#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Reporter: teor | Owner: teor Type: enhancement | Status: | needs_revision Priority: High | Milestone: Tor: | 0.2.9.x-final Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Severity: Normal | Resolution: Keywords: rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, | Actual Points: 13 TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- | group-8 | Parent ID: | Points: 6.5 Reviewer: dgoulet | Sponsor: -------------------------------------------------+------------------------- Changes (by teor):
* actualpoints: 11.5 => 13 Comment: I redesigned single onion service key poisoning for key files in the following commits: [feature-17178-v7 269b829] fixup! Allow the unit tests to pass a service list to rend_service_load_all_keys [feature-17178-v7 919c54c] Refactor the hidden service code to use rend_service_path [feature-17178-v7 6293a08] squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services Here's the description from that last commit: When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned (marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the hidden service directory. Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and anonymous if it does not. Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode if any existing keys are non-anonymous. Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive. Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys(). Next step is to add the ephemeral ADD_ONION case: * Flags must contain OnionServiceSingleHopMode when that option is set, and must not if it is not set. * This will need a control spec patch as well, see #20094. -- Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17178#comment:80> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/> The Tor Project: anonymity online _______________________________________________ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs