* Aaron Zauner <[email protected]> [08/05/2017 04:58:55] wrote: > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9173491/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9501595/ > https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/char/random.c#L745
BTW: current thinking by many in the Linux/FOSS community on entropy depletion and how the RNG in Linux works is impacted by an entirely misleading manpage (random(4)) that's been finally fixed recently: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=71211 it now says: ``` Usage The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient in all use cases, with the exception of applications which require randomness during early boot time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead, because it will block until the entropy pool is initialized. If a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below (all major Linux distributions have done this since 2000 at least), the output is cryptographically secure against attackers without local root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and perfectly adequate for network encryption session keys. Since reads from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to open it in nonblocking mode (or perform a read with timeout), and provide some sort of user notification if the desired entropy is not immediately available. ``` (http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/random.4.html) Aaron [off-topic: people tell me there's Riseup swag around these days, is it publicly available on-line somewhere? :)]
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