Hi,
> The presentation has been posted here:
> http://srlabs.de/research/decrypting_gsm/
Just a quick note about the mitigation steps mentioned in TS44.006
(the 'random padding').
At least on my local networks this would have virtually no effect to
do only that.
The SI5 & SI5ter don't have any padding here so their content would be
known in anyway and they provide way enough plain text.
Randomizing the TA by +/-1, or randomizing the encoding of the BCCH
list, and randomizing the order of SI5/5ter/6 on SACCH would have more
effect. But that's still very limited (there is only so many way to
encode the same information), and would only slow down the attack a
little ...
Cheers,
Sylvain
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