Hi Marco,
I'd like to ask you to help me understand the attack (>_<)
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01#section-3.2
> 3.2. Attack Example
>
> (snip)
>
> 2. The adversary picks a channel 'f*' at random, and monitors it for
> N_C consecutive slotframes to determine the timeslots in which
> the victim node communicates on that channel. Due to the usage
> property, the number of such timeslots is equal to the number of
> cells assigned to the victim node.
How does the adversary identify communication of the victim? It
assumes the adversary knows the EUI-64 address of the victim in
advance, or the adversary randomly picks out a victim node?
If the adversary attacks based on a target EUI-64 address, it seems
using EUI-16 (short) address which can be assigned through the join
process could mitigate the attack.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-09#section-10
I'm wondering how severe the attack is...
Best,
Yatch
On 12/17/2018 12:38 PM, Marco Tiloca wrote:
Hi all,
We have just submitted a new version of our draft describing how to
alter the communication pattern of network nodes to counteract selective
jamming.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
This update especially addresses the comments from IETF 103, by
clarifying the attack importance and the adversary model. Also, the
draft is now aligned with the CoJP Join Response from the latest minimal
security framework.
Comments are welcome!
Thanks,
/Marco
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2018 03:27:31 -0800
From: internet-dra...@ietf.org
To: Marco Tiloca <marco.til...@ri.se>, Gianluca Dini
<gianluca.d...@unipi.it>, Simon Duquennoy
<simon.duquen...@yanzinetworks.com>
A new version of I-D, draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Marco Tiloca and posted to the
IETF repository.
Name: draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling
Revision: 01
Title: Robust Scheduling against Selective Jamming in 6TiSCH Networks
Document date: 2018-12-17
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 15
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling/
Htmlized:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
Htmlized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling
Diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-tiloca-6tisch-robust-scheduling-01
Abstract:
This document defines a method to generate robust TSCH schedules in a
6TiSCH (IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4-2015) network, so as
to protect network nodes against selective jamming attack. Network
nodes independently compute the new schedule at each slotframe, by
altering the one originally available from 6top or alternative
protocols, while preserving a consistent and collision-free
communication pattern. This method can be added on top of the
minimal security framework for 6TiSCH.
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
The IETF Secretariat
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