> For the scheme in this draft，
> the probability of a a second public key is: 1-(1-p)^(2^{1024-48}), where p
>is the probability of a random number being a RSA public key.
I would not construct the attack by trying random numbers and checking them for
whether they are a public key. I would s
Jari Arkko 写于 2013-03-22 05:55:35:
>
> Hosnieh,
>
> > What is it that you don't understand. I will be happy to explain it to
you.
>
> Thanks. I read the details, but I'm missing the big picture. I.e.,
> some effort is required from the owner to create an address. By
> repeating that effort
ipv6-boun...@ietf.org 写于 2013-03-18 09:36:25:
> 2048 bit RSA security is overstated. Cracking it requires on the
> order of 2^112 operations. You should look at NIST SP 800-57 Part
> 2, Table 2 Section 5.6.1.
It is in Part 1:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_re
