Hello Lutz and William, I have used the certutil -J option to remove orphaned private keys from the NSS key database (in this case key3.db). I always make a tarball backup of the three NSS database files (cert8.db, key3.db, secmod.db) before performing the operation just in case something goes awry.
Example: #List private keys in NSS keystore certutil -K -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/ certutil: Checking token "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB" in slot "NSS FIPS 140-2 User Private Key Services" Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB": < 0> rsa ea4730830deb0dd40a7b2f6d4578a28132ae0251 NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB:Server-Cert < 1> rsa 0c7130b409a03ae2752b0cba6a6dc834d7d5dfb0 (orphan) #Remove the orphaned key using its keyid certutil -F -k 0c7130b409a03ae2752b0cba6a6dc834d7d5dfb0 -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/ Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB": ##List private keys again certutil -K -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/ certutil: Checking token "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB" in slot "NSS FIPS 140-2 User Private Key Services" Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB": < 0> rsa ea4730830deb0dd40a7b2f6d4578a28132ae0251 NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB:Server-Cert Thanks, Dave David Ritenour Senior Directory Engineer MartinFederal Consulting, LLC 513 Madison Street SE Huntsville, AL 35801 -----Original Message----- From: William Brown <william.br...@suse.com> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 7:02 PM To: Lutz Berger <lutz.ber...@multigrid.de> Cc: 389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org Subject: [389-users] Re: docker, 389ds/dirsrv:2.0, vendorVersion 2.1.0, ssca, certificate chain, orphan key, cert9.db, key4.db ** WARNING: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. > On 17 Mar 2022, at 20:50, Lutz Berger <lutz.ber...@multigrid.de> wrote: > > > On 16.03.22 23:39, William Brown wrote: >>>>> An orphan key doesn't look nice, but I am more worried about the >>>>> unnecessary stuff in the databases >>>>> >>>> So the orphan key is the "original" server-cert key that was orphaned >>>> since you loaded your own key. It's honestly harmless. Everything else >>>> appears to have imported correctly which is excellent! >>>> >>> OK, agreed. It is harmless, but also not needed. Usually, I choose to use >>> only one private key in my key3.db or key4.db. >>> My assumption was, that if I provide certificates in the tls >>> subdirectory, the ssca directory is not even used at all, since the key and >>> cert that are effectively used are stored in the config directory and its >>> databases. >>>>> and the failing openssl certificate validation. >>>>> >>>> We'll need to see the output of 'openssl -_client -connect >>>> url1.XXXXXX.de:3636 -showcerts' to see what is or isn't self signed in the >>>> chain. It could just simply be that your ROOTCA/ServerCA aren't trusted by >>>> your openssl install of the host. >>> Due to NDA I can't provide more details. But the problem is not >>> related to self-signed-certs as indicated by openssl's error messages, it's >>> really that I didn't properly specify rootCA/ServerCA. >>> >>> It works now with: >>> >>> cat XXXXXXROOTCA2015.crt > ./chain.crt cat XXXXXXServerCA2015.crt >> >>> ./chain.crt openssl s_client -connect ur1.sedevsso.XXXXXX.de:3636 >>> -CAfile <path>/ca/chain.crt : >>> >>> ... >>> ... >>> SSL handshake has read 4776 bytes and written 427 bytes >>> --- >>> New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 Server >>> public key is 2048 bit Secure Renegotiation IS supported >>> Compression: NONE >>> Expansion: NONE >>> No ALPN negotiated >>> SSL-Session: >>> Protocol : TLSv1.2 >>> Cipher : ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 >>> Session-ID: >>> 003BB677D15FC7C0490D3E795F193AB103D1E579D2F554086B63853DA9916525 >>> Session-ID-ctx: >>> Master-Key: >>> D050F13AD8343F825E4602F57BFFDB7BFBF38438E9ED497C9626F973C7772EC0D52C92B68E4BE087AF49C1DE4C2FB06A >>> Key-Arg : None >>> Krb5 Principal: None >>> PSK identity: None >>> PSK identity hint: None >>> Start Time: 1647338825 >>> Timeout : 300 (sec) >>> Verify return code: 0 (ok) >>> --- >> You should only need ROOTCA for -CA, since the chain will be presented by >> 389-ds itself as you have the chain on the server. Otherwise yep, sounds >> like you just need to ensure clients have the ca cert setup correctly. >> >> Happy to help! > > This is to confirm, that > > openssl s_client -connect ur1.XXXXXX.XXXXXX.de:3636 -CAfile > /root/389ds/tls/ca/XXXXXROOTCA2015.crt > > works. So, yes, only the root cert of a chain (and not the whole chain) is > needed for server-cert validation done by openssl. > > > You are the man, William! > Thank you so much. You are most welcome :) > > Still, I suggest to remove the ssca stuff, if a customer provides his own > cert chain. > Even if everything works properly, I think it's unnecessary to store the ssca > cert > and key in the databases. From a troubleshooting perspective it's a bit > misleading > in my opinion. Or is there a benefit of keeping it that I do not see? It's not that there is a benefit as much as "NSS makes it a complete pain" to remove keys. That's why I never really bothered to actually do it in these cases when we are loading in the data from PEM's :( -- Sincerely, William Brown Senior Software Engineer, Identity and Access Management SUSE Labs, Australia _______________________________________________ 389-users mailing list -- 389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to 389-users-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. 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