On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 06:48:26PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> >The only problem area are the upper limits imposed on the lengths of
> >various strings and arrays. The upper limits seem to be required for
> >safely decoding messages from untrusted sources. Som
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 06:42:01PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> Attached are the args (*_args) and return structures (*_ret) for all the
> calls covered by the remote protocol, that is to say everything except
> Save, Restore and CoreDump (see previous email).
>
> The only problem area are
Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
The only problem area are the upper limits imposed on the lengths of
various strings and arrays. The upper limits seem to be required for
safely decoding messages from untrusted sources. Some of them however
would impose limits on such things as the number of CPUs su
Attached are the args (*_args) and return structures (*_ret) for all the
calls covered by the remote protocol, that is to say everything except
Save, Restore and CoreDump (see previous email).
The only problem area are the upper limits imposed on the lengths of
various strings and arrays. The
Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:41:52PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
VIR_DRV_OPEN_QUIET causes important diagnostic error messages to be
thrown away. This patch removes this.
We used to use this flag to make the Xen drivers keep quite when connecting
to test, or qemu
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:41:52PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> VIR_DRV_OPEN_QUIET causes important diagnostic error messages to be
> thrown away. This patch removes this.
We used to use this flag to make the Xen drivers keep quite when connecting
to test, or qemu backends. The refactoring
Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:35:04PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
Seems to me that it should be safe to allow non-root callers to use the
getCapabilities call over the Xen proxy. This patch adds that feature.
Yes, that's a reasonable use case. The patch looks OK to
Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:32:00PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
Xen-unified introduced a stupid bug, down to me, when running in the
non-root case. It didn't keep track of which drivers successfully
opened, so will try and perform operations on drivers which didn'
Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 10:12:43AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
Jan Michael wrote:
Hello libvirt fellows,
I have some problems to distinguish between those function calls in libvirt
API:
virConnectNumOfDefinedDomains
virConnectNumOfDomains
The API description s
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 10:12:43AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> Jan Michael wrote:
> >Hello libvirt fellows,
> >
> >I have some problems to distinguish between those function calls in libvirt
> >API:
> >
> >>virConnectNumOfDefinedDomains
> >>virConnectNumOfDomains
> >
> >The API description s
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:32:00PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> Xen-unified introduced a stupid bug, down to me, when running in the
> non-root case. It didn't keep track of which drivers successfully
> opened, so will try and perform operations on drivers which didn't open.
> I suggest
On Mon, Apr 30, 2007 at 12:35:04PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> Seems to me that it should be safe to allow non-root callers to use the
> getCapabilities call over the Xen proxy. This patch adds that feature.
Yes, that's a reasonable use case. The patch looks OK to me.
Dan.
--
|=- Red Ha
virDomainSave (for example) is currently defined like this:
/**
* virDomainSave:
* @domain: a domain object
* @to: path for the output file
*
* This method will suspend a domain and save its memory contents to
* a file on disk. After the call, if successful, the domain is not
* listed as r
VIR_DRV_OPEN_QUIET causes important diagnostic error messages to be
thrown away. This patch removes this.
Rich.
--
Emerging Technologies, Red Hat http://et.redhat.com/~rjones/
64 Baker Street, London, W1U 7DF Mobile: +44 7866 314 421
Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 10
Seems to me that it should be safe to allow non-root callers to use the
getCapabilities call over the Xen proxy. This patch adds that feature.
Rich.
--
Emerging Technologies, Red Hat http://et.redhat.com/~rjones/
64 Baker Street, London, W1U 7DF Mobile: +44 7866 314 421
Registered Addres
Xen-unified introduced a stupid bug, down to me, when running in the
non-root case. It didn't keep track of which drivers successfully
opened, so will try and perform operations on drivers which didn't open.
I suggest that if people approve of the attached patch, then it is
applied with some
Jan Michael wrote:
Hello libvirt fellows,
I have some problems to distinguish between those function calls in libvirt
API:
virConnectNumOfDefinedDomains
virConnectNumOfDomains
The API description states on both function that they will return me the
number of active domain.
Am I right if I as
On Tue, Apr 24, 2007 at 09:48:09PM +0900, S.Sakamoto wrote:
> diff -u -p -r1.110 xend_internal.c
> --- src/xend_internal.c 23 Apr 2007 07:41:23 - 1.110
> +++ src/xend_internal.c 24 Apr 2007 11:00:55 -
> @@ -587,24 +587,33 @@ static int
> xend_op_ext2(virConnectPtr xend, co
Hello libvirt fellows,
I have some problems to distinguish between those function calls in libvirt
API:
> virConnectNumOfDefinedDomains
> virConnectNumOfDomains
The API description states on both function that they will return me the
number of active domain.
Am I right if I assume that the first
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