On Nov 9, 2003, at 3:13 PM, Bob Hinden wrote:
Alain,
If you, or the wg, thinks this avenue is worth exploring, I can write
a 2 page draft. I honestly believe that this entire issue can be
solved outside of the IETF by the RIRs without introducing anything
new/damaging in the IPv6 architecture.
UL
Alain,
If you, or the wg, thinks this avenue is worth exploring, I can write
a 2 page draft. I honestly believe that this entire issue can be
solved outside of the IETF by the RIRs without introducing anything
new/damaging in the IPv6 architecture.
ULA do not introduce a change to the IPv6 archite
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Brian E Carpenter wrote:
| Pekka,
|
| Leakage in the payload (i.e. a referral) is problem we will have anyway,
| e.g. if the referred address is inside a firewall. I think that problem
There are important differences between the two types of leakage tho
On Sun, Nov 09, 2003 at 02:16:10PM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
>
> My suggestion is to let the authority in charge of administering
> the public IP address space to allocate directly address space
> from a specific bloc to whoever wants it, with no expectation that
> it will be routable and leave i
Alain Durand wrote:
>
> On Nov 9, 2003, at 1:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>
> > Alain Durand wrote:
> >>
> >> On Nov 3, 2003, at 5:12 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> >>> In the case in point, there is a significant constituency who
> >>> believes
> >>> that they need a replacement for site loca
Pekka,
Leakage in the payload (i.e. a referral) is problem we will have anyway,
e.g. if the referred address is inside a firewall. I think that problem
is unavoidable. It's true that with a fully registered PI, diagnosis is
easier.
Brian
Pekka Savola wrote:
>
> On Sun, 9 Nov 2003, Brian E Ca
Alain,
I think it is well worth writing such a draft. It might move this debate
forward. However, I'll point out one advantage of Hinden/Haberman
that it cannot match - the locally-assigned version of Hinden/Haberman
is instantly available when IANA assigns a prefix, without a one to two
year dela
On Sun, 9 Nov 2003, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
[...]
> > As I explain in a previous message, this last property is not verified
> > by the hinden/haberman draft, as when those addresses leak,
> > they would create untraceable problems, very similar to the one
> > caused by RFC1918 leaks today.
>
> Q
On Nov 9, 2003, at 1:24 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
Alain,
Please define "real PI (by real I mean registered)". Not having seen
the
draft that defines it, I can't evaluate your argument.
The problem with the Hinden/harbeman draft is that it allocates a part
of
the public IPv6 address space for
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Brian E Carpenter wrote:
| Alain,
|
| Please define "real PI (by real I mean registered)". Not having seen the
| draft that defines it, I can't evaluate your argument.
|
I seem to remember Kurtis making a proposal but I'm not sure if it
was written up a
On Nov 9, 2003, at 1:19 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
Alain Durand wrote:
On Nov 3, 2003, at 5:12 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
In the case in point, there is a significant constituency who
believes
that they need a replacement for site local addresses, and that
"draft-hinden" is a reasonable way t
Alain,
Please define "real PI (by real I mean registered)". Not having seen the
draft that defines it, I can't evaluate your argument.
Brian
Alain Durand wrote:
>
> On Nov 4, 2003, at 12:48 AM, Tim Chown wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 10:45:07PM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
> >>
> >> As
Alain Durand wrote:
>
> On Nov 3, 2003, at 5:12 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > In the case in point, there is a significant constituency who believes
> > that they need a replacement for site local addresses, and that
> > "draft-hinden" is a reasonable way to obtain this replacement. You are
> >
Excellent analysis. I fully concur.
Keith
> - using site local is roughly equivalent to using net 10 in IPv4. The
> address range can be filtered in routers, but it is ambiguous. Ambiguity
> prevents tracing the source of the leaks.
>
> - hijack a prefix is roughly equivalent to the pre-RFC-195
Thank you! I was trying to get to the same point, but your summary is much
better!
And no, I absolutely do not think we should try and wait for routable PI
space, which seems to be the only other suggestion made on this list.
--On Tuesday, November 04, 2003 09:21 -0800 Christian Huitema
<[EMA
On Nov 4, 2003, at 10:00 AM, Tim Chown wrote:
How do we control or throttle the allocations and not regret it later?
With current IPv6 adoption we don't have a problem though... (!)
Exactly the point... The fear of a gold rush has been driving many
similar
discussions over the last few years. The
On Tue, Nov 04, 2003 at 09:45:31AM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
>
> You're assuming that the alternative to hinden/haberman is hijacking
> random prefixes.
> I don't. I see allocation of real PI (by real I mean registered) a more
> serious alternative.
> The more I think about it, the more I come
On Nov 4, 2003, at 12:48 AM, Tim Chown wrote:
On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 10:45:07PM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
As I explain in a previous message, this last property is not verified
by the hinden/haberman draft, as when those addresses leak,
they would create untraceable problems, very similar to the
On Tue, Nov 04, 2003 at 09:21:43AM -0800, Christian Huitema wrote:
>
> - the addresses proposed in draft-hinden appear to be strictly better
> than either the existing site-local or hijacked addresses. They can be
> filtered in routers. Attempts at uniqueness give us a reasonable hope of
> tracing
> On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 10:45:07PM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
> >
> > As I explain in a previous message, this last property is not
verified
> > by the hinden/haberman draft, as when those addresses leak,
> > they would create untraceable problems, very similar to the one
> > caused by RFC1918 l
On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 10:45:07PM -0800, Alain Durand wrote:
>
> As I explain in a previous message, this last property is not verified
> by the hinden/haberman draft, as when those addresses leak,
> they would create untraceable problems, very similar to the one
> caused by RFC1918 leaks today.
On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 05:12:58PM -0800, Christian Huitema wrote:
>
> In the case in point, there is a significant constituency who believes
> that they need a replacement for site local addresses, and that
> "draft-hinden" is a reasonable way to obtain this replacement. You are
> indeed free to
On Nov 3, 2003, at 5:12 PM, Christian Huitema wrote:
In the case in point, there is a significant constituency who believes
that they need a replacement for site local addresses, and that
"draft-hinden" is a reasonable way to obtain this replacement. You are
indeed free to not use such addresses an
Whoa, sorry if this got that far out of context!I very expressly
believe that a local scheme in general, and the one in draft-hinden in
particular, is needed for a number of scenarios!
--On Monday, November 03, 2003 17:12 -0800 Christian Huitema
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Hans,
You have c
> OK, this is going to go around endlessly, so please re-read my
original
> message where I said that there are some who simply do not agree that
> local
> addressing is needed -- I know that is your position and I respect it.
I
> also said that I firmly disagree and suggest that we have plenty of
OK, this is going to go around endlessly, so please re-read my original
message where I said that there are some who simply do not agree that local
addressing is needed -- I know that is your position and I respect it. I
also said that I firmly disagree and suggest that we have plenty of
scena
I'll combine two answers in message..
[me:]
> > Why exactly should we care if party X's internal applications break
> > because it hijacks a prefix?
On Mon, 3 Nov 2003, Hans Kruse wrote:
> We don't, and that is my point. The draft in question improves on that
> situation by creating a prefix th
We don't, and that is my point. The draft in question improves on that
situation by creating a prefix that the rest of the network can easily deal
with. Internal apps may still break, although I would argue that the local
addressing prefix opens some options to make that a little less likely..
Pekka Savola wrote:
On Mon, 3 Nov 2003, Hans Kruse wrote:
Please explain to me how the job of applications gets any easier if the
local addressing is done with a hijacked prefix
Why exactly should we care if party X's internal applications break
because it hijacks a prefix?
Because si
On Mon, 3 Nov 2003, Hans Kruse wrote:
> Please explain to me how the job of applications gets any easier if the
> local addressing is done with a hijacked prefix
Why exactly should we care if party X's internal applications break
because it hijacks a prefix?
--
Pekka Savola
My question regarding "need anything else" referred only to the registry
requirements. And I think we really need to delineate those requirements.
I do not appreciate your personal attack; reading either this specific
message or the archive should make it clear that I did not "miss this major
> Do we need anything else from a technical perspective?
I think I and Keith Moore commented on the application impact,
and to the extent that the current document doesn't state
the application impact very accurately.
Once that application impact is better known one could and should discuss
the
Here are my current thoughts on the last-call discussion going on regarding
the unique local addressing: It seems to me that three subjects are going
around:
(1) There have been a few comments of the "we just don't need this type of
address" kind. I respect that point of few, and firmly disag
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