At the risk of sounding "waaay too scholarly and pedagogical" (my memory for
how one poster described the discussion, at times, on this list), I would like
to examine the recent thread concerning the controversial contributions to this
list of a certain TIPSter or two. The discussion that emerged was fascinating
to me because of what it may illustrate about the present state of scientific
psychology. I apologize for the length of this post, but I wish to sort a few
things out here and also to see what others think about the issues raised
below. Basically, I wish to examine some criticisms that were made about the
teaching of psychology, and about higher education in general. These claims
have wider implications, I believe, not only for the future of our science, but
also for our society--implications that, perhaps, are beginning to come to life
on this list, an unsettling thought for me.
Marc Turner wrote:
>Rather than providing enlightenment to our students, we teach them that
>they have to agree with what the book says or what we say. Some professors,
>when presented with an opposing view point, become defensive of their own
>beliefs rather than engaging in a dialogue with students about the
>issue. I find it somewhat ironic that we encourage our students to ask
>questions, challenge beliefs, not to believe blindly in authority, etc.
>then penalize them when they challenge or disagree with us....
Marc seems to be suggesting that our educational practice is geared toward
getting students to conform to our beliefs, at least partly because of our own
insecurities, but perhaps also because of the practical need to evaluate
student learning. Others made a more general criticism related to this one that
suggested that there is a structured "educational production line" that
attempts to mass-produce educated students who are told, but not taught, to
think on their own in a critical manner. Our teaching methods, these critics
seem to be saying, ensure that we will "stamp out" each new baccalaureate from
the same mold at the end of four years. Paul Smith objected to this general
criticism in the following:
>I work in a far more structured curriculum than almost any of you...,
>and I have no doubt that [this] curriculum serves to encourage diverse
>thinking and diverse expression of individual interests and skills
>among our students. I have no doubt but that they _come to us_
>looking (relatively) the same, and leave us looking FAR more
>individual.... The notion that college makes people more similar
>seems to be one of those western cultural assumptions that needs
>questioning....
It is patently true, I believe, that our courses represent an attempt to get
our students to conform to standards by teaching them both the norms of our
"scientific culture" (by "culture," I am referring loosely to the set of ideas,
customs, skills, etc., of a distinct group of people) AND the knowledge base
that is commonly accepted within our discipline. In other words, education IS
an exercise in encouraging conformity to a particular set of beliefs and norms.
With regard to norms, every culture, including our own scientific one, has
standards of thought and conduct which are so central that one is not allowed
to deviate from them, at least not if one hopes to be accepted by other group
members. With regard to knowledge, every culture has beliefs which are
considered to be certain with regard to particular evaluatory standards
specified by the norms. For example, within all scientific disciplines, there
are certain theories and general principles that have been so well-supported by
empirical evidence that we deem it necessary for students to learn them almost
without question. In fact, this is the knowledge base that we MUST teach our
students if they are to think critically about those beliefs that are less
certain. Marc goes too far, however, in suggesting that the all-too-human
defensiveness which any of us can exhibit is a central aspect of a scientific
education. Although we all have certain beliefs about our field which are so
personally important that we bristle when they are challenged, most instructors
recognize the need to avoid such defensiveness and arrogance: they recognize
that such beliefs do not represent the accepted general knowledge base of their
discipline.
I am most interested in discussing the norms of scientific culture, because
these seem to be at the core of the general criticism about "mass education"
mentioned above and the related controversy that erupted here about acceptable
posts to the list. Furthermore, cultural norms are central to determining which
knowledge is thought to be certain within any culture, including our scientific
one, and which knowledge is not. That is a major reason why these norms are so
important and can be so hotly contested when different cultures clash (as I
believe is happening on this list). Thus, a scientific education demands
conformity to a circumscribed set of centrally important norms that tell us how
to evaluate and communicate potential knowledge. These norms include the
following:
(1) the acceptance of particular attitudes fundamental to scientific practice--
especially those of empiricism, naturalism, and skepticism;
(2) the avoidance of personal biases in one's reasoning about nature (which
does not include the "cultural biases" listed in #1);
(3) the requirement that one communicate ideas in a particular manner set by
convention, including the following--giving specific reasons for holding
particular beliefs; avoiding arguments for these beliefs based primarily on
emotion, sentiment, or intuition; and using certain formal rules for expressing
these beliefs.
These are three norms that virtually all of us were trained to accept as
central to our scientific culture. These norms are central because, over the
last several hundred years, they have proved to be essential for accomplishing
the practical goals of science--goals involving the prediction and control of
natural phenomena by understanding their causes.
In fact, in everyday life, these same standards are essential for accomplishing
ANY practical goal involving the prediction and control of complex events (even
one so mundane as getting your car to work properly). This is why we believe
that these specific norms aid us in KNOWING REALITY: whenever we want to modify
the world around us, it is this set of standards that allows us to do this
successfully. People from widely varying cultures adopt these very same
standards whenever they need to accomplish a practical goal in the world around
them. Everyone on this list adopts these same standards in their everyday lives
when they want to accomplish a practical goal in the world around them. IT
SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THESE NORMS HELP US TO ACCOMPLISH PRACTICAL GOALS BECAUSE,
BY GUIDING OUR ACTIONS AND THINKING, THEY HELP US TO DISCOVER THE REALITY
AROUND US. Thus, we expect our students (and our colleagues) to conform to
these norms if they want to be called "scientists." We suspect that anyone who
rejects these standards, or places them on an equal footing with other
standards, is being disingenuous, at least when the problem he/she is trying to
solve involves the understanding and modification of natural events in the
world.
Within any culture, however, there is room for deviation OUTSIDE OF ITS CENTRAL
NORMS. This seems to be especially true within the academic culture of
scientists. For example, in psychology, we teach a large number of theoretical
approaches in our courses--approaches that use very different sets of
fundamental assumptions about human nature (such as behavioral, evolutionary,
cognitive, existential, neurological, and interpersonal approaches). Each
approach is considered to be scientific (even if we personally consider some of
them to be "wrong") as long as their supporters accept the central norms of
scientific culture outlined above. We may, at times, tell our students that
certain approaches are wrong because, we believe, the evidence doesn't support
them. This is the situation that Marc Turner correctly criticizes: we have an
opportunity here to get the students to think critically and, instead, we have
become dogmatic.
The problem, however, is that we MUST accept almost without question some set
of norms so that we can evaluate the various theoretical approaches in a
critical manner. In the culture of science, we have accepted a set of norms
that have been shown to work consistently IN PRACTICE. Some apparently believe,
however, that we are being equally dogmatic if we require that our students
learn these time-tested norms. What these critics don't seem to realize is that
we are left with no firm foundation for discourse if we blithely uproot these
norms and substitute whatever new ones come along. The discord expressed in the
recent thread on this list suggests to me that the central norms of our
scientific culture are being shaken and perhaps driven to their knees. That is,
some on this list are asserting that the central norms of our science have no
privileged position. For example, when it is insisted that, on this list,
posters use a means of communication conventional to scientists (Norm #3 above,
including specifying one's reasons for a claim and using certain formalities of
expression), some replied that there are "alternate forms of expression" that
are equally appropriate. Well, in the culture of scientists, this is not the
case. Such responses by (apparently) trained scientists suggest to me that the
cultural norms of our discipline are now on a very shaky foundation. Perhaps
some places to look for reasons for this situation are the emergence of
postmodernist thought in psychology (e.g., the thinking of psychologists such
as Gergen and Cushman) and the "democratization" of higher education (which has
led to a large number of people from many different cultural backgrounds
entering academia).
I am becoming more concerned about this situation after seeing the apparently
easy acceptance of such ideas by people on this list.
Jeff Ricker
Scottsdale Community College
Scottsdale AZ
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
