--- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
> Interestingly, "Applied Cryptography" (by Bruce Schneier)
> briefly discusses a distributed timestamping protocol that uses a
> hash of the content to be stamped in order to select which nodes will
> provide the stamp, the idea being that the requester ca
On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 10:50 AM, Brian Mearns wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Martin Fick wrote:
>> --- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
>>
>>> > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how
>>> > would a hash translate to a relay address? The
>>> > maximum possible strengt
On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Martin Fick wrote:
> --- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
>
>> > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how
>> > would a hash translate to a relay address? The
>> > maximum possible strength of a hash is related to the
>> > size of its address space,
--- On Fri, 10/2/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
> > Perhaps I don't understand your suggestion, but how
> > would a hash translate to a relay address? The
> > maximum possible strength of a hash is related to the
> > size of its address space, if this is limited to the
> > number of relays available, i
On Thu, Oct 1, 2009 at 3:13 PM, Martin Fick wrote:
> --- On Thu, 10/1/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
>
>> My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client)
>> for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically
>> done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to
--- On Thu, 10/1/09, Brian Mearns wrote:
> My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client)
> for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically
> done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to
> ensure that it is random, and would this be desirable? I
My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client)
for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically done at
random. However, are there any safeguards in place to ensure that it
is random, and would this be desirable? I would imagine that attackers
might try to choose s
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