Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
you wrote:
> If we
> are going to link the randomization that allegedly eliminates
> injustice to "minority" voters, we must have open voting, we can't
> have secret ballot. If we have secret ballot, and there is some
> hidden process that randomizes the results, well, tell me
At 04:50 PM 3/5/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Mar 5, 2007, at 7:02 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>>How, indeed, it occurs to me to ask, are we to know who "got their
>>way" in a secret ballot system? The presumption might be that the
>>"way" was gotten by a party.
>>
>>It would be just my luck that by the
At 04:49 PM 3/5/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Mar 5, 2007, at 6:41 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>>>It is also questionable if it always makes sense to select the
>>>favourite alternatives of those votes that have strong feelings and
>>>not to respect the opinions of voters with milder feelings that much.
At 06:24 AM 3/5/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> > "Majority rule" does not refer to a specific group of people, the
> > "majority" who rule over others who have no power.
>
>Yes it does. It refers to that specific group who decides to use the
>system to get their will regardless of what the rest wants
At 06:00 AM 3/5/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Do you mean to say that the will of a consistent faction of 49% of the
>electorate, who will never get their way under a majoritarian system,
>is "noise"??
No. But that condition is essentially impossible. There is *never* a
consistent faction of that s
Forest W Simmons wrote:
>A candidate X covers a
>candidate Y if and only if X (pairwise) defeats both Y and each
>candidate that Y defeats.
>
>So if X covers Y, then in a pairwise sense X dominates Y.
>
>Now for UncAAO:
>
>1. Write abbreviations for all of the candidate names on a big sheet of
When I shot the margins monster with URNEC, a few years ago, margins
disappeared from EM for a while. But it came out of its grave again, like
some kind of Romero cannibalistic zombie. But now it's been shot with the
Plurality criterion, and this time it has really been finished off for good.
T
When I shot the margins monster with URNEC, a few years ago, margins
disappeared from EM for a while. But it came out of its grave again, like
some kind of Romero cannibalistic zombie. But now it's been shot with the
Plurality criterion, and this time it has really been finished off for good.
T
1. Is C socially preferable to A? ___Yes
2. Is tossing a coin to decide between A and B socially preferable to
A? ___Yes
3. Is C socially preferable to tossing a coin to decide between A and
B? ___No,
although asymptotically the added variety of a lottery like (A+B+C)/3
might be preferable.
I guess some people are posting their votes on the list.
I said yes, no, yes. It's merely my opinion that C is "socially preferable"
to A and B.
But with #2:
> 2. Is tossing a coin to decide between A and B socially preferable to A?
If there are future elections, then you could argue that the c
On Mar 5, 2007, at 7:02 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
How, indeed, it occurs to me to ask, are we to know who "got their
way" in a secret ballot system? The presumption might be that the
"way" was gotten by a party.
It would be just my luck that by the time I wised up and became a
Republic
On Mar 5, 2007, at 6:41 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
It is also questionable if it always makes sense to select the
favourite alternatives of those votes that have strong feelings and
not to respect the opinions of voters with milder feelings that much.
If we were deciding a series of choices,
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>In a posting to a different mailing list, Markus pointed out that margins
>fails the Plurality Criterion, and that wv Condorcet passes the Plurality
>Criterion.
>
Yes.
11: A>B
07: B
12: C
A Woodall example that applies. Margins elects A, yet C has more top
preferenc
Dear Abd-ul Rahman,
you wrote:
> If the system does not allow majority rule, my
> experience as well as theory indicate that the result is not
> democracy, but oligarchy, whenever the status quo favors a minority.
What theory tells you that Random Ballot results in oligarchy? Oligarchy
means a k
Dear Abd ul-Rahman,
replying to Juho, you wrote:
> At 03:29 PM 3/4/2007, Juho wrote:
> >Single winner at its
> >purest is just electing one of a number of candidates, giving no
> >consideration to if it was the same voters that last time got their
> >way through. Basic single winner methods maybe
Dear Abd-ul-Rahman,
ad 2., you wrote:
> >2. Is tossing a coin to decide between A and B socially preferable
> > to A? ___
>
> It might be perceived as fair. Let's look at this situation in
> another way. Let's assume that the utilities are normalized.
> Actually, on an "absolute" scale, the rating
My definitions can be found at the following website:
http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html
URNEC probably isn't there, though I intend to add it there.
SFC and SDSC are there.
Mike Ossipoff
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I'd said:
>>But if we're going to have the added definition-wordiness of Condorcet,
>>we should get what Condorcet can offer, including compliance with the
>>Plurality Criterion, SFC, GSFC, and SDSC, and URNEC.
>
Juho replied:
>And maybe [will you provide] pointers to the definitions of t
18 matches
Mail list logo
