N_U, N_V, E_V, Alg_V, Enc(K_VE; ID_V, Sig(V; Mac(K_VM; prot_2)))|
    | <---------------------------------------------------------------+
        |                             message_2                           |
            |
|
    |                                                                 |
        |    N_U, N_V, Enc(K_UE; ID_U, Sig(U; Mac(K_UM; prot_3)))

Why is N_U echoed back to U in message 2?
Why are N_U and N_V included in message 3?

If the nonce acts as a defense against off-path attacks, then at least
N_U does not need to be in message 3.  Including N_U in message 2 defends
an off-path attacker racing V to reply to message_1, which seems unlikely.


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-



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