Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-02 Thread Martin Fick
--- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote: > Interestingly, "Applied Cryptography" (by Bruce Schneier) > briefly discusses a distributed timestamping protocol that uses a > hash of the content to be stamped in order to select which nodes will > provide the stamp, the idea being that the requester ca

Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-02 Thread Kasimir Gabert
On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 10:50 AM, Brian Mearns wrote: > On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Martin Fick wrote: >> --- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote: >> >>> > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how >>> > would a hash translate to a relay address?  The >>> > maximum possible strengt

Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-02 Thread Brian Mearns
On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Martin Fick wrote: > --- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote: > >> > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how >> > would a hash translate to a relay address?  The >> > maximum possible strength of a hash is related to the >> > size of its address space,

Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-02 Thread Martin Fick
--- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote: > > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how > > would a hash translate to a relay address?  The > > maximum possible strength of a hash is related to the > > size of its address space, if this is limited to the > > number of relays available, i

Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-02 Thread Brian Mearns
On Thu, Oct 1, 2009 at 3:13 PM, Martin Fick wrote: > --- On Thu, 10/1/09, Brian Mearns wrote: > >> My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client) >> for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically >> done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to

Re: Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-01 Thread Martin Fick
--- On Thu, 10/1/09, Brian Mearns wrote: > My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client) > for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically > done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to > ensure that it is random, and would this be desirable? I

Is it desirable to prevent users from choosing their own circuits?

2009-10-01 Thread Brian Mearns
My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client) for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to ensure that it is random, and would this be desirable? I would imagine that attackers might try to choose s