In your previous mail you wrote:
> About the modifier that I have, I will also check to determine whether using
> makes breaking it easier or harder. If it is easier. then I will use the
> entire 64 bits of the public key (set bit u and g) and use the fixed part of
> the public key.
=> I do
...@ietf.org
Cc: 'Erik Nordmark'; alexandru.petre...@gmail.com; 'Ray Hunter'; 'Michael
Richardson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)'
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
I don'
In your previous mail you wrote:
> I don't think the index helps much. I suspect that SSAS could be broken in
> minutes if someone did a parallel implementation on a GPU. Maybe seconds.
=> you peak 2 primes for a standard RSA public key. You fix one and
you divide the modulus to get an idea of
In your previous mail you wrote:
> - Choosing a random part of the public key does not help to
> increase the probability of matching the public key to the IID?
=> IMHO the main good effect of this is that it makes a dictionary
of matching public key candidates not attractive... But t
I seconds Christian's argument: CGA was carefully designed to offer
a security of the ownership property higher than you can get from
a direct use of the interface ID. Of course this has a cost in CGA
generation time (but not verification) at higher SEC values.
Now about 48 bits of a RSA public ke
il.com; 'Ray Hunter'; 'Michael
Richardson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)'
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
Thanks again for your response. I have some questions:
- Choosing a
ik Nordmark'; alexandru.petre...@gmail.com; 'Ray Hunter'; 'Michael
Richardson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)'
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
Thanks Christian. You answered my quest
dson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)'
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
Thanks Christian. You answered my question. This is what I wanted to know about
security when directly using keys or using in
om: Hosnieh Rafiee [mailto:i...@rozanak.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 16, 2013 1:45 PM
To: Christian Huitema; ipv6@ietf.org; s...@ietf.org
Cc: 'Erik Nordmark'; alexandru.petre...@gmail.com; 'Ray Hunter'; 'Michael
Richardson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gaglia
16, 2013 1:45 PM
To: Christian Huitema; ipv6@ietf.org; s...@ietf.org
Cc: 'Erik Nordmark'; alexandru.petre...@gmail.com; 'Ray Hunter'; 'Michael
Richardson'; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; 'Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)'
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA an
l
Richardson; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
As you say, the attack that you mention depends on the strength of RSA or
ECC. In fact, pretty much all of public key cryptography
ail.com; 'Ray Hunter'; Michael
Richardson; jeanmichel.com...@orange.com; Roque Gagliano (rogaglia)
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
Hi Christian,
> But can y toou explain why you believe that retrieving the private key from
hristian Huitema [mailto:huit...@microsoft.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 16, 2013 5:37 PM
To: Hosnieh Rafiee; ipv6@ietf.org; s...@ietf.org
Cc: Erik Nordmark; alexandru.petre...@gmail.com; Ray Hunter
Subject: RE: security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action :
draft-rafiee-6man-ssas
It is very c
It is very clear that if the attacker finds the private key, the size of the
hash does not matter. But can you explain why you believe that retrieving the
private key from the public key and a clear text/encrypted text pair is easier
than breaking a hash? Did you somehow crack RSA?
From: ipv6-b
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