Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Shal Farley via dmarc-discuss
J.Gomez, > Is this ARC thing a mechanism to know when it is safe to ignore > the sender's DMARC policy of "p=reject"? It helps in judging that, but isn't complete by itself (you still need a reputation system for the intermediaries). > And if it is such, shouldn't it be part of the DMARC

Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Shal Farley via dmarc-discuss
Scott, > So the idea is that arbitrary data added from an untrusted sender > (unknown reputation) is sufficient to override DMARC p=reject? No, that isn't the idea at all. It is up to the receiving service to decide how to handle the ARC information, but the guidance is not to simply accept

Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Shal Farley via dmarc-discuss
Scott, > As described in the drafts, the ARC stamp is applied by the > intermediary, not the originator, so I don't think that works. Yes, but the intermediaries had to sign their ARC seal, and thereby identify themselves in a non-forgeable way. > Even if it did, it's still just another

Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Al Iverson via dmarc-discuss
On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:54 PM, Scott Kitterman via dmarc-discuss wrote: >>ARC should be helpful in that perhaps non-exotic situation. > > Could be. I certainly don't claim it's not potentially useful. My concern > is that it seems to be marketed as a solution to the

Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Roland Turner via dmarc-discuss
Shal wrote: > By allowing greater automation and accuracy in identifying > intermediaries ARC may benefit the little guys the most - you > won't as likely be lost in the noise because the receivers will > be more likely to track the reputation of each and every ARC > participant they receive

Re: [dmarc-discuss] A bit quiet?

2015-10-25 Thread Roland Turner via dmarc-discuss
Al Iverson wrote: > From my own perspective, I'm unclear on how well this will work. I > assume the chain process is based on addressing anything thrown at at > it; mailing list posts going through mail forwarding; ARC on both > would in theory keep authentication intact and prevent p=reject