On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 07:40:38PM -0500, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I think you're under-appreciating how useful the "plausible deniability".
> Someone I know was (solo) traveling to the United States when a border agent
> asked her to unlocked her phone; thumbed through her apps, ended up
I think you're under-appreciating how useful the "plausible deniability".
Someone I know was (solo) traveling to the United States when a border agent
asked her to unlocked her phone; thumbed through her apps, ended up finding
tinder and went through all her recent conversations to make sure she
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 09:26:17AM +1100, Ben Kloester wrote:
> > This sounds very dangerous. As Gregory Maxwell pointed out, the key
> derivation
> > function is weak enough that passphrases could be easily brute forced
>
> So you are essentially imagining that a perpetrator will combine the
> cr
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 12:39 PM, Pavol Rusnak wrote:
> On 08/01/18 05:22, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>>> https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.md
>
> Hey Gregory!
>
> Thanks for looking into the scheme. I appreciate your time!
>
>> This specification forces the key being used thro
> This sounds very dangerous. As Gregory Maxwell pointed out, the key
derivation
> function is weak enough that passphrases could be easily brute forced
So you are essentially imagining that a perpetrator will combine the
crypto-nerd fantasy (brute forcing the passphrase) *with* the 5-dollar
wrenc
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 02:00:17PM +0100, Pavol Rusnak wrote:
> On 08/01/18 13:45, Peter Todd wrote:
> > Can you explain _exactly_ what scenario the "plausible deniability" feature
> > refers to?
>
>
> https://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/advanced_settings.html#multi-passphrase-encryption-hidd
That's the point indeed and the scope is wider than XYZIP-39, even if
what I mean is the very contrary of your point (really bitcoin is
reserved to an elite understanding english/ascii letters?)
This proposal is tailor made for Trezor and does not simplify anything
for people, that's the contrary
>I'm shocked that so many people are resisting the idea that just *maybe* there
could be people in other parts of the world who do not want to use or
cannot use the strict set of latin characters and words from the English
language.
You're mistaking concern for users potentially losing money with
Greg yes, there were already examples in this very thread of people
explaining how they use languages other than English. I'm shocked that so
many people are resisting the idea that just *maybe* there could be people
in other parts of the world who do not want to use or cannot use the strict
set of
> Let me re-phrase: Is it a known thing for users to actually use it?
yes. Based on language stats from the app stores, roughly 30% to 40% of
Copay users have their backup on a language
other than English, and we constantly get requests to support new languages
in BIP39.
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 11
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Has anyone actually used the multilingual support in bip39?
>
Copay (and all its clones) use it.
>
> If a feature of the standard has not been(widely?) used in years, and
> isn't
Let me re-phrase: Is it a known thing for users to actually use it?
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 9:52 AM, Matias Alejo Garcia
wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Has anyone actually used the multilingual supp
Has anyone actually used the multilingual support in bip39?
If a feature of the standard has not been(widely?) used in years, and isn't
supported in any major wallet(?), it seems indicative it was a mistake to
add it in the first place, since it's a footgun in the making for some poor
sap who can'
On 2018-01-08 at 04:22:43 + Gregory Maxwell wrote:
I'm happy to see that there is no obvious way to abuse this one as a
brainwallet scheme!
BIP 39 was designed to make brainwallets secure! If a user generates a
weakling 12-word mnemonic from 16 tiny octets of entropy drawn off the
non-a
On 2018-01-08 at 07:35:52 +, 木ノ下じょな
wrote:
This is very sad.
The number one problem in Japan with BIP39 seeds is with English words.
I have seen a 60 year old Japanese man writing down his phrase (because
he kept on failing recovery), and watched him write down "aneter" for
"amateur"...
On 08/01/18 13:45, Peter Todd wrote:
> Can you explain _exactly_ what scenario the "plausible deniability" feature
> refers to?
https://doc.satoshilabs.com/trezor-user/advanced_settings.html#multi-passphrase-encryption-hidden-wallets
--
Best Regards / S pozdravom,
Pavol "stick" Rusnak
CTO, Sa
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 01:39:20PM +0100, Pavol Rusnak via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > The construction also
> > will silently result in the user getting a different private key if
> > they enter the wrong passphrase-- which could lead to funds loss.
>
> Again, this is by design and it is main point wh
On 08/01/18 05:22, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>> https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.md
Hey Gregory!
Thanks for looking into the scheme. I appreciate your time!
> This specification forces the key being used through a one way
> function, -- so you cannot take a pre-existing ke
18 matches
Mail list logo