On a Tuesday in 2022, Peter Krempa wrote:
Extend the test for io_uring to also test startup policy.
Since the actual logic for dropping disks is in the host preparation
phase, thus skipped for tests we can use any file path.
Add a case also for 'file' backing to have all cases covered.
Signed-
Extend the test for io_uring to also test startup policy.
Since the actual logic for dropping disks is in the host preparation
phase, thus skipped for tests we can use any file path.
Add a case also for 'file' backing to have all cases covered.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
---
.../disk-aio-io_u
On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 10:39:52 -0400, Cole Robinson wrote:
> Internally we already collect x86 host family + model + stepping
> numeric values. This exposed them in capabilities CPU output.
> Example:
>
> $ sudo virsh capabilities | grep -A1 -B1 signature
>
>
>
>
> Users ne
Internally we already collect x86 host family + model + stepping
numeric values. This exposed them in capabilities CPU output.
Example:
$ sudo virsh capabilities | grep -A1 -B1 signature
Users need to know these values to calculate an expected.
SEV-ES/SEV-SNP launch measureme
The 0.5.6 release of libvirt-php is tagged and tarball is available at:
https://libvirt.org/sources/php/
Notable changes:
* PHP-8.0 support
* Implemented virDomainSnapshotCurrent() API
* Implemented virNetworkGetDHCPLeases() API
* Implemented virDomainGetCPUStats() API
* Implemented virDomainUnd
Hi,
> libvirt requires the firmware to support SMM to enable secure boot. But is
> SMM a strict requirement for secure boot? IIUC, lack of SMM makes the
> securely booted stack less secure since it is easier to tamper with it, but
> it does not prevent securely booting the components.
Well, 'l
Hi,
> I think we need an ARM expert to explain the rules about SecureBoot
> on aarch64. Given SMM doesn't exist outside x86, it may be fine to
> just enable secureboot unconditionally on aarch64 and have it be
> genuinely secure. I simply don't know enough in this respect.
Unlikely. The firmwa
On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 02:39:46PM +0200, Peter Krempa wrote:
> Fixes breakage of 'sc_linguas_sorting'.
>
> Fixes: c886a40cfcbceb2efa57930b64f758d3e263d759
> Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
> ---
> Pushed as a build fix. Whether that syntax check is a sensible use of
> CPU cycles is for another discu
Hi,
> Having said that I find Fedora does still buld shim 15.4 for
> aarch64. We only exclude 32-bit, and I think RHEL does the
> same. Whether anyone's tested SecureBoot on aarch64 in
> Fedora/RHEL though, I'm not so sure.
Well, at least the fedora shim builds are not signed with anything,
an
Fixes breakage of 'sc_linguas_sorting'.
Fixes: c886a40cfcbceb2efa57930b64f758d3e263d759
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
---
Pushed as a build fix. Whether that syntax check is a sensible use of
CPU cycles is for another discussion.
po/LINGUAS | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
d
On a Tuesday in June Peter Krempa wrote:
>
> Patch 4/4 fixes the regression. Patch 3/4 fixes missing cases in the
> validation. Rest of the series is preparation/cleanup.
>
> Peter Krempa (4):
> virDomainDiskDefValidate: Improve error messages for 'startupPolicy'
> checks
> domain_validate
Our startup policy checkers work only for local paths, so disk sources
such as NVMe, or vhost-user can't be used with startup policy.
Unfortunately the validation did not catch these cases. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
---
src/conf/domain_validate.c | 5 -
1 file changed, 4 insertion
The check was historically done only for _TYPE_VOLUME disks, but
refactors to allow _TYPE_VOLUME disks in the backing chain caused a
regression where we'd reject startupPolicy also for _TYPE_BLOCK disks
which historically worked well.
Fix it by using the 'virDomainDiskDefValidateStartupPolicy' hel
Move the code into 'virDomainDiskDefValidateStartupPolicy' which will be
later reused in the qemu driver.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
---
src/conf/domain_validate.c | 45 --
src/conf/domain_validate.h | 2 ++
src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 +
3 files changed
Remove linebreak and mention the attribute name. Also prepare the error
messages for future by substituting the type of offending access.
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa
---
src/conf/domain_validate.c | 9 -
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/conf/domain_valida
Patch 4/4 fixes the regression. Patch 3/4 fixes missing cases in the
validation. Rest of the series is preparation/cleanup.
Peter Krempa (4):
virDomainDiskDefValidate: Improve error messages for 'startupPolicy'
checks
domain_validate: Split out validation of disk startup policy
virDomain
On Sat, Jun 11, 2022 at 12:46:26PM -0400, Cole Robinson wrote:
> Internally we already collect x86 host family + model + stepping
> numeric values. This exposed them in capabilities CPU output.
> Example:
>
> $ sudo virsh capabilities | grep -A1 -B1 signature
>
>
>
>
> Users
On Sat, Jun 11, 2022 at 12:46:26 -0400, Cole Robinson wrote:
> Internally we already collect x86 host family + model + stepping
> numeric values. This exposed them in capabilities CPU output.
> Example:
>
> $ sudo virsh capabilities | grep -A1 -B1 signature
>
>
>
>
> Users ne
On 03/06/22 5:18 pm, Peter Krempa wrote:
This version fixes multiple problems which I'd point out when reviewing:
- virStorageSource is properly used in all places
- logic for initializing NVRAM imgages from template is fixed to avoid
touching network backed nvrams
- documentation now
On 14/06/22 3:51 pm, Peter Krempa wrote:
On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 12:18:34 +0530, Ani Sinha wrote:
On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 10:15 AM Rohit Kumar wrote:
On 03/06/22 5:21 pm, Peter Krempa wrote:
On Thu, Jun 02, 2022 at 16:50:42 +0530, Rohit Kumar wrote:
On 17/05/22 8:55 pm, Peter Krempa wrote
On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 12:18:34 +0530, Ani Sinha wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 10:15 AM Rohit Kumar wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 03/06/22 5:21 pm, Peter Krempa wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 02, 2022 at 16:50:42 +0530, Rohit Kumar wrote:
> > >> On 17/05/22 8:55 pm, Peter Krempa wrote:
> > >>> On Mon, May 1
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