Hi Cigdem, It seems I have let my todo list get the better of me once again :( On the grounds of "better late than never", more inline...
On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 08:24:07PM +0000, Cigdem Sengul wrote: > Hello Ben, > No worries. It's been a very busy period for me as well. > My responses are below. Thank you, as always, for your feedback. > > On Tue, Dec 7, 2021 at 8:14 PM Benjamin Kaduk <ka...@mit.edu> wrote: > > > Hi Cigdem, > > > > Oof, has it really been two months since you sent this? I am sorry to have > > let it linger for so long. > > > > I've gone through the published -13 and have a handful or two of comments > > left (which I will send separately), but let me just reply here to a few > > things first (inline). > > > > On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 03:23:12PM +0100, Cigdem Sengul wrote: > > > Hello Ben, > > > I thought I should comment on your original review to have the same order > > > you initially planned. > > > I went through all the comments, and our discussions of it. > > > The comparison with Editor's copy and github draft is here > > > < > > https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile.txt&url2=https://ace-wg.github.io/mqtt-tls-profile/draft-ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile.txt > > > > > > . > > > > > > In summary, I made the following changes: > > > (1) Kepts dtls profile informative (going through it, I brought all that > > > applied to this draft but kept out the ones that didn't apply). For > > that, I > > > introduced new sections that explains how we support TLS - PSK and RPK > > for > > > client authentication (2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2). Aimed to clarify all > > > TLS-related stuff e.g. added recommended references for using TLS in > > > constrained environments, followed the cipher suite requirements from > > these > > > references. > > > > I think I see what you're trying to do here, and it makes sense in a > > certain way ... but if I go and compare side-by-side the text we have here > > and what's in the DTLS profile, the DTLS profile goes into a lot more > > detail. In particular, the DTLS profile mentions some things that > > implementations need to do in order to avoid vulnerabilities, and I'm not > > sure that we want to go into so much detail in this document when it's > > already recorded elsewhere. I'm willing to let the document advance to > > IETF LC and IESG review with this part as-is (but will not be surprised if > > other reviewers raise the topic), but just wanted to check if there's a > > particular reason to want the DTLS profile to not be a normative reference. > > I think I don't understand that part of things very well, so to me there's > > not much harm in making it a normative reference -- maybe I'm missing > > something! > > > > [Cigdem: I wasn't sure if I could make DTLS profile normative when I was > using TLS, and then there were > a few MUSTs in the DTLS profile that I felt didn't apply. But, given there > is a new short draft that says the profile applies to TLS, > things are in a better place ( > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize/). (For what it's worth, I think it's entirely permissible to cherry-pick specific sections of a normative reference without pulling in the whole thing. That is, something like "for <this purpose>, follow the procedures of Section <X> of <reference>" would not make any dependency on sections other than <X>.) > However, I need input on the following issues before I revise to make DTLS > profile normative, and reorganise the > sections accordingly based on that change i.e., refer more to DTLS sections > in the newly introduced sections, > and shorten them. > > The DTLS profile expectedly talks about CoAp, CBOR, COSE (some examples > below). > Also, token expiration is handled differently with MQTT. > Can those be revised for MQTT-TLS profile? > "If the "ace_profile" parameter is present, it is set to "coap_dtls". > "This specification uses CBOR web tokens to convey claims within an access > token issued by the server." Yes, we can revise them. That would be something like "follow the procedures of [DTLS-PROFILE], with the exceptions that the 'ace_profile' parameter is set to 'mqtt_tls' and JSON Web Tokens can be used (CBOR Web Token can also be used)." > For PSK mode: > "The authorization server adds a "cnf" parameter to the access information > carrying a "COSE_Key" object that informs the client about the shared > secret that is to be used between the client and the resource server. If > the access token carries a symmetric key, the access > token MUST be encrypted using a "COSE_Encrypt0" structure (see section > 7.1 of [RFC8392])." > DTLS channel setup: > "To do so, it MUST create a "COSE_Key" structure with the "kid" that was > conveyed in the "rs_cnf" claim in the token response from > the authorization server and the key type "symmetric". Hmm, so this would have to discuss both the JOSE and COSE formulations... > Token expiration: > "As specified in Section 5.10.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the resource > server MUST notify the client with an error response with > code 4.01 (Unauthorized) for any long running request before terminating > the association." > (The error response for MQTT would be different.) That should be pretty straightforward to override, but yes. > Also, for PSK, > "If a resource server receives a ClientKeyExchange message that contains a > "psk_identity" with a length greater than zero, it MUST > parse the contents of the "psk_identity" field as CBOR data structure" > I think this is defined differently in TLS with pre_shared_key extension > etc. > ] pre_shared_key vs "psk_identity" is a TLS 1.2 vs 1.3 thing, rather than a DTLS-profile vs TLS+MQTT profile thing. We do let the token be transferred as a PSK identity, though, so maybe we can get away with a generic statement about "nonempty PSK identities in TLS are used to convey JWT or CWT tokens". > [SNIP] (It looks like this was all resolved; let me know if I missed something.) Sorry again for the slow reply. -Ben _______________________________________________ Ace mailing list Ace@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace