For the record... I have first hand knowledge that KSA's filtering is
not too effective.
I'll abstain from the ethics/moral discussion.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Vadim Antonov
Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2004 8:35 PM
To: Randy Bush
IN Public Policy
>Mailing List (PPML) and voice your opinion.
>
>http://www.arin.net/mailing_lists/index.html
>
>Forrest
>
>
>-Original Message-
>From: H. Michael Smith, Jr. [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 4:24 PM
>To:&
Even if they understand it, why should they accept it? If an ISP
assigns an address block, runs BGP with the customer, promotes
multi-homing, shouldn't they make a reasonable effort to make it work?
Unless I am missing something, I am having a big problem with an ISP
assigning a /24 to a multi-h
ng that I am missing something here. If not, I sure hope
more folks don't adopt Verio's filtering techniques. (I know that a
VERY low AS # issues /24's out of a /8)
-Original Message-
From: Phil Rosenthal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 5:42 PM
T
What about the /24's that many ISPs (especially tier 2-3) are assigning
to multi-homed customers? What about an IX or "critical infrastructure
providers" that may be issued a /24 from ARIN (Policy 2001-3)?
Although it may be rare that a large aggregate would become unreachable
to a "large" net
Hello All,
A few months ago someone posted a URL to a tool that maps the Internet
from the perspective of any (inputted) AS Number. Could someone send
this URL (on- or off-list)?
I've searched the archives, but I cannot find it.
Thanks,
Michael
el
H. Michael Smith, Jr.
Network Services and Security Manager
Clark Atlanta University
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Mike Donahue
Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 2:22 PM
To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
Subject: AS announcement quest
One of my clients is currently a victim of an over-zealous ISP
recklessly trying to implement rpf.
One (of two) ISPs are trying to monitor my customer's circuit by
watching the serial interface (IP address) of the cpe (customer owned
and controlled) router (IP address is from ISP's block). Due
riginal Message-
From: Christopher L. Morrow [mailto:chris@;UU.NET]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2002 1:21 AM
To: H. Michael Smith, Jr.
Cc: 'Hank Nussbacher'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: no ip forged-source-address
On Wed, 30 Oct 2002, H. Michael Smith, Jr. wrote:
A fundamental effect of spoofing addresses from your local subnet is
that when the packets reach their target, the source addresses are
meaningful. I realize that the traceability of these packets has
already been mentioned, but I want to point out the profound difference
between a DDoS attack wi
0:26 AM
To: fingers
Cc: H. Michael Smith, Jr.; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ICANN Targets DDoS Attacks
I would point out that if we were to define it and provide the
definition to the proper authorities, it would go a long way towards
getting a definition that makes sense.
I, (and many oth
.
-Original Message-
From: fingers [mailto:fingers@;fingers.co.za]
Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2002 10:04 AM
To: H. Michael Smith, Jr.
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: ICANN Targets DDoS Attacks
> Source address verification at access layer and rate limiting icmp
would
> be fine starts.
Source address verification at access layer and rate limiting icmp would
be fine starts.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner-nanog@;merit.edu] On Behalf Of
fingers
Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2002 1:12 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ICANN Targets DDoS Attacks
Hello All.
Can anyone suggest tools to use for gathering statistics for billing
purposes? I would like to know what tools are most common among ISPs.
Thanks,
Michael
<>
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