proxy. There's a lot of code reuse there.
 Digging into pion/sctp in particular, there are quite a few loops in use
 that are candidates for closer examination.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33215 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33215: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > This is based on commit f5fdff3bf0b9e957ab011f95af9e215cca7aeed6 from
 ticket:28704#comment:23.
 >
 > {{{
 > diff --git a/projects/android-toolchain/config b/projects/android-
 toolchain/config
 > index 8c9c8222..4c02b2f3 100644
 > --- a/projects/android-toolchain/config
 > +++ b/projects/android-toolchain/config
 > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ var:
 >  export GRADLE_HOME=/var/tmp/dist/[% project %]/gradle
 >  export ANDROID_HOME=$ANDROID_SDK_HOME
 >  export GRADLE_USER_HOME=$GRADLE_HOME
 > +export PATH=$ANDROID_NDK_HOME/[% c("var/toolchain_arch")
 %]/bin:$PATH
 > }}}
 > If we put the toolchain at the end, are there situations where a system
 executable is used instead of the Android toolchain?

 I'll need to check old logs, but yes some projects just look for clang
 without the host info so it picks up the system executable for clang.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:5 cohosh]:
 > The first thing that struck me was how much more expensive log messages
 are now that we're using safelog to perform regexes.

 I noticed this too, that in normal operation the CPU use of proxy-go is
 dominated by safelog.

 My feeling is that the occasional anomalous high CPU usage is something
 else. I'll not that I think I have seen the same symptom in snowflake-
 client as well. I neglected to write it down, but I made it happen in the
 past few weeks running the command-line client. I think that was with a
 non–Turbo Tunnel client. I also had it happen again today, with the quic
 snowflake client from #6. I left the browser idle for about a half an
 hour, and when I came back the fans were spinning and it was using
 160–180% CPU. But just as I started to investigate, it resolved itself
 spontaneously and returned to normal levels. I hadn't one of the programs
 escape from that state before.

 > The proxy-go instances are logging the byte count of every outgoing and
 incoming messaage [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/proxy-go/snowflake.go#n94 here] and
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree
 /proxy-go/snowflake.go#n323 here]. Removing those shows that the remaining
 CPU time is spent in the pion library:

 Agree that logging every message is excessive.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33364 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Could not connect to the bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33364: Could not connect to the bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:9 dcf]:
 > Sorry, I don't think we can help with uMatrix console logs, you may have
 to ask on a uMatrix forum. If Snowflake is throwing errors, those will
 show up in the console log though.

 I'm a bit confused. Let me clarify my comment.

 This is an error in ''Snowflake's'' console log, which is ''caused'' by a
 .js file in uMatrix. The interaction between these two extensions is
 buggy, hinging on the uMatrix setting I mentioned. So this is a bug either
 in Snowflake, or uMatrix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm tracking changes to snowflake here:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/tree/ticket/33211

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33081 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new gnt-fsn node (fsn-node-04)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33081: new gnt-fsn node (fsn-node-04)
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 aaand it boots! next step is to follow through new-machine.mdwn!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33081 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new gnt-fsn node (fsn-node-04)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33081: new gnt-fsn node (fsn-node-04)
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 performed basic grml-bootstrap install following the new procedure in new-
 machine-hetzner-robot, after moving a lot of stuff into grml-debootstrap
 post-scripts hooks. we're now at only 7 mandatory steps (12 total, with
 safety checks).

 rebooting now to see if it actually works (probably not).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33211 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33211: proxy-go sometimes gets into a 100+% CPU state
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Starting to take a look at this. I haven't made it go into an infinite
 loop, but I have noticed that the proxy uses quite a bit of CPU,
 particularly if you have more than one client downloading files through
 it.

 The first thing that struck me was how much more expensive log messages
 are now that we're using safelog to perform regexes. The proxy-go
 instances are logging the byte count of every outgoing and incoming
 messaage [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/proxy-go/snowflake.go#n94 here] and
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree
 /proxy-go/snowflake.go#n323 here]. Removing those shows that the remaining
 CPU time is spent in the pion library:

 {{{
 File: proxy-go
 Type: cpu
 Time: Feb 19, 2020 at 5:04pm (EST)
 Duration: 3.20mins, Total samples = 34.03s (17.73%)
 Entering interactive mode (type "help" for commands, "o" for options)
 (pprof) top --cum
 Showing nodes accounting for 7.20s, 21.16% of 34.03s total
 Dropped 423 nodes (cum <= 0.17s)
 Showing top 10 nodes out of 229
   flat  flat%   sum%cum   cum%
  0.09s  0.26%  0.26%  9.87s 29.00%  runtime.systemstack
  0.05s  0.15%  0.41%  6.61s 19.42%
 github.com/pion/sctp.(*Association).writeLoop
 6s 17.63% 18.04% 6s 17.63%  runtime.futex
  0.03s 0.088% 18.13%  5.54s 16.28%
 github.com/pion/dtls.(*Conn).Write
  0.01s 0.029% 18.16%  5.30s 15.57%
 github.com/pion/dtls.(*Conn).flushPacketBuffer
  0.03s 0.088% 18.25%  5.24s 15.40%  runtime.mcall
  0.07s  0.21% 18.45%  5.01s 14.72%  runtime.schedule
  0.65s  1.91% 20.36%  4.81s 14.13%  runtime.mallocgc
  0.04s  0.12% 20.48%  4.35s 12.78%  runtime.park_m
  0.23s  0.68% 21.16%  4.25s 12.49%  runtime.findrunnable
 }}}

 Removing the log messages is a good start. Doing so makes it so that a
 single client downloading a large file over snowflake uses a maximum of
 about 43% CPU, whereas with the log messages, a single client would cause
 the proxy-go instance to use up to 60% CPU.

 I'll do a deeper dive into the pion code to see if there's something that
 can be optimized there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate installs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31239: automate installs
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 while setting up the fsn-node-04 server, i got the checklist from 17 to 12
 steps, with 5 of those being only safety checks! we're under way to have
 this being a single "deploy git repo and run this one command" installer
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: LibEvent Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28765: LibEvent Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [ticket:28704#comment:23 sisbell]:
 > Other issues:
 >
 >  1. There was a suggestion to move some of the fields in configure_opt
 up to rbm.  OpenSSL doesn't use the same configure_host value as other
 projects so this will require some more discussion if we want to move
 forward with this suggestion.
 >  1. Information regarding libevent --disable-libevent-regress--disable-
 samples. I need to look back through my notes. I'll post in a follow up
 comment.

 From ticket:28704#comment:26, do including these change the size of the
 resulting library? I'd rather disable these for all platforms in a
 separate ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:23 sisbell]:
 > Latest Set of Commits
 >
 > https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-28704a

 In the future, please provide one branch per ticket. If one ticket depends
 on another, then you can base a ticket's branch on top of another ticket's
 branch, but separating each ticket into its own branch makes reviews much
 easier.

 I'm setting this ticket as 'assigned' and each child ticket can be worked
 individually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33216: Add Android Host and ABI Info to RBM.conf
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => boklm


Comment:

 This is based on commit 9731400810fd0cd1930d097fd1e6fae9ba4f07cc from
 ticket:28704#comment:23.

 This commit seems okay to me.

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[tor-bugs] #33387 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: establish tmpfs policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33387: establish tmpfs policy
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |   Keywords:  tpa-
 Severity:  Normal   |  roadmap-february
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31239
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 our tmpfs configuration varies wildly across the infrastructure. some
 hosts have "defaults" (which is 50% of available ram), others have 2GB,
 1GB, 4GB, but most have 512m available. The latter is what our current
 install procedures sets up, and seems rather small for a tmpfs.

 I set the latter in the current install scripts, with the following
 commitlog:

 {{{
 switch to 512m tmpfs

 The tmpfs configuration actually varies wildly:

  * 512m: (37)
 
alberti.torproject.org,cache-02.torproject.org,carinatum.torproject.org,chiwui.torproject.org,colchicifolium.torproject.org
 ,crm-
 
ext-01.torproject.org,cupani.torproject.org,eugeni.torproject.org,forrestii.torproject.org
 ,fsn-
 
node-[01-03].torproject.org,gayi.torproject.org,gitlab-01.torproject.org,henryi.torproject.org
 ,hetzner-hel1-02.torproject.org,hetzner-
 
nbg1-02.torproject.org,mandos-01.torproject.org,materculae.torproject.org,meronense.torproject.org,neriniflorum.torproject.org,nevii.torproject.org,omeiense.torproject.org
 ,oo-
 
hetzner-03.torproject.org,palmeri.torproject.org,pauli.torproject.org,perdulce.torproject.org,polyanthum.torproject.org,rouyi.torproject.org,rude.torproject.org,savii.torproject.org,staticiforme.torproject.org,subnotabile.torproject.org,troodi.torproject.org,vineale.torproject.org
 ,web-cymru-01.torproject.org,web-hetzner-01.torproject.org
  * 512m: (1) build-x86-09.torproject.org
  * 512m: (2) build-x86-[05-06].torproject.org
  * 1g: (1) crm-int-01.torproject.org
  * 1g: (1) scw-arm-par-01.torproject.org
  * 2g: (1) build-x86-08.torproject.org
  * 2g: (1) build-x86-07.torproject.org
  * 4g: (5)
 
bungei.torproject.org,kvm[4-5].torproject.org,macrum.torproject.org,unifolium.torproject.org
  * "defaults": (21) bacula-
 director-01.torproject.org,cache01.torproject.org,cdn-backend-
 
sunet-01.torproject.org,chives.torproject.org,corsicum.torproject.org,gettor-01.torproject.org,gitlab-02.torproject.org
 ,hetzner-hel1-[01,03].torproject.org,hetzner-
 
nbg1-01.torproject.org,loghost01.torproject.org,nutans.torproject.org,onionbalance-01.torproject.org
 ,onionoo-backend-01.torproject.org,onionoo-
 frontend-01.torproject.org,orestis.torproject.org,static-master-
 fsn.torproject.org,submit-01.torproject.org,tbb-nightlies-
 master.torproject.org,web-fsn-[01-02].torproject.org
  * "defaults": (1) build-arm-10.torproject.org

 List extracted with:

 cumin '*' 'grep tmpfs /etc/fstab'

 Since 512m is the most common one (and especially the one currently in
 use by fsn-node-XX), let's adopt it for now, and we can revise later.

 Note that the 512m configuration in the robot instructions in the wiki
 seem to come from:

 e48b7699645dfc137e73d937ca0f1a9c74dbbf3f iterate on new-machine-hetzner-
 robot.mdwn

 ... which does not include a rationale for the setting.

 The setting is also present in the `tor-install-hetzner` script,
 introduced in:

 33a552a049c32227fb1599a5437077f45eaa27e6 Add tor-install-hetzner script

 ... which also doesn't include a rationale.
 }}}

 But it would be nice to find a more uniform policy here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project for LZMA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32992: TBB Project for LZMA
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Similar to #32991, are there signed git tags available for this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32991 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Project For ZSTD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32991: TBB Project For ZSTD
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 This is based on commit 191e603664aa5eba0ae670a48af1cb6501248372 from
 ticket:28704#comment:23.

 {{{
 +git_hash: 'v[% c("version") %]'
 }}}
 Does Facebook sign their git tags for zstd? If not, then we should use the
 git commit hash instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28764: OpenSSL Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is based on commit b06af71cf1aed690da281e4eb2f89294d48dcb15 from
 ticket:28704#comment:23.

 {{{
 -make
 -make DESTDIR="$distdir" install
 + make
 + make DESTDIR="$distdir" install
 }}}
 nit: Please delete the new space introduced at the beginning of the line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33215 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33215: Android Toolchain: Add NDK bin path to system path
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 This is based on commit f5fdff3bf0b9e957ab011f95af9e215cca7aeed6 from
 ticket:28704#comment:23.

 {{{
 diff --git a/projects/android-toolchain/config b/projects/android-
 toolchain/config
 index 8c9c8222..4c02b2f3 100644
 --- a/projects/android-toolchain/config
 +++ b/projects/android-toolchain/config
 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ var:
  export GRADLE_HOME=/var/tmp/dist/[% project %]/gradle
  export ANDROID_HOME=$ANDROID_SDK_HOME
  export GRADLE_USER_HOME=$GRADLE_HOME
 +export PATH=$ANDROID_NDK_HOME/[% c("var/toolchain_arch") %]/bin:$PATH
 }}}
 If we put the toolchain at the end, are there situations where a system
 executable is used instead of the Android toolchain?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I should mention this is based on commit
 `b00b0d40320431abd0d13a4fa959ce53407b35e9` from ticket:28704#comment:23.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 {{{
 -cp $distdir/share/tor/geoip $TORCONFIGDIR
 -cp $distdir/share/tor/geoip6 $TORCONFIGDIR
 -
 +[% IF !c("var/android") -%]
 +  cp $distdir/share/tor/geoip $TORCONFIGDIR
 +  cp $distdir/share/tor/geoip6 $TORCONFIGDIR
 +[% END -%]
 }}}
 Can you set `TORCONFIGDIR=assets/common` and use the original code
 instead?

 In the build script, please use `install` instead of `cp` (see how files
 are copied within the other platform blocks).

 {{{
 +[% IF c("var/android") %]
 +  libsdir=jniLibs/[% c("var/abi") %]
 +  mkdir -p $libsdir assets/common
 +  # Copy tor using naming convention that Android will recognize
 +  cp bin/tor $libsdir/libTor.so
 }}}
 There's a trailing space after 'recognize'

 Can you move the `tar` command into the general platform-specific tar/zip
 block that immediately follows the android block?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33385: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt,|  Actual Points:
  proposal-needed, censorship, sponsor19, 040|
  -roadmap-proposed, anti-censorship-roadmap |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:48 dfiguera]:
 > arma said:
 > > The bridge operator can also set AssumeReachable 1 in her torrc config
 file, and then firewall the port, and I bet that would work, but it isn't
 the sort of thing every bridge operator will be able to do.
 >
 > I've tried that in my bridge, but it couldn't publish its descriptor.
 > Maybe if the firewall makes an exception for the DirAuths (and any other
 needed host) it will work?

 Is it an inbound or outbound firewall?

 Bridges need to make outbound connections to all relays, including
 directory authorities and the bridge authority. (Effectively every address
 on the Internet, because new relays join the network all the time.)

 Bridges need to accept inbound connections to their ORPort from the bridge
 authority (for its reachability checks), and from other relays (for the
 bridge's ORPort reachability self-treats), and from clients. (So any
 address on the Internet.)

 In any case, bridges currently require an IPv4 ORPort to publish their
 descriptor. If we remove that requirement, then IPv6 bridges wth outbound
 IPv4 connectivity will work. And we won't need the AssumeReachable
 workaround any more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32720 [Core Tor/Tor]: How much bandwidth does a user use to bootstrap and maintain dir info? How has that changed over time?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32720: How much bandwidth does a user use to bootstrap and maintain dir info? 
How
has that changed over time?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop312-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33049| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I think we should put anonymous directory purposes behind "SafeLogging 0".

 I'm also happy with a specific option to enable all these logs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32493: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5a6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 sysrqb]:
 > Thanks! I'd like this patch as a squash! on `TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox
 preference overrides.` (currently
 `4348eef9818fdbda51b9a89aa1cacc71c9770052`). Can you update the patch or
 do you want me to update it?

 Sorry, ingore that. This patch is good as-is. I applied as commit
 `6046d1d582804594a57d132280376b8027d1ed83` on `tor-
 browser-68.5.0esr-9.5-1`.

 We already have a similar patch for Android.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33364 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Could not connect to the bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33364: Could not connect to the bridge.
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32493: Consider adding MOZ_SERVICES_HEALTHREPORT to mozconfig
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks! I'd like this patch as a squash! on `TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox
 preference overrides.` (currently
 `4348eef9818fdbda51b9a89aa1cacc71c9770052`). Can you update the patch or
 do you want me to update it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32658: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  GeorgKoppen202001, tbb-9.5a6   |
Parent ID:  #33173   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, GeorgKoppen202001 => tbb-
 sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, GeorgKoppen202001, tbb-9.5a6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32658: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:  #33173   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I cherry-picked the commit as `0f42a8ed2229c1ad5da15803eeebd2f849ffdb21`
 onto `tor-browser-68.5.0esr-9.5-1`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33191 [Applications/GetTor]: Write database tests for twisted adbapi for GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33191: Write database tests for twisted adbapi for GetTor
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  hiro |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by cohosh:

Old description:

> Right now we're using the twisted database api for connecting to our
> sqlite3 database. This is difficult to use and test. BridgeDB uses the
> sqlite3 python package and that works just fine, perhaps we can move to
> that.

New description:

 We discussed moving to a different sqlite3 api, but after talking with
 @meejah, it's a bad idea to mix and match twisted with other I/O
 operations.

 So, we're opting to stay with twisted, write some tests that work, and see
 whether we need to make changes to how dbpool is called and used.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25723 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Multiplex - one client splits traffic across multiple proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25723: Multiplex - one client splits traffic across multiple proxies
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh, phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33191 [Applications/GetTor]: Write database tests for twisted adbapi for GetTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33191: Write database tests for twisted adbapi for GetTor
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  hiro |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay here's a merge request that implements working database tests while
 sticking with the twisted adbapi.

 https://dip.torproject.org/cohosh/gettor/merge_requests/9

 Note that
 
[https://dip.torproject.org/cohosh/gettor/merge_requests/9/diffs?commit_id=c413a8ebdaf1c70bc40255e35e7917165fa75552
 one commit] actually makes changes to how the database code is called in
 gettor. Specifically, we weren't ever closing the connection to the
 database in the gettor code. This should fix that bug as well as get our
 tests running cleanly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33366 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33366: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  implemented
  2020Q1, 043-deferred library-size  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Seems to still work; merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Nice, it's also working for me on a non-Turbo Tunnel 9.5a5 version of Tor
 Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32645 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update URL bar onion indicators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32645: Update URL bar onion indicators
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #30025  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mcs |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--

Comment (by antonela):

 > It would be great to have a permanent test bed / set of servers for this
 stuff

 +1. What do we need?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33366 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33366: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .2
  2020Q1, 043-deferred library-size  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 CI has passed; merging.  I hit a small conflict in include.am, so
 verifying that stuff works before I push.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't compile ext_orport.c when relay mode is disabled.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33368: Don't compile ext_orport.c when relay mode is disabled.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  implemented
  2020Q1, 043-deferred library-size  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 CI has passed; merging this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33033 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33033: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  juga |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32658: Create new MAR signing key for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202002R, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:  #33173   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Thanks! I verified the new primary key is good, but I'll wait until I can
 verify the secondary key is correct.

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[tor-bugs] #33386 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Slide verification CAPTCHA displays incorrectly on Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33386: Slide verification CAPTCHA displays incorrectly on Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  PROTechThor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 On other browsers, the slide verification CAPTCHA box displays the
 appropriate  image alongside the slider. On Tor Browser, the image doesn't
 display.

 You can try this out for yourself here: https://www.geetest.com/en/demo .
 Or refer to these links for images:

  * Tor Browser: https://imgur.com/a/f4QnjvZ
  * Firefox: https://imgur.com/a/f4qXapT

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33033 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33033: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  juga |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Merged! 🎉

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33033 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33033: sbws stuck thinking a destination is dead
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker, sbws-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33121   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  juga |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * points:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Patch lgtm, applied in https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/369
 Added a unit test

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 All right, both the packages from comment:4 are working for me, with no
 configuration other than picking "snowflake" from the menu. I had to try
 bootstrapping the quic one twice, but now it's working playing video and
 everything.

 One thing I didn't think about is that if you want a log for debugging,
 you'll have to manually add a `-log` option to the `ClientTransportPlugin`
 line in Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults.
 {{{
 ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports
 /snowflake-client -url https://snowflake-broker.azureedge.net/ -front
 ajax.aspnetcdn.com -ice stun:stun.l.google.com:19302 -log snowflake-
 client.log
 }}}

 Here's a tip on how to run multiple Tor Browsers at the same time. This
 way you can run the experimental Turbo Tunnel bundles alongside your
 ordinary Tor Browser. It can be helpful to go to the Customize... menu and
 pick different themes (default/light/dark) to distinguish which is which.
  * [[doc/TorBrowser/Hacking#Launching Tor with an Alternate SOCKS and
 Control port]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30946 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Port BridgeDB to Python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30946: Port BridgeDB to Python 3
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  python  |  Actual Points:  5.3
Parent ID:  | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 5.3


Comment:

 No more issues have surfaced after several days of running this branch, so
 it's time to wrap things up! I merged this patch set in commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=c3a820daeffa1acc02b9c0458ba8495ff387ecd4
 c3a820d] and [https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/bridges/bridgedb-
 admin.git/commit/?id=f801cc121721b97888445232ff0fadb452600386 f801cc1],
 released BridgeDB version 0.9.4, and deployed it on polyanthum.

 Thanks again for your help, Damian!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32662 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Rewrite BridgeDB with Django 3 and Python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32662: Rewrite BridgeDB with Django 3 and Python 3
+
 Reporter:  moonsikpark |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:  #30946 =>


Comment:

 Note that our Python 3 port over at #30946 is now done. I'll leave this
 ticket open for now, in case anyone's interested in the Django part.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33283 [Applications/rbm]: Add caching for the exec function in rbm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33283: Add caching for the exec function in rbm
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R,  |  Actual Points:  .5
  tbb-9.5a6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * actualpoints:   => .5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt,|  Actual Points:
  proposal-needed, censorship, sponsor19, 040|
  -roadmap-proposed, anti-censorship-roadmap |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by dfiguera):

 arma said:
 > The bridge operator can also set AssumeReachable 1 in her torrc config
 file, and then firewall the port, and I bet that would work, but it isn't
 the sort of thing every bridge operator will be able to do.

 I've tried that in my bridge, but it couldn't publish its descriptor.
 Maybe if the firewall makes an exception for the DirAuths (and any other
 needed host) it will work?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  merge_ready => accepted


Comment:

 I built commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h=turbotunnel&id=da37211c74b7d6992f4cb07adb6033a684d56838
 da37211c74b7d6992f4cb07adb6033a684d56838] using go1.13.8, installed it,
 and started it at 2020-02-19 18:03:30.

 I set it up as a symlink so we can easily restore the non–Turbo Tunnel
 version if needed.
 {{{
 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root   28 Feb 19 18:03 snowflake-server ->
 snowflake-server.turbotunnel
 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  9067083 Feb 18 23:18 snowflake-server.normal
 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 12459290 Feb 19 18:01 snowflake-server.turbotunnel
 }}}

 I tested with a non–Turbo Tunnel client at [https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/log/?id=380b133155ad725126bc418d0e66b3c550b4c555
 380b133155ad725126bc418d0e66b3c550b4c555] using snowflake/client/torrc at
 and was able to bootstrap once, but that's all I have tested so far.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add build-infos.json to sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33380: Add build-infos.json to sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6   |
Parent ID:  #25102   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202002R => tbb-rbm, tbb-
 update, TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33283 [Applications/rbm]: Add caching for the exec function in rbm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33283: Add caching for the exec function in rbm
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5a6  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam202002R, tbb-9.5a6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33283 [Applications/rbm]: Add caching for the exec function in rbm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33283: Add caching for the exec function in rbm
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202002R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, the patches look good. I merged the branch with `master` and I
 picked it up on tor-browser-build with commit
 `ffc6f844dbbf1985f5d10bd8dab2b15d9c8c2e75`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33157 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Client generates SDP with "IN IP4 0.0.0.0", causing proxy to send "client_ip=0.0.0.0" and bridge to send "USERADDR 0.0.0.0:1"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33157: Client generates SDP with "IN IP4 0.0.0.0", causing proxy to send
"client_ip=0.0.0.0" and bridge to send "USERADDR 0.0.0.0:1"
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dcf):

 #33385 is to have the server ignore client IP address of 0.0.0.0, separate
 from the issue of proxies failing to extract a meaningful address.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33385: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #33385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33385: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 In #33157, proxies sometimes fail to extract a meaningful client IP
 address from the client's SDP and send `?client_ip=0.0.0.0` to the bridge.
 The bridge [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/server/server.go?h=webext-0.2.1#n113 counts]
 an address of 0.0.0.0 as a client that had an IP address, which inflates
 the numerator in the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/server/stats.go?h=webext-0.2.1#n35 "in the
 past %.f s, %d/%d connections had client_ip"] log line.

 This is a patch to treat a client address of `0.0.0.0` or `[::]` as if it
 were not present at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33385 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33385: In server, treat a purported client IP address of 0.0.0.0 as missing
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-In-server-treat-a-client-IP-address-of-0.0.0.0-as-
 mi.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33384 [Webpages/Support]: Create entry in support.torproject.org for Onion-Location automatic redirects.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33384: Create entry in support.torproject.org for Onion-Location automatic
redirects.
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27
--+---

Comment (by ggus):

 When #21952 proposal will be merged in TBB stable?

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[tor-bugs] #33384 [Webpages/Support]: Create entry in support.torproject.org for Onion-Location automatic redirects.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33384: Create entry in support.torproject.org for Onion-Location automatic
redirects.
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21952
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor27 |
--+
 We need an entry in support page for the `Learn more` in #21952 (see
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/21952/21952%20-%20UI%20Review.png).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33366 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33366: Disable dns.c when relay mode is disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .2
  2020Q1, 043-deferred library-size  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Good review, teor! It turns out that two of the functions were only used
 in feature/relay, which means they can just get a comment to that
 effect... but one of the functions was a candidate to become STATIC, and
 another was no longer used in Tor, and hadn't been used since 2009.

 I've pushed a few more commits; I'll merge this if/when CI passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:5 dcf]:
 > Shall we deploy the Turbo Tunnel bridge? I can do it as early as today.
 I was waiting until we had figured out #33367 (and I've added the patch
 for #33367 to the turbotunnel branch).
 >
 > To be specific, what I want to do is build the server at commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h=turbotunnel&id=da37211c74b7d6992f4cb07adb6033a684d56838
 da37211c74b7d6992f4cb07adb6033a684d56838] to the public bridge. Then watch
 it closely for a few hours to make sure it hasn't broken currently
 deployed clients. The Tor Browser packages from comment:4 should start
 working just by selecting "snowflake" from the menu, without extra
 configuration.
 Yes, I'd like to go ahead with this. When it's deployed I'll make some
 trial connections on my side with the three different Snowflake Tor
 Browser builds (existing alpha, kcp, and quic). Let me know if you want
 extra eyes on the server.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't compile ext_orport.c when relay mode is disabled.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33368: Don't compile ext_orport.c when relay mode is disabled.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  .1
  2020Q1, 043-deferred library-size  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks for the review! I've added comments and moved functions per your
 comment above; once CI has passed, I'll merge.

 I've also opened #33383 because of my surprise about an unused function.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33336 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6: Deploy a Turbo Tunnel–aware Snowflake bridge
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  turbotunnel  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Old description:

> We now have a
> [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h=turbotunnel
> turbotunnel branch] of Snowflake that uses an inner transport protocol to
> migrate session across multiple proxies.
>  * https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-
> team/2020-February/59.html
> And some first-draft Tor Browser builds that can use it:
>  * https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-
> team/2020-February/69.html
>
> I want to deploy a bridge that supports Turbo Tunnel, then make Tor
> Browser builds and invite testers to test them.
>
> There's the question of whether to run the Turbo Tunnel code on the
> existing public bridge, or to set up a second bridge reserved for the
> Turbo Tunnel experiment. I propose to run the Turbo Tunnel code on the
> existing public bridge (i.e., snowflake.torproject.net). This is because
> (1) the Turbo Tunnel server is [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
> /anti-censorship-team/2020-February/62.html backward-compatible] with
> non–Turbo Tunnel clients, and (2) we would need to somehow provide proxy
> capacity for the second bridge, which our current proxy code cannot
> easily handle. Running a separate bridge would have the advantage,
> though, that because we would have to run our own special proxy-go
> instances to support it, we could closely control the proxy environment;
> but part of my goal in an experimental deployment is to see how the Turbo
> Tunnel code fares with the organic proxies we have now.
>
> I've have versions of the code using two different session/reliability
> protocol libraries: kcp-go and quic-go. Other than to note that two two
> libraries are [https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/14 basically
> equivalent in features], I haven't done much to compare them as to
> performance. kcp-go is more mature and stable, while quic-go
> [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-
> team/2020-February/69.html add fewer dependencies to the Tor Browser
> build].
>
> We could make use of this opportunity to compare the two options. We set
> up a triple-mode bridge: supporting legacy, KCP, and QUIC clients. We
> make two Tor Browser builds, one with KCP and one with QUIC, and invite
> testing of both. Based on the results of user testing, we decide which we
> like better, and finally deploy only that option (and the backward-
> compatible mode). The only thing is, giving people two options to test is
> more confusing than giving them one.

New description:

 We now have a
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h=turbotunnel
 turbotunnel branch] of Snowflake that uses an inner transport protocol to
 migrate session across multiple proxies.
  * https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-
 team/2020-February/59.html
 And some first-draft Tor Browser builds that can use it:
  * https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-
 team/2020-February/69.html

 I want to deploy a bridge that supports Turbo Tunnel, then make Tor
 Browser builds and invite testers to test them.

 There's the question of whether to run the Turbo Tunnel code on the
 existing public bridge, or to set up a second bridge reserved for the
 Turbo Tunnel experiment. I propose to run the Turbo Tunnel code on the
 existing public bridge (i.e., snowflake.torproject.net). This is because
 (1) the Turbo Tunnel server is [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /anti-censorship-team/2020-February/62.html backward-compatible] with
 non–Turbo Tunnel clients, and (2) we would need to somehow provide proxy
 capacity for the second bridge, which our current proxy code cannot easily
 handle. Running a separate bridge would have the advantage, though, that
 because we would have to run our own special proxy-go instances to support
 it, we could closely control the proxy environment; but part of my goal in
 an experimental deployment is to see how the Turbo Tunnel code fares with
 the organic proxies we have now.

 I've have versions of the code using two different session/reliability
 protocol libraries: kcp-go and quic-go. Other than to note that the two
 libraries are [https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/14 basically
 equivalent in features], I haven't done much to compare the

[tor-bugs] #33383 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we actually need the orconn_ext_or_id_map?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33383: Do we actually need the orconn_ext_or_id_map?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 So apparently we have this structure, orconn_ext_or_id_map, where we map
 from ext_orport identifiers to the corresponding orconn objects ... but
 nothing in our code (outside of the unit tests) actually looks anything up
 in this map.

 I can't remember -- is this a feature that we were planning to do
 something with if transports needed it in the future?  Or is this just
 dead code?

 Found while working on #33368.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add build-infos.json to sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33380: Add build-infos.json to sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorBrowserTeam202002R  |
Parent ID:  #25102   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's a good idea. Looks good to me, thanks! Merged on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
--+
 Reporter:  brade |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:  #19251| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)


Comment:

 Adding emmapeel for visibility.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33370 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't build selftest.c when relay mode is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33370: Don't build selftest.c when relay mode is disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  implemented
  2020Q1, 043-deferred, library-size |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks for the reviews, ahf and teor!  Merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run practracker --regen-overbroad

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33373: Run practracker --regen-overbroad
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, coding-standards  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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