[dmarc-ietf] Re: Proxy signatures to combat SPF upgrade?

2024-06-10 Thread Douglas Foster
Several differences: I am not worried about From authentication of ESP messages because I have concluded that the major ESPs can be trusted to authenticate their clients. The client might be malicious, but the identity will not be forged. Along the same lines, ESPs are not doing forwarding so I

[dmarc-ietf] Re: Proxy signatures to combat SPF upgrade?

2024-06-10 Thread Neil Anuskiewicz
> On Jun 7, 2024, at 1:14 AM, Richard Clayton wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > In message il.com>, Douglas Foster writes > >> Google applies annotation signatures from .. >> gappsstmpt.com, with periods replaced in the domain name. >> Microsoft applies proxy s

[dmarc-ietf] Re: Proxy signatures to combat SPF upgrade?

2024-06-07 Thread Douglas Foster
I have 1603 messages from google.com servers that are not signed by the >From domain. These are all domains other than Gmail. All but 18 messages are proxy signed with a d= of the form {domain}.{digits}.gappssmtp.com. At least some of the exceptions are known to be forwarded messages where a pro

[dmarc-ietf] Re: Proxy signatures to combat SPF upgrade?

2024-06-07 Thread Murray S. Kucherawy
On Fri, Jun 7, 2024 at 1:14 AM Richard Clayton wrote: > >Is this worth standardizing as a best practice (in a future document)? > > Since the WG declined to provide an indicator for "ignore SPF when there > is a valid aligned DKIM signature" I doubt this has much chance of > widespread approval,

[dmarc-ietf] Re: Proxy signatures to combat SPF upgrade?

2024-06-07 Thread Richard Clayton
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 In message , Douglas Foster writes >Google applies annotation signatures from .. >gappsstmpt.com, with periods replaced in the domain name. >Microsoft applies proxy signatures from .onmicrosoft.com pretty much every ESP adds a DKIM signature of thei