create a PR for the code point change on the RFC draft, will work on there: https://github.com/vasilvv/tls-alps/pull/15, thanks.
On Wednesday, January 24, 2024 at 1:55:56 PM UTC-5 Erik Anderson wrote: > Thanks, it will be helpful to make sure this is documented outside of > Chromium. I will also chat with some folks on Microsoft’s end that both own > server implementations and have more IETF experience to explore how we can > help with moving things forward. > > > > *From:* Victor Tan <victor...@chromium.org> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 24, 2024 9:00 AM > *To:* blink-dev <blink-dev@chromium.org> > *Cc:* Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org>; blink-dev < > blink-dev@chromium.org>; Erik Anderson <erik.ander...@microsoft.com>; > Chris Harrelson <chris...@chromium.org>; David Benjamin < > david...@chromium.org>; Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org>; Victor Tan < > victor...@chromium.org>; Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> > *Subject:* Re: [blink-dev] Re: Intent to Ship: New ALPS code point > > > > You don't often get email from victor...@chromium.org. Learn why this is > important <https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> > > Rick, thanks for question, I will create a PR on the ALPS RFC draft to > document the new code point regarding the early experiment. > > On Wednesday, January 24, 2024 at 11:15:39 AM UTC-5 Yoav Weiss wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 4:48 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote: > > Oof, I agree it's not good that the only documentation for the actual code > point value is in Chromium code - that's the sort of thing our blink I2S > process is supposed to prevent. In addition to confusion, there's also > potential IP-risk downsides to this. Our blink process is generally to > block shipping on the existence of some specification for everything > necessary for a compatible implementation in a forum that ensures IP > protection. While this isn't typically an adoption barrier for many > companies, I know it has been in the past for some (including Microsoft). > This doesn't mean we have to block on getting consensus in the "right" > standards venue, we can just do a monkey-patch spec in a venue like the > WICG, or an unlanded PR in a formal WG where the PR counts as an IP > contribution. Then we can ship it as an "incubation" while doing the > standards maturation work in parallel. Erik, can you comment on the extent > to which such incubation spec work would help with Microsoft adoption? > > > > Victor, is there any chance you can throw something together quickly (spec > PR or monkey-patch) that would cover the gaps in what's necessary for > compatible implementations? This particular delta seems very tiny and > straightforward to me, so I was originally thinking I'd just approve it. > But in principle I don't think we should be continuing to approve changes > to APIs which we realize are struggling with adoption due to the standards > work not quite being up to our I2S bar. > > > > +1 to defining these codepoints somewhere. Where are such codepoints > typically defined? I'd have assumed they'd go into one of the relevant > I-Ds.. > > > > > > Erik, thank you for your offer of help on the standardization front! It > definitely sounds to me like we should be pushing on the full standards > effort in parallel to this specific intent. Having Microsoft and Google > work together on that would hopefully be able to accelerate it. > > > > Rick > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 23, 2024 at 11:40 AM 'Victor Tan' via blink-dev < > blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: > > To be clarify, currently David is not working on the standardizing ALPS > feature. > > > > On Tuesday, January 23, 2024 at 11:27:41 AM UTC-5 Victor Tan wrote: > > Hi Erik, > > We are actively working on it, but we need to put more efforts to > standardization. > > In the last serval IETF, David is the only person is talking about the > ALPS feature. We'd glad to combine more efforts to move it forward to > standardization. > > > > Bests, > > Victor > > On Monday, January 22, 2024 at 5:24:25 PM UTC-5 Erik Anderson wrote: > > Is the ALPS draft being actively worked on? > > > > Various teams at Microsoft that own web sites leveraging client hints have > expressed interest in using it, but the lack of a finalized standard has > significantly slowed conversations with the teams that own the server code > that would need to add support first. > > > > Are you looking for help in moving standardization forward? > > > > *From:* Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) <yoav...@chromium.org> > *Sent:* Monday, January 22, 2024 7:39 AM > *To:* Victor Tan <vict...@chromium.org> > *Cc:* blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org>; Chris Harrelson < > chri...@chromium.org>; David Benjamin <davi...@chromium.org>; Mike Taylor > <mike...@chromium.org> > *Subject:* Re: [blink-dev] Re: Intent to Ship: New ALPS code point > > > > Is the old code point defined somewhere? Would it be possible to add such > a definition to one of the I-Ds? Or is this something that's not > traditionally defined in IETF drafts? > > > > On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 4:03 PM Victor Tan <vict...@chromium.org> wrote: > > Currently, It's on the code: > https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/include/openssl/tls1.h?pli=1#247 > > Once we standardize the ALPS RFC draft, we can finalize the value. Hope > this helps. > > On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 7:50:46 PM UTC-5 Chris Harrelson wrote: > > Thanks for clarifying. Last question: where in the specifications is the > new 17613 code point documented? > > > > On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at 12:59 PM Mike Taylor <mike...@chromium.org> wrote: > > In our OWNERS meeting this week, there was some confusion on what's being > proposed here (which is understandable, this isn't quite a typical intent > for web exposed feature). Here's a summary of what we're trying to > accomplish: > > 1) We shipped support for the ACCEPT_CH frame over h2 and h3 back in M96, > which relies on the TLS ALPS protocol extension. > 2) There are 2 parts to this: the client being able to understand > ALPS/ACCEPT_CH (and in return do something useful), and the server being > able to send it. > 3) Because of a (long fixed) bug present in Chromium's implementation, > it's risky for a server to send too much data via ACCEPT_CH, so it's > usefulness is potentially limited. > 4) In order to guarantee that older clients don't have this bug, we > propose to rev the version (aka, code point) at the protocol layer. This > way, if a server sends the new code point and the client understands it, it > can send a larger payload without triggering the bug (which may result in > sad things like a connection being refused). > 5) This is sort of web observable, but right now if servers that support > the old code point continue to send the old code point - nothing will > break. Chromium will support both for now, with hopes to deprecate and > remove the older one in the future when we're confident it won't result in > performance regressions for servers sending ACCEPT_CH (since this is a > performance optimization). > > I hope that helps clear it up, and I'm sure Victor or David will chime in > if I'm getting something wrong. :) > > And to be clear - this isn't a request for a deprecation or removal (yet), > but for shipping the new code point. > > On 1/17/24 11:16 AM, Victor Tan wrote: > > If the server received the new code point, while it doesn't support, the > ALPS extension will ignore. This also mean client might not know the > server's client hints preferences before the first request. Currently, only > few sites using the ALPS extension. As TLS extension is negotiated, the > server need to support both code points during the transition period, after > some time, the server can drop the old one. > > > > On Wednesday, January 17, 2024 at 11:00:13 AM UTC-5 Yoav Weiss wrote: > > On Saturday, January 13, 2024 at 12:08:33 AM UTC+1 Victor Tan wrote: > > *Contact emails* > > vict...@chromium.org, mike...@chromium.org, davi...@chromium.org > > > *Explainer* > > > https://github.com/WICG/client-hints-infrastructure/blob/main/reliability.md > > > > *Specification* > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-http-client-hint-reliability > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vvv-httpbis-alps > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vvv-tls-alps > > > > *Summary* > > Shipping a new code point (17613) for TLS ALPS extension to allow adding > more data in the ACCEPT_CH HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 frame. The ACCEPT_CH HTTP/2 > frame with the existing TLS ALPS extension code point (17513) had an > arithmetic overflow bug <https://crbug.com/1292069> in the Chrome ALPS > decoder. It limits the capability to add more than 128 bytes data (in > theory, the problem range is 128 bytes to 255 bytes) to the ACCEPT_CH > frame. With the new ALPS code point, we can fully mitigate the issue. > > > *Blink component* > > Blink>Network>ClientHints > <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component%3ABlink%3ENetwork%3EClientHints%2C&can=2> > > > *TAG review* > > https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/549 > > > *TAG review status* > > Closed > > > *Risks* > *Interoperability and Compatibility* > > This is switching to a new code point for the TLS ALPS extension. It won’t > change the design of ALPS and ACCEPT_CH mechanism implementation. The main > source of compatibility risk is that it causes conflicts with ALPS > negotiation since some clients could still use the old code point while > others are switching to use the new code point. The ALPS extension could > be ignored if the code point doesn’t match during negotiation, which means > the server's client hints preferences won’t be delivered in the ACCEPT_CH > HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 frame. We mitigate this by enabling servers to support > both code points, monitoring both code points usage and removing the old > ALPS code point support in a future intent once the usage is low enough. We > also split the rollout into two phases: we first start to enable the new > ALPS code point for ACCEPT_CH with HTTP/3 frame in a slow rollout, and > then eventually enable the new code point with HTTP/2 frame. > > > > Does the server have an indication if the client in question supports the > newer code point? > > If not, what would we expect servers that support the newer code point to > do? > > > > > > > > *Edge*: No signals > > *Firefox*: Pending > https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/510 > *Safari*: Pending > https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-April/031768.html > > *Web/Framework developers*: > https://twitter.com/Sawtaytoes/status/1369031447940526080 > https://twitter.com/_jayphelps/status/1369023028735148032 > > > > *Activation* > > The site’s TLS and HTTP serving application would need to be updated to > support this new code point. We aren’t aware of many sites using this > feature yet, however. > > > *Debuggability* > > No special DevTools support needed. The effects of the code point change > of ACCEPT_CH frame will be visible in the DevTools’ network tab. Also, the > NetLog will record the ACCEPT_CH frame value if TLS ALPS extension is > negotiated successfully. > > > *Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, > Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?* > > Yes > > > *Is this feature fully tested by **web-platform-tests* > <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> > *?* > > No, this feature is tested with browser-side tests. We can’t test > TLS-adjacent features currently through web-platform-tests. See this issue: > https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/issues/20159 > > > *Flag name* > > UseNewAlpsCodepointHttp2 > > UseNewAlpsCodepointQUIC > > > *Tracking bug* > > b/289087287 > > > *Launch bug* > > https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4299022 > > > *Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status* > https://chromestatus.com/feature/5149147365900288 > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/c704d985-a5cc-4e5e-99b0-1f78cc4428e6%40chromium.org > > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/c704d985-a5cc-4e5e-99b0-1f78cc4428e6%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAOmohSJQu%2BjtN9hQ302XVW1_Y1b8BUYQUDr4ujMavPU1vU7%2Bzw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAOmohSJQu%2BjtN9hQ302XVW1_Y1b8BUYQUDr4ujMavPU1vU7%2Bzw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/fbfcefbb-637e-428b-9ca2-3c879e2af1e2n%40chromium.org > > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/fbfcefbb-637e-428b-9ca2-3c879e2af1e2n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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